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PRECIS
Time past and time future are both contained in time present wrote T.S. Eliot. Therefore, in one 
sense, all time is always contained in time present through the influence on it of the past and its 
influence on the future and all time is therefore unredeemable. But in another sense altering the 
influence of the past and shaping the future - possible only in time present by redeeming the time, 
is a normative imperative. The normative imperative underlying this paper's analysis and proposals 
is restoring and re-empowering households and peoples devastated by war to redeem their 
livelihoods, their access to basic services and their participation in governance.
Historical R-R-R (Reconciliation, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction) have intellectually and in the 
North tended to be marginal offshoots of two, at least until recently, themselves marginal areas: 
Emergency Relief for Calamities (natural disasters) and alleviation (sic) or reduction of poverty. In 
the South they have tended to be crafted ad hoc in the crucible of crisis management during 
catastrophes (man - literally - made disasters). The consequences usually - especially in the North - 
include short termism (undue optimism on the scale and duration of strategic, policy and resource 
allocations required) and almost total micro or project focus - especially by IFI's and INGOs -  
while failing to integrate R-R-R into central macro economic strategy. That is somewhat like 
playing Hamlet without either the Prince of Denmark, Polonius or the late king's ghost. In most of 
the 50 odd post war or war countries with over 500 million people, Rehabilitation of livelihoods is 
strategically central in political economic and socio political terms especially, but not only, in those 
cases in which provinces or whole countries have had one third to one half livelihood destruction 
and human displacement often with comparable impact on infant and aged mortality, basic services 
provision, domestic food security, tax revenue and exports.
Rehabilitation is a process - not an event. While one can schematically locate countries along a 
continuum from survival (albeit even in survival relief substantial rehabilitation and planning for 
more is sometimes possible) to post R-R-R development (although even a single country is unlikely 
to reach that point for all districts at the same time). However, the process of rehabilitation is most 
unlikely to be one o f straight line progress along a broadening highway to a New Jerusalem of 
sustainable, continuous, poor person friendly development within a frame of economic good 
housekeeping and good governance. Some apparently promising roads will be dead ends, 
calamities (including terms of trade shocks and debt crises as well as droughts and floods) and
renewed catastrophes (at least partial return to armed violence) are likely - inevitable in respect to 
calamities. On the potentially positive side, the progress of rehabilitation is likely to open up new, 
unforeseen opportunities.
The processual nature o f rehabilitation, the near inevitability of setbacks, and the potential for new 
opportunities increase the need for strategic planning and for flexibility. Long term objectives are 
needed to avert being blown off course by crisis gales and to allow for goal efficient redeployment 
of resources when cutbacks are needed (or opportunities for additional high return initiatives arise.
Rehabilitation consists primarily a) of enabling households to restore livelihoods; b) of broadening 
access to basic services including law order and freedom from violence as well as health, 
education, water and extension services); c) of restoring local level infrastructure especially as to 
market access, basic services and local governance); d) of providing safety nets with special 
attention to food and water security to alleviate the initial impact of calamities and to facilitate 
rapid snap back of livelihoods after then and e) effective participation of households in governance 
- especially of rehabilitation - through local governance and domestic social actors (religious 
bodies, community organisations, women's groups, trade unions and domestic NGOs). The last 
requires local through national 'ownership' of rehabilitation with pre-planned phasing down of 
external government agency and INGO provision of leadership, personnel and resources in favour 
of domestic. While these conceptual and strategic generalisations are possible and useful they 
cannot constitute a rulebook for strategic sectoral or community programming because 
rehabilitation is very highly contextual. Even pairs of countries assumed to be similar - e.g. 
Mozambique and Angola; Somalia and Somaliland turn out to be very different in attainments and 
in prospects for rehabilitation (indeed for sufficient lulls in armed conflict even to attempt it in two 
cases) which rest on historic, resource course of war, governance and social factors which are in 
fact radically different. The 'COPE country' experiences - Sri Lanka, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Somalia and Somaliland - illustrate the importance of context. They also suggest that the 
pace and extent of rehabilitation is not inevitable - actors by households, communities, domestic 
social actors, war riven states and external actors can have substantial influence, for better or for 
worse (much worse in the cases of non-action in Rwanda in 1994 and intervention in Somalia in 
1 9 9 1 -9 4 ). Rehabilitation is not replication. What existed pre war was usually part o f the cause of 
the war and was rarely either poor household or female friendly. The fact of war has altered reality 
e.g. loss of livestock herds, increase in proportion of female headed households. Neither the world
economic systems parameters for poor countries nor best practice in - e.g. - primary health services 
have stood still during wars, especially as some arguably date back 40 (Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Eritrea, Angola) years with only ephemeral lulls. However, at least in its initial stages return home 
(often very literally) for up to or over 75% of displaced households and restoration of what has 
been lost in basic service access and local infrastructure/market access are central and can be 
checked by quick consultation with returnees and continuous residents. At that stage, the 
opportunity costs o f delay far outweigh those of marginal misallocations or misplaced priorities if 
(and only if) intended beneficiaries are brought into the decision informing process.
R-R-R interlock. Reconciliation and governance are usually seen as primarily political and 
rehabilitation as economic. However, participation and accessible deconcentrated and/or 
decentralised governance are crucial to cost efficient attainment of rehabilitation goals. Further the 
perceived legitimacy of governments for most people turns to a large extent on their ability to 
deliver law-order-safety, basic health and education, water and sometimes extension and market 
access. Capacity, as well as accountability (beginning with oral and numerical accounts) and 
participation, is crucial to sustainable reconciliation. Reconstruction of major infrastructural and of 
a direct production and finance enterprises is usually seen as macro economic and distinct from 
rehabilitation. This is not valid. Household shares in generating GDP, incomes above the poverty 
line, tax revenue, exports, food are frequently dominant and very rarely distinctly secondary. One 
purpose of major infrastructure is to support the household and small scale sector, just as a major 
market for many (not all) large directly productive enterprises and financial institutions is the rural 
household sector. Rational allocation is not possible unless rehabilitation is integrated into macro 
strategy.
Recommendations flow fairly directly from this analysis and these summary case studies.
1. Rehabilitation (and R-R-R) needs to be conceptualised and planned strategically at macro, 
sectoral, district/provincial and household (as well as sometimes cross border regional) levels 
and to be fully accepted as being central and medium term not short term and marginal;
2. While generalisations are possible and useful, they need to be tested against contextual reality if 
the sum of rehabilitation efforts are to be cost effective relative to goals set and, indeed, if goals 
relevant to and prioritised by intended beneficiaries are to be chosen;
3. The importance of context, the need for sustainability and the relatively transitory external 
interest in any particular post war rehabilitation point to the need for national 'ownership' with 
government strategic planning leadership and coordination of external as well as domestic 
actors. Ideally this should be the apex of similar coordination through deconcentrated national 
and decentralised local governance with substantial participation and accountability. That 
requires not just a reversal of the use of external programmes to substitute for (and in practice 
erode) states, domestic social actors and households in favour of INGO's and external agencies, 
but also strengthening local actors. An immediate acceptance of domestic (state, local 
government, domestic social actor and household) coordination and leadership with external 
actors complementary, supportive and participatory needs to be related to planned phasing over 
in respect to personnel, institutional and knowledge access and financial resources from 
external to domestic at all levels. Certain INGO's and agencies do act in this strategic 
approach, others give the impression (especially in sub-Saharan Africa) of prancing pro-consuls 
determined to perpetuate their leadership roles (if not necessarily their resource input).
4. Strategic medium term rehabilitation budgeting/planning is crucial to attaining positive results. 
One usually underestimated factor is the need for flexibility. Negative shocks (and usually 
positive opportunities) are perfectly predictable, but their timing and severity impact are not. 
Therefore both means to vire resources among programmes, contingency reserves built into 
budgets and/or pre negotiated lines of additional external resource inflows triggered by pre 
defined eventualities are needed - and to date very rarely present.
5. External debt service burdens on post war economies pose special problems. Rehabilitation 
cannot wait six years for low income heavily indebted country debt writedown qualification. 
Interim suspension of payments is in many cases likely to be crucial. By the same token to 
demand effective/participatory governance, full economic good housekeeping, restoration of 
basic services (including law-order-absence of violence) as a pre-condition for substantial 
rehabilitation aid is both common and a clear example of catch 22. Rehabilitation is a vital 
component to attaining the pre-conditions and cannot be financed on an adequate scale from 
domestic resources (with cases of their augmentation by huge - relative to GDP -Diaspora 
remittances for rehabilitation rare though not unknown).
iv
6. More data is needed. Conceptualisation may no longer be the primary area - if present practice 
catches up with generalisations now possible. Indeed because of the importance of context, 
more and deeper case studies may be a necessary condition for more valid and cutting edge 
conceptualisaton and generalisation as well as for better country strategic rehabilitation 
programmes. More baseline data - pre and post war - from household through macro levels 
plus more consultations with intended beneficiaries to inform decisions as to temporal and scale 
priorities are needed in virtually all post war countries as is more personnel and institutional 
capacity to iterate from macro through sectoral and provincial to local and household data and 
back relating concepts and generalisations to contextual realities and potentials at all levels.
As some - by no means all - o f the COPE cases illustrate, it is possible to go forward with 
rehabilitation, sometimes very impressively. The ultimate uses of research, data, programme 
decision and monitoring/review are basically applied - to assist households, communities, social 
actors and governance institutions to recapacitate themselves to recover that from which they have 
been dispossessed by war as a sustainable base from which to build.
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REHABILITATION: Toward Sustainable Peace and 
Reconciliation for Redevelopment
by Reginald Herbold Green
Development is about human beings. They need 
four things. First is water. It is the first thing 
needed to live. Without it a plant, an animal, 
or a baby dies. Second is food. Without enough 
of it, life is miserable and short. Third, once water 
and food are won is health - otherwise the human 
being becomes sick. Fourth is education, once a 
human being has water, food and health he needs to 
learn to open new horizons and unlock new possibilities. 
And there is a fifth - peace and order. Without these 
none of the four basic needs can be sustained
- Somali Elder 
Baidoa, 1995
The bird of time has but a little way to fly.
And lo, the bird is on the wing.
Omar Khaiyum
If you want to dismantle a hedge,
Remove one thornbush at a time.
- Somali Proverb
REHABILITATION: AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY1
Rehabilitation atter armed conflict (sub-national, national or transborder) is of increasing 
importance both in national rebuilding and in international cooperation policy and resource 
allocation. The reason is partly a rise in humanitarian concern, partly an increased realisation that 
lack of rehabilitation can result in or contribute to renewed conflict and partly the reality that over 
fifty countries - in all continents, slightly under half in sub-Saharan Africa - with over 500 million 
people have recently experienced or are in the throes of sub-national or national civil wars or of 
wars crossing national frontiers. If cases such as Mexico (Chiapas plus), Indonesia (beyond East 
Timor), Nigeria (Delta) and India (Kashmir) are included the total (including only directly affected 
regions) passes 600 million. On the narrower definition, the probable loss of life (including deaths 
resulting from war caused famine, dislocation and collapse of health - water - sanitary services) 
over the last two decades o f the 20lh century probably exceeds 10 million and the cumulative loss 
of output $200,000 million.2
Rehabilitation is part of a triad-Reconciliation among combatant or ex-combatant factions and 
those (often the majority) alienated from both (or all), Reconstruction of major infrastructure and 
production units and of macro economic sustainability and Rehabilitation of household 
livelihoods and access to basic services as well as to local infrastructure. The three R-R-R 
elements interact - reconciliation and religitimisation (or legitimisation) of governance are crucial 
to sustained rehabilitation as are major reconstruction works and macro economic viability. But, 
without ability to provide effective basic service and local infrastructure access, a government will 
find it hard to sustain - or even attain - legitimacy just as it will if most households are unable to 
regain decent livelihoods. Similarly a recovery based only on a few large unit enclaves, even if 
nominally economically sustainable, is unlikely to have a long political or social life expectancy.
While this study concentrates on post war rehabilitation, elements of rehabilitation can - and 
should - be incorporated into wartime survival oriented strategies3 and into programmes for 
less affected urban and rural areas during wars. In refugee/displaced person contexts camp self 
organisation for health, education water and child support programmes using camp members could 
be practiced more widely as could at least partial provisioning by small farming activities.4
I
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Rehabilitation - like other aspects of R-R-R is a process rather than an event. It is not - much as 
this might be desirable - a steady, unidirectional highroad because, while war to peace and abject 
devastation to modest rebuilt sufficiency are logically continua, setbacks from renewed outbreaks 
of violence, from other exogenous shocks (as varied as drought and terms of trade) and of policy 
and programme errors, causing slide backs as well as drives forward on the continua, are much 
more probable than stable peace building, benign physical and economic environmental climates 
and near perfect public and private decision taking in respect to rehabilitation/
Rehabilitation - like reconciliation and reconstruction - cannot usefully be read as simple 
replication of the pre war situation. At least in the civil or multi country regional cases,6 the pre 
war context almost always contained elements leading to rising lends of tension contribution to the 
outbreak of armed violence.7 Even when these were by no means purely or even dominantly 
economic, rehabilitation programmes may be able to increase cross group social capital through 
creating mutual economic or basic service interests8 and/or addressing livelihood and 
service/infrastructure access grievances. Further war creates two new contextual groups - female 
headed households (especially bereaved ones) many of whom have severe adult able bodied 
hands to mouths to feed ratio constraints, which need to be addressed if they are to climb out of 
absolute poverty and demobilised combatants who have often been desocialised and usually have 
few skills other than the use of weaponry and few assets other than tools of violence, implying that 
in the absence of programmes directly addressing their livelihood creation needs either armed 
banditry or renewed war or semi war outbreaks are likely.9
However, avoiding pure replication should not be interpreted as requiring a tabula rasa approach 
and the delays of totally reconceptualising and replanning as if nothing valid but existed before and 
been lost during war. For example:10
1. most refugees/displaced persons want to 'go home' (often very literally indeed);
2. most small farming households wish to resume farming and most urban or rural 
employees to get wage employment (whether formal or ‘informal’ again;
3. criticisms of pre war health, water, primary and continuing education, law and order, veterinary 
and (perhaps less uniformly) agricultural extension services are usually dominantly as to
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inadequate quality or quantity not disagreement as to their importance or demands for 
total reconceptualisation.
That suggests that first steps toward rehabilitation can use even limited baseline data plus quick 
consultation with intended beneficiaries to identify and to prioritise a substantial body of 
programmes and projects of types for which experience does exist.11
Conceptualisation, Literature, Practice12
Internationally, rehabilitation conceptualisation literature - and less uniformly practice - have 
grown up as offshoots of calamity (natural disaster) relief and reconstruction work, of conflict 
theory and - more recently - of poverty alleviation (relief) and reduction thinking. This history 
has led to distinct limitations and in particular to marginalisation into the relief/safety net and the 
micro/NGO categories with exclusion from central macro and sectoral policy and programming 
and from governmental strategic priority coordination.
Arguably it has had further - and also marginalising - consequences in:
a. inadequate examination o f interactions with other aspects of achieving an exit from armed 
conflict e.g. recreation of respected user-friendly police and protecting households from 
violence.
b. explaining how ex-combatants can be integrated/reintegrated into civilian livelihoods and 
social/community relationships;13
c. recognising the value of identifying elements which have worked in other emerging from 
conflicts settings - and why - but
d. avoiding simple generalisation14, even from multiple cases, because contextual (both historic 
and geographic as well as economic)'3 realities are complex, divergent and likely to offer both 
'bridge out' and 'no through road' signals for rehabilitation scenarios; as well as
e. generalisng somewhat facilely from one or two cases or causally ambiguous correlations.
Nationally conceptualisation has often been intuitive rather than formal and/or limited to 
identifying a set or shopping list of projects or programmes rather than a strategy. This situation is 
encouraged by external actor - not least the World Bank - failure to respond to strategic approaches
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putting war afflicted livelihood, basic service and infrastructure rehabilitation at the core o f 
political economic strategy from macro through local levels.16 There are exceptions - though only 
in Mozambique17 is there a single document outlining and quantifying rehabilitation strategy and 
that was simply ignored (more than head on rejected) by external funders. Ethiopia's diverse relief, 
reconstruction, basic services programmes arguably are an R-R-R strategic approach in a country in 
which most zones have not suffered serious physical destruction or massive war forced human 
displacement. Eritrea's centrally controlled strategy and practice for state creation and national 
reintegration does pay specific attention to reversing displacement and organising resettlement to 
improve livelihood - basic service access - infrastructure. Somaliland - because of its limited state 
resource base and lack of large official external flows (as a result of non-recognition) has focussed 
on recreating security (army-police-courts), political legitimacy (melding traditional and modern), 
basic service access (coordinating INGO, international agency, domestic social sector and state 
actors) and - as external support has become less constricted - infrastructure 
rehabilitation/reconstruction as a minimalist conceptualised strategy which is more evident in 
dialogue than documentation.
The influence of INGO's (international non-governmental organisations) on conceptualisation and 
practice has been substantial and less than wholly benign;
1. the link to calamity relief and rapid recovery from - e.g. - drought has limited recognition that 
rehabilitation can rarely proceed in a straight line or be viewed as a 1 to 2 year programme 
because exit from armed conflict is substantially different from exit from drought;
2. because INGO's before the 1980's worked largely with community level projects nominally 
phased for handover after a limited period, their particular orientations and skills are not ideal 
for strategic macro programming from national through local level nor with effective 
collaboration with, or acting primarily as support groups for, national or local government or 
for domestic social actors/civil society groups (e.g. churches, mosques, trade and farmers 
unions, women's groups and community or district associations);
3. as a direct result of the temporal urgency of disaster (armed conflict) relief work and the 
pervasive - albeit very uneven - weaknesses of central and local government and o f domestic 
social actors plus, perhaps, their own bureaucratic, social capital and partner procedures and 
preferences - INGO'S have been funded from the North as alternatives to, more than
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complements to or support groups for, domestic actors. However necessary this may be 
under conditions of chaos and extreme conflict18 it frequently corrodes, fragments and 
delegitimises domestic actors, prevents national R-R-R strategy and practice from being and 
being seen to be dominant and creates serious problems of disengagement if de facto INGO and 
aid agency parallel government structures outside domestic accountability and also of financial 
transparency are created, expanded and sustained.19
One clear problem - intellectually and for practitioners - is the limited interaction between postwar
political and social economic rebuilding and rehabilitation analysis and programming which is
largely weak on political rehabilitation conceptualisation and on links to conflict causation and
process'" and conflict theory and analysis which is less strong on past (or potentially post) war and
• • 2 1on the contribution o f economic and basic services programming in the transition to peace. To
99  • • 9*2some extent projects such as COPE and "Comprehending and Mastering Conflict" do move 
these two strands closer together. Whether they do so by synthesis or simply setting side by side 
may be more contentious.
Main Themes and Issues
As of 2000's end the intellectual and operational position in respect to Rehabilitation can be 
summarised relatively briefly:
a. the economic and political important of addressing the livelihoods of literally scores of millions 
in war ravaged economies in scores of countries is widely recognised, but
b. integration of rehabilitation into sectoral regional24 and macro economic strategy formulation 
and prioritisation is rare,
c. partly because the origins of attention to rehabilitation tend to treat it as a package of short 
term, micro safety nets under an emergency rubric not as a more central part of political 
economic renewal; and therefore
d. projects (whether in livelihood basic services or/and local infrastructure access) tend to be 
small, temporary add ons to central macro economic planning and policy, often contracted out 
to INGO's and other uncoordinated external actions;
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e. varied levels o f attention to attempted generalisations (sometimes either from one example or 
somewhat ambiguous empirical correlations) and to specific contextualities whether historical, 
social, political or/and economic; resulting in
f. a certain confusion as to the nature of substantive agreements and disagreements and to the 
applicability of conceputalisation in one context to another.2"
The main topics of this paper address ways forward from this relatively unsatisfactory 
(intellectually, let alone for persons emerging from conflict) position, which is nonetheless much 
less unsatisfactory than a decade ago when R-R-R received minimal intellectual or specific 
programming attention.
1. Rehabilitation as Process: Parameters and Interactions;
2. Main Elements in Postwar Rehabilitation;
3. Recurrent Themes and Issues;
4. Country Rehabilitation Heads, Vignettes, Panorama;
5. Flexibility and Margins: Managing Uncertainty.
followed by a brief resume of points and parameters with more than single country applicability.
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PARAMETERS AND LINKAGES: REHABILITATION AS PROCESS
Rehabilitation is a process (as are Reconciliation and Reconstruction) not a once for all event. It
is also a problematic process in that both setbacks in the decline/suspension/ending of armed 
violence and damaging external shocks (whether literally climatic - e.g. drought - or relating to 
economic climate - e.g. terms of trade, donor fashions) - are highly probable. Perhaps it would be 
more illuminating to describe it as processes in the plural -  over time and in different 
regions/districts/zones within one country and among countries at any one time.
Rehabilitation can - probably should under most circumstances - be a component during wars in 
programmes which are primarily survival support.26 In the first place there are frequently some 
major towns and rural areas not physically overwhelmed by war, but suffering from consequential 
economic (livelihood) and budgetary (basic services) indirect impact. In Mozambique after initial 
setbacks, mother and child care and primary education in urban areas were pushed beyond 1980 
levels and primary health care restored to them while water and sanitation coverage more or less 
kept pace with urban expansion. Livelihood rehabilitation/augmentation was less marked but 
opening of large peri urban green zone (allotment) areas and positive preference for women in 
respect of some allocation processes were important for nutrition (originally in own food grown, 
later indirectly via cash earned) levels of a not insignificant proportion of very poor households.27
Second, displaced person and refugee settlements do offer opportunities for maintaining at least 
some independent livelihood capacity and for largely displacee staffed basic service provision.
Most camps afford some opportunities for agricultural or artisinal production and some residents 
qualified to provide primary education, health services and basic pure water and sanitation 
facilities. The potential varies with camp location, general area security, stability of population and 
degree o f self organisation by residents (as well as of the goals of the internal leadership).28 In 
Angola and Zambia, SWAPO camps were highly organised in respect to basic service provision, 
artisinal production (including vehicle repair and small scale construction) and education to 
underpin and build beyond ongoing service and livelihood levels. Agricultural production was 
much less successful except when linked to child nutrition.
II
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The three reasons why rehabilitation has usually played a lower role than would have been possible 
and desirable in refugee/displacee contexts are:
1. relatively high bureaucratic concern with controlling rather than empowering 
displacees/refugees and frequently underestimation of their skill and organisational capacity;
2. lack of finance, UNHCR, WFP or governmental, to do more than provide minimal - or 
subminimal - food, shelter, water and basic medical care plus vaccination;
3. leaderships (whether in or outside the refugee/displacee groups) who have objectives and 
priorities quite different from Rehabilitation (or indeed Reconciliation).
Similarly Rehabilitation is likely to remain relevant to some zones and population groups well after 
the overall national political and social economic situation can no longer usefully be defined in 
terms of the post war. Arguably this is the case in much of both Uganda and Somaliland as of 
2000. In some zones peace and security came much later than in others (or remain elusive). For 
some groups - e.g. ex combatants 'warehoused' in the Somaliland armed forces beyond its 
estimated operational needs - re-entry into civilian livelihoods has proven exceedingly difficult 
whether for overall economic or retraining cost reasons.
However, the main thrust of this paper turns on the period after (or during a lull which it is hoped 
to extend and make permanent) war during which R-R-R are central to most households and 
geographic areas even if not necessarily to Gross Domestic Product/’0
Conditions Conducive To Full Scale Rehabilitation
Strategic components include:
1. cessation, full suspension or a substantial and relatively long lull in armed violence;
2. relative peace and stability interacting with the reemergence of credible law, order and justice 
systems as perceived by residents;
3. governmental priority to reducing proportions of households in absolute poverty and near 
absolute lack of access to basic services and local infrastructure combined with institutional, 
personnel and financial resources to act on that priority to give it credibility;31
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4. effective demobilisation ot ex combatants into functioning civil society and civilian economy 
contexts, not into banditry and poverty;
5. an ongoing process of reconciliation (usually multifaceted not simply between two 'sides');
6. a functioning macro economic strategy able to provide a framework within which reconciliation 
could be pursued (including rehabilitation of large scale infrastructure and production units);
7. limited calamities (natural shocks such as drought or flood as well as external economic 
debacles whether on terms o f trade or donor preferences as to countries or programmes) and 
catastrophes (reversion to armed violence over substantial areas) combined with at least basic 
'trampoline' type survival safety nets to allow households to snap back once the shocks had 
abated/2
These conditions are by no means absolute preconditions - the outlook for R-R-R would be 
very' bleak if all had to be met in advance or throughout the whole country in all sectors.
However, the more which are blatantly not met, the less likely emergence from war toward a 
process leading to peace. Once that process starts it can operate cumulatively with attainment of 
one condition facilitating advance on others. By the same token even relatively favourable initial 
conditions on several can erode rapidly if rehabilitation is not visibly begun and/or does not begin 
to produce visible (to war impacted households) results - not least the ability to 'go home' - within 
perhaps 18 to 24 months.
The type of preceding war and the nature of its conclusion appears to influence the climate for 
rehabilitation . A liberation war - from perceived colonial rule, e.g. Somaliland, Namibia , 
Mozambique to 1975) - combined with a serious effort to build legitimate government structures 
and political processes is probably the most favourable context. A post independence civil war 
ended by genuine mediation and a broadly accepted election may - e.g. Mozambique after 1992 - 
also create a relatively favourable context whereas an unresolved conflict (even if a formal 'peace
• • 33 •agreement' is nominally in place) - e.g. Sierra Leone, Somalia ' is very weak ground for 
Rehabilitation (not least because it is likely to be characterised both by repetitive outbursts of 
armed violence or worse and by near total absence of reconciliation).
Beyond this rather general parameter list - and in detail even within it - the conditions for and 
course of Rehabilitation processes is highly contextual. What is needed depends to a large part
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on what has been lost and is seen to be a priority for regaining as well as on what remains and 
can be used as a base for initial winning back.
Perceived history - which can diabolise but can also, perhaps more positively, gild portions o f the 
past - is highly relevant to how robust a context exists for rehabilitation as well as (more obviously) 
for reconciliation. For example the somewhat roseate vision of later colonial self governance 
public service and service provision model and hybrid parliamentary/elders system as recalled from 
the 1950's34 has been at the heart of rebuilding legitimacy and the operational as well as the 
symbolic and political aspects of governance in Somaliland.
Rehabilitation (like other not war/not peace and postwar processes) exists in time. The past 
necessarily informs the present - especially the perceived past even if'objectively' inaccurate. The 
present informs the future and believed perceptions of the future affect the present. Legitimate 
institutions and processes - especially those with historic legitimacy and renewed life (in a renewed 
or mutated form) from reconciliation - determine or at least influence what is possible how and 
how fast.
While rehabilitation - like reconciliation and governance - is a step by step iterative 'project' or 
process focusing on items identified as both high priority and high immediate possibility, an 
overall strategic frame or ' project' of medium term future goals is usually fairly crucial to 
mobilisation and to efficient deployment of resources. The caveat is that rehabilitation - both as 
to setbacks and as to unforeseen possibilities - is even more uncertain and in more need o f flexible 
implementation and programme revision than non-war economic and social planning and 
programming.
Initial Elements
What elements should have temporal priority in a rehabilitation process is in large measure a 
contextual question. However, four generalisations appear to hold widely:
1. because war leads to large scale displacement of people and because most (whether rural or 
urban)35 wish to return to approximately (or even literally) the places from which they have 
been forced to flee36 return home is usually a vital early step in rehabilitation. Until it happens
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rebuilding livelihoods and providing permanent (as opposed to camp) access to basic services 
is either impossible or small scale;
2. to be viable, return home requires security from violent interference with normal life
whether by rebels, border raiders, bandits, 'protecting' troops, police or officials operated with a 
security force (usually civilian police’7 except for combating formed rebels) and a primary 
court system which do have civilian credit-credibility;
3. building toward food security both in respect to physical supply and national balances and to 
household entitlements and food balances. Both the breadth (proportion) and depth (shortfall 
from minimum acceptable level) of food shortages in SSA are closely related to present and 
historic presence or absence of war.,s The direct (production) and indirect (entitlement) gains 
from peace, return home and perceived security can be large and rapid e.g. within 5 years of
1992 (Rome Agreements) Mozambique had regained national food balance in coarse grains and 
most returnees could feed themselves, while also selling some food (and/or industrial crops) 
thereby strengthening commerce, transport and urban production with consequent multiplier 
entitlement effects. Even in the predominantly pastoral economy of Somaliland small stock 
herd levels, sales and exports as well as crop production regained pre war (1985) levels by 5 or 
6 years after the 1991 victory over the Barre regime's occupation army even though substantial 
(but lesser and intermittent) insecurity was endemic in many pastoral areas until 1996;
4. basic services which were widely accessible34 and highly valued before the war are also likely 
to be high on returnees' demand lists/tests of the competence and legitimacy of the state. The 
most usual high priorities (in order) are primary health services, nearby water supplies for 
households (sometimes for livestock as well human use) and (perhaps less uniformly and with a 
slightly more relaxed time frame for restoration) primary education.
These heads meet the tests of rapid visible payoff to large numbers of households as perceived by 
them and are usually at least in large part attainable even within very tight resource constraints 
neither o f which holds true for Reconstruction of major infrastructure or large production units.40
The initial rehabilitation targets will usually be in large (even predominant) measure 
replacement/revival/renewal of what existed before, because that is how most war displaced 
people especially in rural areas, see return home, restoration of food security/entitlements and
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regaining access to basic services. They do wish to regain what was lost - and - if asked - can 
usually spell out what has been lost, which parts are most urgently needed back and what particular 
changes are seen as immediately needed. It is in subsequent processual steps (and even more in 
reconstruction and reconciliation)41 that changes and transformation diverging from pre war 
services and local infrastructure become more important.
This is not to say that certain new conditions -  often, e.g. up to 25% to 33% versus 5% prewar 
female headed households and the effective demise of the right of each adult woman to 1 use and on 
some male headed household allocation - may not require immediate attention. However, when 
they do, even a quick consultation process is likely to raise - if less likely to offer agreed 
approaches to - the relevant issues.
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DEEPENING, BROADENING, REVIEWING THE PROCESS
While it is important to begin Rehabilitation — and associated Reconciliation and Reconstruction - 
programming rapidly, it is desirable also to plot out tentative strategic targets and time scales. In 
principle - though not often in practice (with Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe partial 
exceptions), the R-R-R process, goals, sequences and dated targets can be mapped out before 
peace is won. If it is not done then, a similar exercise is appropriate parallel to initial action.
The intrinsic difficulties confronting such an exercise are twofold:
a. working through goals and means beyond and/or diverging from replication requires data 
collecting, analysis and pilot project testing which ranges from identifying and broadening 
national or regional best practice (especially in agriculture) through identification, 
screening, importation and adaptation of experience outside the country to approaches 
which may draw on varied experiences but are basically new departures. Coffee 
management (as to fertilisation, shade, inter-cropping, harvesting) can be an example of the 
first, micro-credit of the second and pastoral paramedical services of the third (albeit a half 
remembered precedent existed in Somaliland from the 1950's to late 1960's with a brief and 
partial revival in the early 1980's).
b. by definition postwar economies are not stable. In SSA and Asia most were very poor and 
fragile to start and are prone to climatic and exogenous economic shocks while having few 
resource margins (domestic or external) on which to draw to alleviate shock impact. 
Superimposed on that basic set of weakness and uncertainties which are exacerbated as to 
possible full or partial, national or district continuation or reemergence of armed violence.
The first set of uncertainties and limitations on national coping strategies apply to all poor countries 
but probably more to post, or emerging from war, areas which are initially particularly dependent 
on external financial resources, training capacity and - less uniformly - personnel.42 The second set 
are unique to them and probably more serious in a majority of cases, although in - e.g. - 
Mozambique the greatest obstacles to rehabilitation have been IMF constrictions on basic service 
provision even out o f grant aid, too large and intrusive an INGO rule, marginalisation in overall
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economic policy and investment by the World Bank and - in 1999/2000 - floods rather than 
continued or renewed armed conflict which has simply not happened.
The most complicated - conceptually and practically - cases are those in which war is self 
evidently still an ongoing process with no end in view but substantial areas are relatively
peaceful for extended periods and domestic civil society bodies capable o f acting in respect to 
agriculture and basic services exist. The central issues include:
1. whether attempted rehabilitation (and survival support) will exacerbate/elongate war because 
it is a fact of life and death that one cannot provide adequate food and medical care to civilian 
populations in war zones while the dominant armed forces in these zones go unfed and 
untreated.43 The case that it cannot be justified turns in particular on Interahamwe controlled 
camps in then Zaire over 1994-1996 which precipitated the Kabila-Rwanda-Uganda alliance to 
overthrow Mobuto and wipe out IH bases (only very partially successful on the latter head 
leading to the subsequent Rwanda-Burundi-Congo factions war against President Kabila's 
regime) and the Sudan. Southern Sudan’s Operation Lifeline Sudan, like the food aid to the 
North, is overwhelmingly survival relief in respect to food and medical services, so that it - like 
the IH camps - has not, to date, been primarily about Rehabilitation measures prolonging war 
but relief (survival) food doing so..44
2. what is practicable, where. Probably small farming household production, accessible 
relatively pure war (protected spring waterhole, shallow well, perhaps deep well or borehole) 
primary health care (vaccination, health education with prenatal, HIV, malaria emphasis, first 
aid, simple curative) and education (primary and in some contexts secondary) are the main 
components. These are likely to be feasible and to have relatively low sunk capital costs to be 
lost if active war zones shift and to have substantial rapid nutrition, health, education and social 
capital gains. Both the realities of operating in civil war zones and of expatriate costs in SSA 
suggest domestic civil society actors (community, and/or church or mosque linked in most 
cases) with some autonomy from military command structures4' are the likely best main 
delivery and design detail actors with INGO's in a technical, key professional and logistical 
(and usually financial) support role;
3. How sustainable are such partial rehabilitation efforts? How resilient in the face o f renewed 
conflict? How useful after the war? Probably the answers are intrinsically contextual and
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equally probably highly uncertain ex ante. In central Somalia substantial rehabilitation in and 
around Baidoa was achieved by several INGO's, WFP, domestic civil society actors, somewhat 
tenuous local governance service committees and UNICEF over 1992-1995. All were swept 
away overnight when General Aideed's forces conquered the town -  a risk the actors knew 
from the 1993 UN withdrawal. But in Somaliland a similar (perhaps more water centred) 
programme over 1992-1995 survived three violent uprisings (with all parties very careful not to 
damage water, health or education facilities). Similarly in 1992 the Mozambique government's 
giving priority not just to relief food but also to seeds, tools, medical supplies and reopening 
health posts and primary schools in Renamo controlled areas (largely under WFP, UNICEF and 
INGO flags, but often with seconded government personnel and always with high publicity) 
was perceived then as high risk, but probably helped create the suspension of disbelief and the 
patience needed for the interminably leisurely UN running of demobilisation and elections to be 
possible and to contribute to a positive result.
Rehabilitation - especially early on - is highly vulnerable to shocks other than (or in addition to) 
renewed conflict. Drought (e.g. in Somalia), flood (e.g. in Mozambique), terms of trade (e.g. in 
Rwanda) all have severe impact especially when food security/entitlements livelihood and reserves 
against calamities, local infrastructure and state resources have not recovered fully from war.
Optimally, calamities should be faced by maintaining core rehabilitation programme components 
and augmenting resource flows to reverse shock impact. For example WFP food sold to provide 
wages a) to entitle - say - flood afflicted households to food and b) to rebuild local transport, basic 
service and administrative infrastructure while sustaining the rural transport/commercial sector 
(which literal food for work would damage) is a near optimal approach in at least a range of 
circumstances. It is a trampoline safety net allowing farmers, the rural transport/commerce 
network and infrastructure to bounce back and is a route through which additional external 
resources may be mobiliseable.
But not all calamities offer such conceptually 'easy' answers or chances for damage limitation and 
rehabilitation protection. In Acholiland, Gulu town and three districts (especially Gulu and 
Kitgum) have been hit by the rare, lethal and panic inducing Ebola fever.46 Resources at both of 
Gulu's two hospitals (for 300,000 to 400,000 persons in the town, adjacent displaced camps and 
rural areas) are necessarily diverted to disease containment as are national level health resources -
augmented by WHO assistance. Return home is necessarily blocked to prevent spread o f the 
disease. Therefore food security and services build up (even beyond diverted resource impact) are 
largely suspended. In this and similar cases about the best that can be sought is to limit the period 
and extent o f the calamity setback, improve knowledge of user priorities for future rehabilitation 
(with the immediate side benefit of maintaining consultation/contact) and continue planning and 
mobilisation.
Rehabilitation and Reconciliation
Rehabilitation - even plus Reconciliation and Reconstruction - is not the whole of economic policy 
and praxis even though in post war contexts it should normally be a fully integrated, central set of 
themes in it. Therefore operation of a rehabilitation process does have implications for priorities in 
areas which are, in themselves Reconciliation, Reconstruction or Other:
a. Reconciliation includes restoring government's capacity - notably in security and basic 
service delivery. Therefore training personnel47 and restoring professional and para- 
professional wages from sub-poverty line levels48 are crucial to rehabilitation for reasons 
much broader than direct employment generation or public service poverty reduction;
b. local infrastructure and services do need provincial and national superstructure - most 
evidently in cases such as roads to highways but also health posts and clinics to rural to 
reference hospitals or primary schools to secondary and tertiary, not least teacher training - 
to be effective. Such projects are probably better categorised as reconstruction because 
they are larger, more specialised and inherently directly affecting limited numbers of people 
but a higher proportion of more trained personnel;
c. some categories of non-poor (and if rehabilitation succeeds modestly well off or more) 
households/enterprises’ ability to restore their economic roles are crucial to livelihood 
restoration/poverty reduction. If small family farming households do not have market 
access via rural traders/transporters they will remain poor. Therefore macro economic 
policy to ensure such businesses have credit access (e.g. commercial banks to finance 
inventories and hire purchase/leasing units to purchase transport equipment) is important,
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not via subsidised rates but by influencing financial institution policy and perhaps, by initial 
period partial loan loss guarantees.49
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COMPONENTS TOWARD REHABILITATION
The components o f a rehabilitation strategy are not particularly hard to set out in general terms. 
However, contextual differences mean that particular projects within broad categories, priorities, 
sequences and amount of analysis and consultation needed to identify micro content will vary 
widely, certainly among countries, sometimes among districts within a country and quite probably 
in a country over time (e.g. immediate prewar/several years on, and also after renewed violence or 
other setback).
Major components include:
1. livelihood rehabilitation;
2. restoration and enhancement/modernisation of basic service access (including law, order, 
justice and security);
3. local basic infrastructure repair - restoration - maintenance;
4. market access (on at least a minimally equitable and competitive basis);
5. parallel crisis support and snapback ('safety net' and 'trampoline') structures to alleviate and 
reverse impact of calamities and catastrophes;
6. overall macro economic ('adjustment'), micro and macro political (reconciliation) and 
large infrastructural and production unit restoration (reconstruction)
strategies/programmes/policies interacting with rehabilitation in a positive way and sustainable 
in their own terms as well as contributing to the sustainability of rehabilitation.
7. governance units capable of providing inputs into a/d (both financially and in respect to 
personnel);
8. involvement of local government units, civil society actors and intended programme 
beneficiaries in data collection, programme design, decision taking, on-going evaluation and 
review in parallel to involvement in mobilising human-physical-fmancial and organisational 
inputs;
IV
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9. relationships with external bodies (national governments, INGO's national bilateral and 
multilateral agency donor) which are conducive to rebuilding (not further dividing and 
eroding) local and national capacity;
Livelihood rehabilitation can be defined as enabling households to achieve incomes (including 
production used within the household) at or above the absolute poverty line.50 In the case of 
perhaps 70% of displaced households in both the past and future, livelihood is primarily small 
farming production possibly augmented by one or more urban or overseas working (and remitting) 
members and, more frequently in some but not all contexts seasonal wage labour in agriculture or 
construction/1 Urban livelihoods and their rehabilitation are more diverse, problematic and 
contextual with a majority likely to be informal and especially so called informal wage
S 2  • . . . .employment' and a significant minority artisinal producers or semi fixed (barrow or stall) place of 
business.
Support needs (and need to support) may vary by type of household. Demobilised combatants - 
especially if young - frequently have limited non violent skills or social capital and experience but 
the potential for being very dangerous if not reintegrated into civil society and the civilian 
economy. What is appropriate varies, but the needs are special enough, and the risks of not 
meeting them high enough, to justify particular analysis and resource allocation (including training 
programmes as well as tools - urban or rural - for demobilisees). Returnees from exile or 
displacement are almost always the majority of war impoverished households. The special need of 
'going home' has been addressed above.
Female headed households are likely to have two types of special needs:
a. bad productive ratios of able bodied hands to hungry mouths because - unlike male headed 
households - they usually have only one able bodied adult earner;
b. specific cultural - economic problems which may include, e.g., access to land use rights, to 
drought animals for ploughing (likely to be especially important to such households because of 
'a'), to knowledge of how to manage large stock (sheep, goats and above) which - especially in 
SSA - usually falls on the male (including boys) side of the gender division of labour.
Traumatised, physically or mentally partially or fully disabled and/or isolated (as orphans or 
old persons) individuals require particular programmes. Their present livelihood generation
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capacity is likely to be low, but except for the severely disabled and the aged, recovery is possible. 
The first step however (humanly and economically) is treatment (which includes even semi trained 
'tender loving care in community') and integration into an economically viable household unit, 
whether their original one or a (usually related) successor. '13 In the case of orphans the largest 
numbers in SSA may be HIV/AIDS not war orphans but the needs and programmatic implications 
are largely the sam e/4
Identification specifically on the basis of pre war below poverty line income is not self evidently 
useful unless to highlight clusters of causal factors - e.g. no negligible access to land and/or - in 
pastoral districts - core livestock to set up a herd. A literal and formalistic policy to seek to restore 
livelihoods only to pre war levels of livelihood would raise serious ethical and political problems 
with no very evident likelihood of positive economic efficiency tradeoff gains.
Basic services in the context of rehabilitation virtually always include:
1. law, order, peace, security and justice as perceived by ordinary households.
2. access to nearby relatively pure water - household which may include livestock and small plot 
irrigation depending on their economic system;
3. preventative, educational (not least in respect to HIV and malaria as well as mother and child), 
first aid and simple curative health services;”
4. primary and frequently applied adult, education.
Agricultural extension and veterinary services appear as priorities in some areas, but not all - 
apparently depending on pre war coverage and perceived usefulness of such services.
The short list is not definitive in the sense that frequently some districts or portions o f districts will 
have special priorities which are genuinely key to them, but are not relevant to other areas e.g. 
baboon and crocodile control (to protect endangered crops and children respectively). Flood 
control (more accurately perhaps preemptive flood damage limitation) is also highly specific (e.g. 
deltas) possible priority.
The particular form of service needed/desired may vary and have extensive - not always self 
evident - ramifications. An example is draught power (whether oxen or donkeys - a choice related 
to heaviness or lightness of soil):
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a. in some districts and sub-districts it has been widely used and is usually a war casualty since 
draught animals can provide military or bandit transport, food and loot (or refugee transport, 
food and survival assets);
b. the patterns of use are peculiar, apparently relating to historical presence of dedicated 
veterinary/agricultural staff and successful initial users more than to ecological or crop pattern 
divergences;
c. both draught animals and their users (at least for ploughing) require significant specialist 
training courses;
d. the cost of draught animals and ploughs (plus carts if used for transporting goods) is substantial 
- massive for very poor, war ravaged returnees;
e. women headed households in principle are in most need of draught power to plough because of 
limited adult hand power, but in practice animal drawn ploughing has historically usually been 
virtually entirely on the male side of the gender division of labour.
The operational implications include:
1. recovering (whether from agricultural district records or interviews with farmers) baseline data
on whether? how commonly? for what? how trained? who used?
2. determining whether in terms of benefit/cost tradeoffs, support for reintroduction of draught
animals would be an efficient use of scarce resources and, if so, how they (plus ploughs, carts) 
could be made accessible to poor households and, in particular, female headed ones;
3. identifying personnel, promotion and training issues.
In many post war rehabilitation contexts, draught power will not be a priority issue. In Acholiland 
both some officials and politicians and some researchers and small farming households believe that 
it is?6 Pre war 50,000 draught animals were estimated to be in service in Gulu and Kitgum 
Districts i.e. about one per five households which would imply up to half the agricultural land 
could have been ploughed by them. However, coverage appears to have been patchy. The heavy 
black cotton soil o f the two districts is unsuitable for hand hoeing, suggesting reintroduction should 
be economically viable - and a potential breakthrough for 'best local known practice' focussed
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agricultural extension. Oxen cost perhaps $1,000 each. Women rarely ploughed. At most 1,500 - 
2,500 oxen have survived.
That is not enough data to act, but it is enough to suggest guidelines for consultation (especially 
with would be/returnee small farm households), data refining, training and access (e.g. 3 to 5 
women 'user teams') conceptualisation, and funds plus personnel (plus oxen) mobilisation if prior 
steps yield positive answers.
This example is not only not intended to imply animal draught power is central in all or most 
rehabilitation contexts but also not to conclude that it should/can be a top priority in Acholiland. 
Rather it serves to illustrate contextual diversity and multiple interacting issues within an 
apparently simple (or perhaps pair of) basic services - agricultural veterinary support - and to 
exemplify identifying an issue for urgent study and a study process capable o f leading to a quick, 
informed decision.
Local basic infrastructure repair, reconstruction will usually need to focus on roads - bridges - 
culverts, health posts and clinics, primary schools, wells and other local and small town 
waterworks plus police stations and other local level governmental buildings. In some cases other 
facilities, e.g. small scale irrigation will also be key. These facilities/infrastructures are usually 
heavily debilitated by lack of maintenance during confict, as well as, or more than - by war time 
attacks.
The risk is usually not so much in repairing/rebuilding rapidly to previous standards in previous 
locations. That is broadly correct if most people go home. Even raising size and numbers of 
facilities to increase access can often be determined to be a priority after quite brief consultations. 
Rather it lies in long initial delays - hampering livelihood recovery and basic service access 
restoration - followed by over enthusiastic upgrading. Both result in draining basic services 
including infrastructure maintenance - resources' and creating a serious recurrent/captal budget 
imbalance.
There is a significant interaction between Rehabilitation of local infrastructure and national 
infrastructure Reconstruction. The latter poses more need for detailed analysis and more cases 
for altering pre war patterns, e.g. in Mozambique only the three main rail lines from Maputo, Beira 
and Ncala would appear to have strong cases for reconstruction. In the case of the Nampula -
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Lichinga link there is little case for long term continued use. Unless a major coal development at 
Moatize justifies a line to a new deep water port (not Beira), with links to Beira and Malawi where 
it intersects existing lines, reconstruction of the Zambesi delta -  Malawi -  Moatize line is not on. 
Beyond a highway replacing the Nampula-Lichinga rail line, the key highway questions in 
Mozambique do not concern the broad national/provincial highway net but what standards and 
what maintenance strategies are appropriate.58
It is not self evident 'old' basic transport infrastructures were usually inappropriate even if most 
main routes linked to the main ports. SSA does need to engage more, not less, intensively in 
international trade, e.g. The 1980's Somaliland highway grid was T shaped with the perpendicular 
stroke Berbera-Hargeisa and the horizontal the Boramo (Ethiopian Frontier) -Flargeisa - Ethiopian 
branch to Jijiga - Burao - Erigavo/Las Anod-Somalia route. These broadly follow several century 
old caravan routes: an Ethiopian Highlands to Red Sea trade route and an internal (and trade route 
feeder) one linking most of Somaliland's towns and productive rural areas. The ongoing, largely 
EU (and EU member state) financed, bridge, culvert and other repairs especially on the two routes 
to Ethiopia (Addis and Djijiga respectively) does relate positively to the needs of livelihood 
rehabilitation and local infrastructure utilisation as well as to macro commercial and financial (and 
Ethiopian famine prevention/alleviation as well as international trade) concerns.^9
The main purpose of transport and communications restoration is to rehabilitate market access and 
thus livelihood beyond basic food security. That purpose requires a rehabilitated rural trading 
network linking food, raw material and labour flows to towns; return flows of processed and 
manufactured goods and both inter and intra district rural trade. The overriding issue is not 
public versus private sector but rather small farming household access to reasonably fair 
price buyers/sellers. That may well usually be met better by relatively competitive private (or 
private and voluntary co-op) traders than by state crop purchasing and consumer goods trading 
corporations. Similarly the issue is not one of subsidising merchants but of ensuring (which may 
require initial state guarantees to commercial banks or participation in joint venture leasing/hire 
purchase companies) that enterprises do have access to credit for vehicles and working capital 
(inventories).
Crisis (especially food crisis) safety nets are an important part of sustaining rehabilitation. 
Droughts and floods are not suspended because hostilities are. Even low level attacks can rupture
fragile market networks in the process of rehabilitation. During farm rehabilitation outside income 
from work for (cash for) food projects may often be needed. Food/food aid requirements certainly 
last at least until the end of the first complete crop cycle after war and are likely to be renewed at 
one or more points during the rehabilitation process by exogenous events.
Economic Good Housekeeping And Rehabilitation
None of the forgoing denies the necessity of macro economic good housekeeping ('structural 
adjustment' or 'prudence with a purpose' to use alternative presentational styles). Fiscal, price, 
foreign exchange imbalances need to be held to sustainable levels; incentives (not least peace, law 
and order) provided for large as well as small businessmen; large scale strategic infrastructure and 
enterprises reconstructed and/or pioneered (by both public and private sectors). Without this macro 
context, livelihoods/basic human need costs imbalances will remain unsustainable, basic service 
access will stagnate and rehabilitation will stall or disintegrate. That, however, is an 
interface/background issue rather than a part of rehabilitation operational programming.
To act on the previously noted elements of rehabilitation requires several aspects of governance 
(largely rather boring and tedious ones) be strengthened. Whatever may remain at the time of 
peace it rarely includes robust, decentralised civil governance with a high capacity to deliver basic 
services and infrastructure, to analyse in order to determine a policy set which will enhance 
livelihood and rural/small town market network recovery or to collect data and insites and interact 
in decision taking, resource mobilisation and programme management with domestic civil society 
actors. Therefore - because these capacities are crucial to R-R-R and turn largely on government 
financing, staffing, training and openness to participation and to coordination - their recreation 
(or creation60 is central to rehabilitation. Because ability to deliver is a (perhaps often the) 
major test of legitimacy, these capacity aspects of governance - however a political, technical or 
micro they may seem at first glance - are crucial to maintaining political legitimacy and sustaining 
reconciliation.
Involvement of local government, communities, civil society bodies and domestic NGO's in data 
collection, decision taking and implementation for mobilisation, social capital and efficiency of
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resource use is important to speed and efficiency o f resource allocation and use as well as 'political' 
reasons.
The strategy tor external actor relations needs to be national. But without local capacity to 
interact/negotiate with INGO's and to present proposals or data to go into them for presentation to 
bilateral donors and international agencies no such self determination, self respect and honest 
negotiation strategy can work in a way which is user friendly for poor households in general or 
those returning from war displacement in particular.
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RECURRENT ISSUES 
R-R-R cannot be reduced to R as in Replication for several reasons:
1. flaws in what existed before the war are likely to have contributed to it;
2. war by its nature creates new facts which R-R-R must face - e.g. a qualitative as well as 
quantitative increase in female headed households;
3. certain groups e.g. rank and file combattants and entrepreneurs who have adjusted to war 
contexts will often (not always) lose from peace unless attention is given and support (e.g.
training, credit access) provided for their rebasing their livelihoods in an economy of peace;
4. the world's structural shifts are not halted during war - e.g. the explosive post 1975 rise of 
HIV and post mid 1980's resurgence of malaria as well as the refocusing of health services on 
decentralised primary units with more emphasis on education, prevention (including 
vaccination), mother and child care mean that, while rehabilitation in Mozambique can build 
from 1975-80 strategy and praxis, health sector rehabilitation in e.g. Somaliland, Rwanda, 
Ethiopia or even Acholiland (where the suspension of positive change dates back to 1970) 
would be ill advised to replicate, and have not done so.
5. certain issues by their nature are integral to war and its settlement including e.g. justice, 
amnesty, forgiveness and peace.
Resource Access - Land
Access to resources is central to livelihood rehabilitation. Similarly in respect to governmental 
institutions, to basic service and infrastructure and, in respect to enterprises beyond household 
level, to market and general productive/trading/transport economy recovery. The central resources 
for most displaced persons in most post war contexts is land. This is most true for the usually rural 
60%-80%, but may also apply to urban displacees who do need secure residence or business sites. 
However, land is not the only relevant resource. Basic services and market access can be 
considered resources, but have been treated above. Others are input access (e.g. tools, seeds, 
cutlasses, artisinal raw materials) and credit access.
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V
Whatever the pre war access to resources system, it is most unlikely to have been poor person 
friendly. This feature means pure replication in all respects would probably increase inequality, 
render wartime loss o f resources likely to be permanent (e.g. land grabbing) and - because almost 
all returnee households are absolutely poor - discriminate against war afflicted households.
Peri urban land is frequently the most confused as to status and the least secure because both 
agricultural historic usehold right holders and government units claim title while actual occupiers 
have frequently settled on ill delineated plots with dubious and ill documented transfers (or terms 
and conditions of continued use) from either. The need for security of use in these areas suggest 
either documented 39 year (or longer) transferable leasehold to demarcated plots or similar freehold 
together with programming orderly basic service extension (at least to the extent of keeping plots 
and access routes for them clear - e.g. something a typical Makonde concentric circle village layout 
in a peri urban neighbourhood does not do whether its incomers are ordinary migrants or war 
displaced persons).
Access to land is partly contextual - urban (usually freehold and relatively clearly and stably 
demarcated pre war) is different from rural which varies with the nature of the pre war system (e.g. 
historic household secure usehold vs individual freehold) and how well - for whom - it worked pre 
war.
In the urban context, returnee claims in land/improvements should be clarifiable and the return of 
property should usually be practicable. The problems arise if:
a. settlement o f claims of elites who fled (e.g. from Mozambique) comes long after reallocation 
and a substantial number of low income households would be negatively affected;
b. the returnees (as in Rwanda) are associated with (even if not necessarily part of) the losers of a 
civil war and those occupying the property are associated with the winners and are themselves 
returnees from an earlier body of refugees.61
Rural land is usually held either on a freehold basis, on an historic secure household usehold 
tenure basis or on a mix of both. Mix cases may or may not demarcate clearly between freehold 
and historic tenure and may or may not record both types of rights. If they do not, as in 
Mozambique's largely unreformed Portuguese imperial registration system designed to facilitate
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land grabbing, very serious risks arise for historic tenure holders especially if they return after 
absence, the standard case of refugees and internally displaced households coming home.
The issue of secure, hereditable, leaseable usehold versus freehold has little to do with security of 
return, of rehabilitation of livelihoods or of access for female headed households. For none is it 
either a necessary or a sufficient condition. Freehold may increase small farming household 
security of tenure (or via debt accumulation the reverse), may increase ability to borrow (implying 
rather foolish banks in many contexts) and/or incentivate higher productivity albeit why, unless 
prior usehold tenure was insecure and/or credit on crops not well developed, is unclear. However, 
the enormous personnel, educational and institutional capacity requirements o f transition to 
freehold suggest it is better put further down the phasing list and probably after the rehabilitation 
process has largely run its course.
What is key - and urgent - is to record both freehold and historic titles, to set up procedures 
that prevent one encroaching on the other, to record historic rules and processes to allow central 
and local government to relate to them and to avoid assuming that any land is 'vacant' until after 
return to prevent opportunistic land grabbing. A particular additional problem may arise - as it has 
in Guinea-Bissau in a pre or inter war context - if long rotation (so called 'shifting cultivation') is 
practiced with apparently vacant lands those fallow/reforesting prior to rotating back into use. The 
issue of equal access for female headed households - which often, not always, needs adjustment of 
the existing versions of historic systems - is treated below.
Return may not lead to serious conflict. One positive example is Mozambique historic tenure 
areas. There the basic conflicts are freehold encroachment on historic tenure land and returnee self 
resettlement on long abandoned - often up to 10-15 years - freehold land in their home districts.62 
In the historic tenure areas about 10,000,000 people in 2,000,000 households have gone home from 
refugee, internally displaced or pauperised/hiding in old home areas status. These include 
8,000,000 - 9,000,000 small farming sector persons. The number of serious conflicts have been 
low with sustained, wide reaching violence apparently unknown. Returnees and elders have been 
able either to identify which household (often by inheritance from a war dead prior designated 
holder) had a right to which land or/and which household had valid claims for how much/how good 
alternative or new land. This process was usually facilitated by District and Provincial 
governments, but carried out by the households and their representatives, especially elders.
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Another positive case is Somaliland. Pastoral land (and water) use rights on return from 1991 have 
not led to more quarrels than usual and none (at least in respect to pastoral rights per se as opposed 
to 'rent' due tor their use tor an airport or port) of them violent or large scale despite (as in 
Mozambique) over 50% wartime displacements.
In Somaliland agro-pastoral areas recorded titles have existed since the post war British period. 
Again return has not led to a higher or more violent level of quarrels even though a number of 
holders are Somalians who came in and got title during the Barre regime. When a satellite based 
cadastral survey was launched it was welcomed.6’ In fact so eager to know exact boundaries and to 
receive updated certificates were the household heads that they quickly compromised cross 
claims.64 The macro goal was to avert agro pastoral encroachment on neighbouring pastoral areas 
partly because this would threaten drought year fallback grazing capacity and partly because it 
would in some cases lead to servious inter lineage group and sub clan conflict.
Uganda which had a semi registered/semi historic title system in Acholiland has adopted freehold 
registration nationally but - partly because of the very real risk better educated, better connected 
Kampalans can come up faster with 'better' papers than actual displaced historic users - has 
deferred its application.66 That should allow local government and elders time both to sort quarrels 
on return and to address the female headed household issue (to avert all freehold in practice going 
to men and extinguishing women's traditional rights on household land held in a male name).
In Mozambique the risk - general to parallel historic theme/freehold systems as, e.g., in the 
Philippines - is that continued allocation of titles (including 'concessions' which by giving all or one 
crop marketing monopolies to concessionaires positively cry out that they are unconstitutionally 
abrogating historic 'secure' small farming household use rights!) with no reference to prior 
occupation, not disputes over or reallocation of historic tenure, is the basic land law obstacle to 
sustaining the success of returning home. This is all the more true because it is a visible symbol of 
a belief (belied by output, food supply and export figures) that only large farms and foreign farm 
operators could be productive. That myth runs for over 500 years from Portuguese prazeiros, 
plantation and settler farmers through independence era state farms to sustain abandoned 
Portuguese unit production and to introduce large scale irrigation and support for -in British 
colonial policy terms - 'yeoman farmers’ and replacement estate operators to the present search for 
'good' South African farmers eager to leave the 'Rainbow Nation' and set up on 'virgin soil' in
Mozambique. While there have been successes - at least in production - in general the history has 
been one of violence, insecurity for small farming households, mediocre output trends and much 
social and political grief.66 On the face of it return home/rehabilitation are a time to suspend 
not replicate or seek to transform such 'modernisation'.
Resource Access: Tools, Food Inputs
Seeds, tools and, in many cases, livestock access are crucial to livelihood recovery as is food 
'working capital' for the rehabilitation of land and housing and awaiting first crop harvest period 
after return home. Beyond highlighting the need there is not too much cross country generalisation 
can offer beyond the warning that contexts vary widely.
Seed-tool-food 'packages' should logically be provided in areas of return - if these can in practice 
be pre-identified and distribution nets set up. Who distributes (INGO's, local government, central 
government, WFP, UNHCR) matters less. Second best is provision of'packages' in refugee and 
displaced person camps/settlements before return. In this variant, structures for identification and 
delivery exist but coverage is likely to be very incomplete (self or family - community help 
refugees and displaced persons are in practice excluded) and the 9-15 months likely food needs to 
first harvest are hardly best provided in a single 'package'. Loans are unsuitable - primarily for 
administrative reasons in respect to recovery
Food access is in fact a larger and longer lasting challenge than that of seeds and tools. Usually - 
at least if  the war period and displacement exceeded 18 months - 9 to 15 months are needed to 
reclaim (e.g. re-clear, re-drain) land, restore housing, plant, tend and achieve (drought and flood 
permitting) a harvest. In the case of plantations this is comprised in labour cost (wages) and treated 
as investment in fixed asset restoration. The same logic applies to 'return home'. The households - 
on return very rarely have the 'entitlements' to secure food (nor - less uniformly - close household 
members earning elsewhere and remitting). The logical general solution is work for cash to buy 
food (e.g. via WFP and ILO guided labour intensive small to medium scale construction/civil 
engineering) to restore food entitlements, local infrastructure and the rural commerce/transport 
network.
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In practice, because such logical solutions have proven very hard to get in place in time, the actual 
system is 'phased return'. Refugees/displaced persons remain on camp registers but most able 
bodied, adult household members go home to reclaim land/rebuild houses/plant crops while 
returning monthly to pick up rations collected by wives and children staying on in camp/’7 That 
practice is not fraud, but a sensible way of coping with slow, rigid bureaucracy to secure the means 
to restore livelihood bases.68
Analogous issues can arise for artisans and - as noted earlier - rural commercial operators. These 
are quite context specific. Urban artisans may or may not have had to sell their tools, demobilisees 
graduating from training courses presumably need tool kits to benefit. On the face of it local 
government or domestic social actor operated identification of beneficiaries and grants of tools 
would seem appropriate as the administration (including personnel and institutional) costs of tiny 
loan collection outweigh plausible benefits and local level actors can probably identify appropriate 
recipients. In practice few such programmes have been mounted in post war rehabilitation contexts 
though they do exist with some results in non war contexts - e.g. in Tanzania linked to vocational 
education.
Livestock access is often an intractable issue in contexts in which pastoral income was dominant 
pre war and most of the herds failed to survive requisition, theft, disease and displacement. 
Community/lineage mutual insurance schemes break down when loss levels are over 50% (perhaps 
over 25%). Viable sources of replacement livestock may be hard or impossible to identify and tap.
Somaliland's66 1991-99 success in near total restoration of sheep and goat and - probably - 75% 
plus of cattle and camel herds is not widely replicable:
a. a significant proportion of flocks and herds had been safeguarded in exile in Ethiopia;
b. kinship mutual insurance systems were strong;
c. sheep and goats breed much faster than cattle allowing shorter flock than herd recovery cycles;
d. diaspora remittances provided many households the cash to buy (or not to sell during recovery 
period) cattle and in Ethiopia's Somali region there was a suitable source (genetically and 
commercially) o f cattle and camels.
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In Acholiland (Uganda) a head on state assault on replacing the $200 million plus herd loss (90% 
of cattle and drought oxen) is not practicable because neither the finance nor the beasts to buy can 
be identified. But selective 3 to 5 year programmes focussed - e.g. - on drought oxen (up to 50,000 
and $50 million) and on artificial insemination might be viable and meet the clear Acholi need- 
demand-priority for means to enable them to restore herds and therefore the majority of their pre 
war cash income from livestock sales.70
The cattle (and to a lesser extent sheep, goats, camels) problem is at the core of the reason that 
calamity or catastrophe afflicted pastoralists face greater barriers to returning home and 
restoring livelihoods than do agriculturalists or agro pastoralists. The Somali pastoralist's lament 
to the reporter who in the early 1990's noted that the rains and the pasture had returned: 'Yes, the 
rains have come and brought back the grass, but they have not brought my dead camels back to life' 
is relevant to the end of hostilities and insecurity - access to grazing land and water points, yes, the 
herds to utilise them, no.
Access to credit is important to rehabilitation - including as noted earlier commercial credit to the 
rural transport and merchant sectors vital to restore market access and therefore, the cash income 
element of small farming household livelihoods. The same considerations apply to medium and 
small enterprises (urban and rural) in construction, manufacturing, property operation or rental, 
services and trade.
For micro enterprises and households (overlapping categories, but given usual separation of 
incomes and budgets quite possibly often two micro enterprises in one household) different 
concerns and approaches arise. 'Normal' commercial banks, leasing/hire purchase companies and 
their analogues cannot lend viably to such enterprises:
1. their operating procedures for risk analysis as well as for loan management and collection lead 
to costs per loan which cannot be covered by interest on micro loans;
2. as large, impersonal, 'they' entities, such enterprises have few social claims on borrowers and 
the costs of legal processes exceed any possible recoveries on micro loans. Thus they are likely 
to have medium to high non-recovery rates.
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Specialised micro credit institutions may or may not be able to overcome those barriers:
1. to the extent they are embedded in institutions also providing technical and operational 
information/advice and facilitating access to inputs and markets they may be able to spread 
overhead costs over a wider base;
2. to the extent the lending body (directly or via an intermediary) is perceived as 'us', part of 
society, morally valid and that it lends largely to members or to small groups whose links mean 
an individual's default would lead to significant losses of social capital and of community 
respect, they can often reduce loss rates dramatically.
These factors suggest a large state, enterprise or INGO single purpose micro credit provider may 
have many of the problems of a bank. It can probably only avert these by operating through a 
domestic social sector (mosque, church, trade union, women's group, community organisation 
voluntary small farmers' co-op) which does have social ethical status and, therefore, leverage and 
also a multipurpose programme to provide sharing of overheads.71
These credit access issues are not unique to post war rehabilitation and adequate access to poor 
persons/households and appropriate enterprises rarely existed pre war. But with very large 
numbers of'old ' and 'new' poor households and for rebuilding social capital parallel to livelihoods 
they are potentially crucial in many such contexts.
Basic Services And Safety Nets
Access to basic services and to safety nets are crucial to rehabilitation. Increased health, 
knowledge and access to water (to increase time available for other uses - not least school for girls - 
as well as to increase pastoral and garden plot productivity and health) are relevant to present as 
well as to future ability to enhance household livelihoods. So is an assured work for cash for food 
or, if that is administratively impracticable, distribution of rations after floods and droughts.
Without it rehabilitation will certainly be subject to setbacks and the process may collapse.
Basic services and safety nets have in general been discussed in other sections. Special access 
areas relevant in particular to demobilisees and, in some cases, returning small farming households 
are vocational training and agricultural extension (backed by veterinary services and market
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availability o f the - usually 4 to 6 - key veterinary products, including rock salt, relevant to 
common disease control in particular zones).
Dcmobilisees usually have little pre-war vocational experience or training. Both those (often a 
large majority) intending to return to their family background of farming and those seeking artisinal 
or semi skilled employment can benefit from training. Food, housing, (in barracks or camps where 
practicable) and six months training (based on an employment/self employment potential survey) 
can - judging by Zimbabwe experience - reintegrate/integrate two thirds to three quarters of 
demobilisees into viable civilian livelihoods. The alternatives of abject poverty, 'self help' use of 
guns and 'stockpiling' in the armed forces (practiced by Ghana in the 1970's and Somaliland from 
1995) are less attractive and ultimately more costly.
What agricultural extension can offer varies widely. Probably generalisation of 'domestic best
practice' (an approach Mozambican sources suggest is central to results obtained beyond cotton 
and cashew) has the most general quick payoff potential if field officers are (or can rapidly be 
trained to be) competent to identify, comprehend and extend. For some crops there may be other 
shelf/pipeline knowledge and techniques. Many extension services in SSA have next to no 
adapted/locally field tested knowledge to extend. That does underline the case for more research 
and adaptation/testing of internationally available knowledge, but that is a process largely outside 
of, and over a longer time span than, rehabilitation proper.
Access Barriers - Fees And Charges
Charges and fees to returnees engaged in initial livelihood rehabilitation are a mirror image 
access issue. They create obstacles to access for poor households in general and for rural 
rehabilitees, who have very low cash incomes even after restoring basic household food security, in 
particular.
Water to a degree poses different considerations than health and education. In urban areas 
alternatives to public sector supply normally carry significant cash and/or opportunity (time) costs. 
In rural areas the main cost is likely to be time. In both cases the time cost is likely to reduce 
ability to work or to produce for cash - especially in pastoral or irrigation contexts so that a cash 
and/or time water burden sharing arrangement may be both acceptable to users and practicable.
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Timing and structuring of charges to fit with seasonal income stream patterns is apparently easier • 
than for health and education whose point of use timings tend to correspond to low income periods. 
A substantial portion of user contributions can be via user committee mobilisation of labour and 
materials for routine management/maintenance. Even so, in the early stages of rehabilitation a case 
can be made for temporary waiver o f the cash (not the labour and materials) element of both 
recurrent and - especially - establishment or reconstruction capital costs.
Fees, charges and cost sharing issues have to date rarely been raised in the specific context of 
rehabilitation, but do have special significance during its early years. Even in general fees for 
health and education by central governments have relatively poor success records: revenues below 
targets (and often under 5% of total primary level costs, or - say - ten cents per bottle of beer or 
pack of cigarettes), widespread corruption, high collection cost to revenue ratios, very high 
exclusion of potential user rates even when waiver schemes exist in principle (or alternatively very 
patchy efforts to collect). The World Bank (based on ex post studies) has become less enthusiastic, 
albeit the IMF has not. Especially in SSA schemes are still expanding.72
Highly decentralised systems with more flexible waiver, contribution (not necessarily primarily at 
point of use or all in cash) and decision taking structures at local government, community and 
domestic civil society group level do have more cases of success, but such cash and participation 
sharing approaches appear to need substantial social capital bases and institutions which are 
both technically competent in respect to financial management and respected as service 
deliverers. They are all more successful in respect to water than to health and education.7’
The initial rehabilitation period appears unlikely to be one in which these conditions can usually be 
met:
1. household cash incomes - especially in isolated areas - are very low while - with poor transport 
and sparse service coverage - the time opportunity costs of using services are higher than in 
other areas, often absolutely and certainly relative to cash income;
2. social capital has usually been war eroded even in areas in which ethnic cleavages are not 
prominent. While successful rehabilitation processes do tend to have a two directional positive 
relation with such cleavages, it is unlikely that joint fee collection is an optimal starting point;
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3. local government and - less uniformly - local civil society bodies are still building or rebuilding 
from low levels of service delivery and financial managerial capacity and may (e.g. in Rwanda 
where pre 1994 local government seems to have been more about security policing than service 
delivery) have previous negative histories to overcome.74
However, Somaliland76 can be cited as case in which domestic NGO social actors have played a 
major role in health and education recovery with fees (and exemptions) prominent in their financial 
operations, while local governments have used urban water (largely UNICEF/INGO restored on the 
capital works side) as a means to build credibility and also to achieve modest surpluses for - e.g. - 
sanitation. However, in respect to health and education coverage - while above 1985 levels - is 
very low and appears to exclude (however unintended) poor persons and also most pastoral 
households because adequate clinic or school size (except mobile school and community 
paramedic) for fee based viability cannot be achieved. Moreover, Somaliland's partial success is 
probably heavily dependent on very high remittance levels which inject cash into household and 
domestic NGO budgets.
Possible approaches include:
1. a strategic decision that all charges be at local governance/social actor level with freedom to 
determine timing, level, nature (cash and/or agreed services such as maintenance and goods 
such as food, building materials, furniture) and exemption provisions;
2. special grants in rehabilitation zones to allow local government units to waive most fees (or 
charge at very low levels) during the initial rehabilitation period;
3. where overseas remittances are actually or potentially substantial, systematically promote 
diaspora member contributions to civil society/domestic NGO and local governance basic 
service provision to reduce fee levels needed;
4. develop government/civil society actor partnerships to augment domestic civil society group 
service provision if these groups have perceived capacity and legitimacy and state service 
provider coverage will necessarily remain limited for an extended period.76
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Rehabilitation And Gender
Gender and patterns of womens' participation issues arise in the rehabilitation context for three 
reasons:
1. wars have disproportionately negative affects on women (and children and aged who are
usually particular concerns of women), creating particular needs for redress/restitution in the R-
77R-R process. That factor is enhanced because war creates greater 'enforced opportunities' - 
men dead or away at war - for women leading to greater post than pre war organisation, clarity 
of agendas and - often - self confidence;
2. the increase (often of the order of 5% to 25%) of female headed rural households during civil 
wars requires attention to women's access to land as a foundation for livelihood opportunities if 
these households including their children are not to be locked into absolute poverty;
3. time, attitudes and knowledge (including knowledge by women returning home) have not stood 
still during war. Therefore, the replication of pre war social, economic and household relations 
will rarely be desirable and often would be impracticable.
In principle a fourth category would be inequitable, oppressive or iniquitous gender relations which 
had been significant contributing causes to war. In practice such relations have indeed existed in 
some contexts, but do not appear in themselves to have contributed to armed conflict.
The most general gender 'issue' requiring special attention and priority is the increased proportion 
of female headed households. These - unless headed by wage employed full or semi professionals 
- are particularly likely to be caught in an absolute poverty trap. The reason is not primarily that 
they are female headed, but that they have a poor able bodied hands to earn/hungry mouths to 
feed ratio because they are overwhelmingly single able bodied adult/multiple dependent (children,
n o  t t  t
disabled, aged) households. This indicates a need not just for access to land but also for 
techniques/technology to reduce the working time availability disadvantages facing these 
households. These are likely to be context specific:
a. the example o f animal traction power and the complexities of introducing it have been 
discussed in other sections of this paper;
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b. increased access to nearby water saves womens' and girls' time for household, directly income 
generating, educational and other purposes;
c. small scale, inexpensive units to mill maize, decorticate millet and sorghum, crush oilseeds can 
offer reduced labour time, low cost (versus shop purchase) nutritious weaning food and cash 
income if training, microcredit and womens’s self organisation can be promoted jointly.
None of the above relate only to female headed households or only in the context of rehabilitation. 
All are of special concern to women and to children because they fall almost totally on the female 
side of African gender divisions of labour and of incomes (and children - except in many cases for 
school fees - on the female side of budget obligations). Evidently when successful such 
innovations benefit not so poor households (including their male members) in non war contexts. 
The reason for their coverage here is that they and similar innovations and access broadening 
discussed above can be of particular benefit to female headed households in rehabilitation 
processes.
Rehabilitation is not a magic bullet - given what came before an unsettling analogy! - to resolve 
all issues and to reverse all inequities. Rehabilitation - and even R-R-R- agendas - are not identical 
to gender agendas even if they overlap. Rehabilitation's contribution lies primarily in the areas of 
livelihood and access empowerment. To play those roles effectively, requires attention to actual 
gender divisions of labour, of household budget obligations on input of labour time and meeting 
certain cash expenditure categories and claims on labour time and categories of cash income 
receipt. African household budget patterns vary widely, but are rarely one household/one budget 
forms and similarly while gender obligations/claims balances are frequently highly unequal, 
unilateral male claim/female obligation patterns are virtually unknown. For example, in some 
contexts increased male calls for female labour input into crops whole sale proceeds the men keep 
have resulted in parallel food crop (for household use or sale with proceeds to women) labour 
inputs from men or the husband paying wages to his wife directly or via a more complex multi 
household circuit.79
Because patterns vary - e.g. as to whether men or women are obligated to pay school fees - the 
determination of gender impact of particular measures requires contextual knowledge. Division of 
labour patterns - e.g. that girls and women collect water and do routine water point (and household) 
maintenance but men do contribute in cash and labour to water system initial construction - also
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can have a major impact on the gender gains division of particular programmes. Given the labour 
time scarcity in many female headed households noted above, rehabilitation measures should seek 
to balance labour savings in favour o f women.
While access to resources (including basic services) and economic opportunities is probably the 
focal rehabilitation contribution to gender issues, empowerment on one front can be relevant to 
others. For example, because water collection, water point maintenance and 
collection/management of water use area are 'womens' work' (with male mobilisation usually 
limited to labour and/or cash to establish facilities), men may well accept women taking a leading 
role in User Committees to manage - maintain - collect funds for spares and servicing by technical 
personnel. In turn success by women in one area is likely - not certain - to lead to increased access 
to leadership roles in others.
Food Aid - Uses And Problems
Food aid and its relation to food security are recurrent issues in respect to rehabilitation as well as 
to survival assistance during catastrophes or calamities. The debate tends to comprise several sub­
issues:
a. national physical availability and capacity to distribute related to hungry household 
entitlements (which may lead to similar conclusions in the case of very poor persons in a poor, 
food short, war torn - whether at war or just after - context);
b. quantity o f food provided versus timing (i.e. late food aid may fail to avert dearth or even 
famine, but later damage farming household income recovery in a subsequent good harvest year 
during which the late 'aid' creates a glut);
c. appropriate place and timing of food supply to returnee households vs. the naive argument that 
0 to 6 months food provided at camps for use after 'return home' will normally be adequate;
d. balancing administrative feasibility, avoidance of leakage and support for (damage to) 
commercial food network in evaluating issuing rations, providing food for work, employing to 
work for cash for food. Failure to recognise that, when feasible, the last should have the most 
positive impact on infrastructure and rural commercial sector rehabilitation and - if paralleled
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by food rations and/or meals (perhaps via local domestic social actions to aged, disabled and 
other unable to work groups - should have few offsetting negative effects is likely to lead to 
poorer actual than possible programmes.
True the case for food aid rests on two assumptions:
1. food aid is given for mixed reasons (including Northern farmer interests) and its termination 
would not lead to substantial increases in cash grants;
2. in some countries food aid is harder to divert and more likely to reach poor persons than is 
cash.
The first proposition almost certainly is valid - in whole or in large part - for the USA, the EU and a 
majority o f its members and for Canada, Australia and Japan. The second is not as robust as it 
might seem - the potential for diversion of food and the leakiness of food delivery pipelines can be 
very high - but is at least partly valid.
The general - subject to contextual modification - rehabilitation position vis a vis food aid may 
include:
1. Rehabilitation usually requires substantial external grant inputs into countries/regions with 
substantial overall physical shortages of food. Therefore grant food aid in basic staples or 
readily saleable deficit commodities (e.g. sugar, vegetable oil, dried milk) can be useful;
2. Food aid to be clearly positive requires a strategy for appropriate timing and location of 
delivery over the rehabilitation process with by steps to achieve provider compliance (as to 
amount, timing and quality and actual recipient logistical and delivery implementation capacity.
3 . building interaction among rehabilitation process infrastructure renewal, rural 
commercial network recovery, household cash income regeneration and 
household/personal food entitlements by selling donated food to provide cash for wages 
and tools in support of seasonal employment for returning households;80
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Governance And All That
Governance issues raised repeatedly in the R-R-R context include:
a. capacity and efficiency
b. probity and user friendliness;
c. participation and decentralisation
d. community, local government, central government, INGO, external agency
relationships.
Capacity is clearly a functional issue. Most post conflict governments, especially in rural areas 
which were previously conflict or insurgent controlled zones, are weak in respect to personnel and 
institutional capacity. All are weak financially and, almost always, logistically. R-R-R - not least 
in food security - and even sketchy basic service access in 'return home' poses heavy, complex and 
largely new burdens.
The central issue is how to restore capacity (especially if it had collapsed pre war or the war had 
extended for half a decade or more). None of the R-R-R heads is one in which there is room for 
total spin-off to the household, civil society and/or enterprise sectors.
But in the short run the goals of capacity building and dependence reduction may well not
coincide. Rapid external - agency and INGO - injections are simpler to organise (although
• • 8 1much more expensive per unit of services delivered) than local social actor or government 
capacity restoration. In principle they can complement current public and domestic NGO activity 
and train personnel for them. In practice there is a high risk of their substituting for, 
fragmenting and eroding domestic capacity - both public and private. Contextual patterns vary 
widely - Uganda (Acholiland) and Somaliland appear to have achieved broadly complementary and 
capacity building relationships82 whereas UNOSOM in Somalia83 and most - not all - 
INGO's/agencies in Mozambique illustrate a substitution, fragmentation and erosion process.84
In respect to rehabilitation capacity the issue is not the need for greater efficiency but how to define 
efficiency (or efficiencies?)- within a cost ceiling? unit cost of services? number of units of 
services delivered? lives saved? degree of poverty reduction? All can be valid targets, but 
efficiency toward one may entail a negative tradeoff with another. Similarly present capacity and
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capacity building - i.e. present and future efficiency may well have tradeoffs (especially in 
centrality and pervasiveness of foreign institutional and personnel roles).
Capacity is not only a technical question - it goes to the heart of political legitimacy. A
government perceived as unable to provide an absence of recurrent violence and disorder at least 
significant health, education and water services and calamity alleviation oriented food security will 
- at the best - have conditional and challenged legitimacy. Improved service delivery - in 
coverage and in quality - can consolidate, deepen and broaden legitimacy. Both African 
governments and insurgents often act on that premise - targeting basic services and food 
security logistics, to protect on the government side and to destroy (including mutilation, 
kidnapping and killing of personnel) on the insurgent.^
Probity (absence of pervasive corruption especially when it limits and distorts access as well as 
leaking away resources) and user friendliness (a civilian police force open to the public and
perceived as seeking to avert disorder and violence and to catch as well as deter criminals - as in
86Somaliland - is an example) are objectives which most R-R-R users, most SSA governments and 
most outside agencies and INGO's endorse. The differences relate to interpretation of causes, to 
priorities and to workable means to improve matters.
'Corruption' by personnel paid much less than the household poverty line wage is arguably a form 
o f 'privatised, decentralised, flexible' user fees enforced by'need'. While undesirable, it may 
have limited distorting effects and be better than having no staff on the job. The only cure involves 
phased recovery of wages to the household basic poverty line parallel to training, professional and 
procedural regulations and provision of better tools for the job'. Pay is not a sufficient condition 
to restore probity and enhance efficiency but it is - except in the very short term - a necessary one.
'User Friendliness' - as perceived by users - who do not necessarily have identical perceptions to 
expatriate, or even highly educated urban based national, experts - is a factor in capacity to deliver 
useful services, in efficiency (useful service unity cost) and in rehabilitation legitimacy. It appears 
to be highly contextual in part relating to what was delivered - and valued - before the war and to
87perceived beneficiary groups.
Accountability is sometimes linked to probity and sometimes to participation/user friendliness. 
Perhaps oddly it is less frequently viewed as a background from which to increase efficiency.
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Accountability - especially in community R-R-R contexts - should begin literally. The presentation 
of oral and written verbal and numerical accounts (in the technical sense). Without these civil 
society (and senior officials or politicians) cannot 'call to account', identify areas of gross 
inefficiency (in respect to their goals) and pinpoint opportunities for reallocation (away from - 
probably 'traditional' - activities of low or low immediate priority to potential users, or non-users as 
the case may be).
Decentralisation is frequently (perhaps usually in SSA) persued on two points: deconcentration 
of central government operations with more delegated authority to act at provincial, district and 
city level and dccentratisation to elected local governance units.88 The logic appears to be that 
new or renewed local government units cannot, or cannot yet administer large programmes or 
large units and therefore - for speed, flexibility, user friendliness reasons - local governance needs 
parallel decentralised central government units. While - especially in R-R-R contexts - there is a 
not inconsiderable element of realism to this logic it is also arguable that political and official 
(professional/bureaucratic power division) conflicts of interest play a large role.
Whether new institutions and especially two parallel sets are a resource allocation priority under R- 
R-R depends on the context both as to what functioning institutions exist, how close to the civil
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society pre war institutions were and whether (as in Mozambique ) war has led to substantial de 
facto deconcentration to provinces and districts.
Participation should go beyond consultation (even if the latter is taken into account in 
programme design) and approach co-determination, especially when local government structures 
are weak. The case for it is three fold: efficiency in programme and project selection, design and 
operation (ordinary local households know a great deal which officials and experts do not, as well 
as sometimes visa versa); mobilisation of user community resources to augment governmental 
(much more practicable when users feel their views are taken into account and they share in 
management); good governance (which as normally defined, goes beyond elections, accountability 
as to use of funds and petitioning).
The problems with instituting, sustaining and building participation turn on the fact that it has 
significant time costs - before decisions and their implementation and to all those participating. 
External actors - however pro participation in principle - clearly resent the delays; officials and 
professionals are none too keen to spend many hours in dialogue; poor households and women in
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particular are short of time so that participation often has quite high opportunity costs for them and 
will not be sustained unless payoffs are apparent.
The immediate aftermath of war is a time at which participation can be especially valuable:
1. those returning home can help fill in both pre war baseline data (likely to have been 
incomplete and/or lost) and a revived baseline for the present deteriorated position;
2. they can also indicate their capacities, lacks and priorities as a set of parameters within which 
to allocate resources more efficiently from broad strategy to programmatic, policy and project 
packages;
3. as well as indicating what material and labour contributions to cost sharing and what work 
for cash for food time are likely to be available.
This process, at least first time around, needs to be rapid even at the expense o f approximation of 
data (which can later be refined by further rounds of dialogue) and use o f less than optimal 
survey/observation techniques. The results will usually include 'non obvious' - particularly 
historical and environmental context linked - elements.
External-Civil Society-Government Interaction
In rehabilitation (in some cases unlike survival support) the case for domestic leadership 
combined with supporting (hopefully on a medium term phase down basis) external actor 
participation is strong. Sustainability cannot be based on permanent external dominance in finance, 
top personnel, knowledge and research. Rehabilitation is not a very fashionable area in the first 
phase and tends to have a short shelf life - e.g. no war for two years, no real external memory of the 
need for rehabilitation may not be an unreasonable rule of thumb.
Government to government (at strategic priorities and transfer levels) negotiated agreements on 
broad 3 to 6 year programmes with main policy, sectoral and project clusters identified may be the 
most feasible route to a coordinated, medium term approach with pre determined phasing from
90external and domestic sources.
Governmental (and IFI) services - except for special small project funds91 which can be very useful 
within a strategic frame but are unlikely to form an adequate whole - are bureaucratically and in
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respect to personnel ill fitted to negotiating with and - less uniformly - to working alongside local 
government and domestic social sector (whether religious group, women's organisation, domestic 
NGO or trade/peasants' union) actors because of contextual, language, accounting, knowledge and 
outlook barriers.
In theory INGO's should be able to work both with domestic governments and with local social 
sector actors. In practice this is by no means uniformly the case either in all countries or for all 
INGOs. Action Aid, CIIR, in many cases Oxfam, and SCF and - among international agencies 
which to a degree operate on the ground in the South (and raise funds in the North) as if they were 
INGOs - UNICEF are evidence that the theory is not totally aberrant. Others - e.g. World Vision, 
Medicins sans Frontieres (France)92, CARE (USA) - are evidence that disastrous fragmentation and 
erosion of domestic capacity (both government and social actor) can result.
The negative result is particularly likely if there is an 'overload' of external funds designated for use 
via INGOs, weak government capacity to negotiate (frequently because of lack of alternative 
resource flows, not of negotiators nor of ability to design programmes) and/or domestic social 
actors whose outlook, style and bureaucratic/managerial process are very different from those of 
INGOs and whose desperate need for financial resources, training and - usually - specialised 
personnel9 ’ makes bargaining between each of them and a large INGO no less unequal than 
between a weak national government and the World Bank or its largest bilateral aid agency partner. 
This catalogue of problems is not in itself anybody's 'fault' - it is a consequence of past war and 
present inherent inequality of bargaining strength. But it is a warning to seek to include:
a. honest dialogue - including two way criticism - to lead to clearer understanding of problems 
and of divergent perceptions;
b. accepting that national coordination (at least during post war periods other than in respect to 
some calamity survival crises) is only possible if either domestic government led or co led by 
the national government and a resident external agency (or INGO) head acceptable to them;
c. building in training to reduce professional, managerial and accounting weaknesses of
domestic social actors and local government units as well as at central government level;
d. engaging in realistic analysis of buildup of user social actor, local government and central 
government possible fund buildup and of parallel expenditure requirements to achieve
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manageable phase downs of financial flow scheduling (possibly in part substituting domestic 
governance unit for INGO or donor agency financing for domestic social actors).
After Such Conflict What Forgiveness?
Justice/amnesty, impunity/immunity and redress/forgiveness are not primarily rehabilitation 
issues as rehabilitation is defined here. They relate primarily to achieving and sustaining valid 
processes of reconciliation in particular country (or zone within a country) and time contexts.
However, for precisely that reason they are directly relevant to forwarding or impeding the process 
of rehabilitation. Unless former combatants and their core supporters are willing to co-exist, talk, 
work, and - preferably94 - live together, neither rehabilitation nor local governance prospects are 
positive and recurrence of armed conflict - perhaps escalation out of individual clashes which in 
other contexts would be contained quickly - is all too likely. Neither pursuit of total justice (with 
the margin of error tilted against unwilling or at least pressured participants on the losing side) nor 
mindless pragmatism seeking to wipe out the memory of the war is particularly likely to work well. 
What is morally, administratively, emotionally and economically feasible is much less self evident 
and would appear to be very context specific.
If justice is taken to mean systematic trials of all offenders on the losing side - and preferably gross 
offenders among the winners - then it is likely to be practicable only in cases of total military 
victory, limited numbers of overt opponents of the new government and general stability. Even so 
commitment to reconciliation has led e.g. Mozambique (in 1975), Somaliland and Ethiopia to 
mount quite limited - or in the case of Somaliland to date no95 - war crimes trials of top leaders of 
the former regime and notorious perpetrators of crimes against humanity.
Rwanda is an exception and one which illustrates the problems which arise when the defeated side 
remains capable of armed attacks, the majority of the population while not openly antagonistic are 
at best passive supporters of the new regime and the number of accused is very large.
Realistically 500,000 odd Rwandans participated in genocide from running with killer mobs (often 
in the fear that holding back would put their own lives at risk) and up to 150,000 have been 
arrested. Commitment to due process means than on realistic estimates trying all of them would 
take 25 to 50 years. Lack of resources means prison conditions are very bad so that well before the
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trials were completed at least halt the accused would have died, charged but untried. Division of 
the charges into three classes: capital genocide, follower participation in genocide and mob 
participation with local courts to try the last category having powers to fine, reprimand and impose 
limited imprisonment (usually less than served awaiting trial) have not worked well because of fear 
of what would actually happen to fringe participants who confessed and faced local courts. From 
both reconciliation and economic perspectives the outcome is deeply unsatisfactory. Since the 
alternative was seen - probably correctly - as mob 'justice' against suspects this gloomy comment 
on the 1994-00 results is not a condemnation of the choices made but a comment on the deepness 
of the dilemmas.
Attempting such trials during a war - as Sierra Leone did in 1997-8 - is very unlikely to be 
productive. It tends to hamper subsequent negotiations for 'peace with amnesty' as well as being 
likely to be very uneven justice with most of the worst offenders not in hand to be tried.
Truth and justice hearings following a negotiated settlement with amnesties are an option rarely 
taken after civil wars - the notable exception being South Africa. Rehabilitation conceptualisation 
and logic throws little light on when such processes are feasible or desirable, let alone on the basic 
dilemma of whether to call to account crimes against humanity on the part of those who were 
armed supporters o f the present governments.
Redress - in respect to economic loss - is unlikely to be a practicable twin to amnesty on the 
criminal front. First, a real risk of massive judgements can only deter negotiating peace or taking 
up an amnesty offer. Second the judicial processes and divisions of liability pose massive 
problems. Third it is exceedingly unlikely that any substantial resources for family capital or more 
general rehabilitation can be won in this way except under very unusual circumstances.
In Acholiland in 1999 most Acholi did favour a universal amnesty but also the right to sue ex 
Lord's Resistance Army members for damages. The fact that this would deter taking the amnesty, 
would be embrangled, prolonged and expensive judicially and could hardly make a dent in the 
$300 million plus (two thirds livestock) war losses were perceived and indeed informed 
government policy, but did not override a deep desire for redress. In Somaliland per contra where 
agro-pastoral land rights had been sold under the Barre regime to Oromo and to Southern Somalis 
these transfers have been accepted if proper procedures and payments to the then government 
authorities were made.
Forgiveness through historic (evolving traditional) methods has been highly and perhaps 
surprisingly effective in Mozambique96 and Acholiland. It has been both communal97 and religious 
group and has been linked to trauma counselling and resocialisation for, e.g., child soldiers, girl
• • 98slaves and initially kidnapped ex-combatants. The key elements appear to be acceptability to the 
community and a sense of re-entry into the community by returning persons.
Somaliland - partly via the sub clan and lineage/'blood' group systems and partly by general tacit 
agreement on what past conduct to 'forget' - has achieved similar results. Probably luckily, Barre's 
'divide and rule' practices meant Somaliland troops had not served in Somaliland nor, in general, in 
Puntland. Therefore their reentry as coerced victims who had done Somalilanders no harm was 
easy - indeed they are at the core of the present Somaliland Army. Similarly Somaliland merchants 
who prospered in Mogadishu under Barre (necessarily involving 'side payments') are accepted as 
are civil side ex public servants and even ministers (excluding defense and interior). For example 
the last Barre Prime Minister heads a mobile telephone company, albeit his rehabilitation would not 
extend to his being a politician or an elder.
The limits to this type of reconciliation probably arise primarily in cases of crimes against 
humanity by the ex-combatants within their own local community (e.g. Sierra Leone) and ethnic 
conflict bordering on or being genocide (e.g. Rwanda, Burundi). Personal knowledge o f atrocities 
against persons close to oneself presumably make forgiveness much harder (and less general) while 
historic (albeit not necessarily Christian and Muslim) forgiveness/reentry process are limited by 
ethnic groups and can hardly be expected to transcend them after genocide.
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COUNTRY REHABILITATION HEADS, VIGNETTES, PANORAMAS
The records ol rehabilitation perceptional strategies, analyses, programmes - policies - projects and 
results/prognoses vary widely among COPE countries." This is in part because in Sri Lanka and 
Uganda the actual area studied is a domestic region not a whole country. However, the basic 
reasons for divergence are contested history, results of conflict, probable finality of settlements to 
and/or durability ot lulls in, conflict and the priority to Reconciliation/Rehabilitation 
Reconstruction (R-R-R) accorded by dominant state decision takers and effectiveness of action on 
that priority.
Sri Lanka
North and East Sri Lanka100 has seen very limited R-R-R. Indeed the trend probably remains 
downwards, especially after the mid 2000 Tamil Tiger resurgence on the Jaffna Peninsula.
The absence of stable lines of control, the presence of a large contested area between usually Tiger 
and usually government controlled villages and the lack of any consensus as to when or how the 
Tiger/Lanka State conflict would be resolved has created a very unpropitious context for 
rehabilitation as well as for reconciliation. Further, neither domestic nor foreign non-governmental 
organisations have focussed either on social capital preservation nor on even limited livelihood 
strengthening linked to relief. Social capital has eroded because historically multi-ethnic villages 
have splintered into up to four groups (Tamil, Sinhala, Muslim, Christian) and because even within 
these fragments self organisation and networks have eroded.
Neither government nor non-government survival support has sought to identify possible links to 
partial earned livelihood rehabilitation systematically. While instability, uncertainty and duration 
(already two decades) have contributed, so has the state model of seeking to provide rice rations, 
pensions and, at least some primary education and health - even in contested and Tiger controlled 
zones. This approach has created a dominant perspective of wartime survival support as a cut 
down variant o f the low level welfare state which has - even under conservative governments -
VI
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dominated Sri Lankan politics for two-thirds of a century. The INGO/NGO role is seen as gap 
filling and state provision channelling.
This pattern may be useful to sustaining belief in the state as an underwriter of certain basic 
entitlements and - specifically for the present Sinhala dominated state - embodying a commitment 
to serve (and a claim to legitimate rule over) all Sri Lankans. Ironically it increases Tiger 
controlled area food supplies (these are, even without war, dominantly food deficit areas) while 
directly (e.g. via a proportional tax in kind on rice rations) and indirectly (e.g. via sales tax) 
augmenting Tiger fiscal revenues and foreign exchange flows which may make it easier for the 
Tigers to prosecute armed struggle with all its other resources devoting very few to basic survival 
support for its civilian base (controlled area population). Perhaps more serious it is dependency 
promoting and social capital demobilising - neither conducive to present nor future rehabilitiation 
and development.
A related issue is inadequately conceptualised and still less debated or articulated toward livelihood 
rehabilitation programming. The Southwest of Sri Lanka has been characterised by economic 
stagnation, rising pauperisation (particularly of unemployable educated youth) and a recurrent 
violent neo-fascist jacquerie termed JVP. The past repression of the JVP (much more uniformly 
vicious than the war against Tamil rebels) was followed by the recruitment into the Army o f up to
60,000 young Sinhala from these districts. In many villages their remittances are now the main 
sources of cash income. If they are demobilised into poverty and hopelessness as trained soldiers 
(realistically not surrendering their arms), rather than channelled toward economic rehabilitation 
for demobilised livelihood (not to date fully successfully carried out on a comparable scale by any 
country in the South), the JVP will rapidly re-emerge more virulent and militarily dangerous than 
before. That implies the waves of bloodshed, which reached Colombo's southern suburbs in the 
early 1990s, will this time wash over the whole metropolis.
Northern Uganda
Acholiland (Northern Uganda),101 despite also being a domestic region, provides a very different 
panorama than Eastern Sri Lanka. This is partly out of the different - briefer and shallower - 
historic context of armed conflict, but also of higher Uganda State and majority Acholi community
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priority to reconciliation and rehabilitation. In addition no Ugandan government has ever been able 
to provide even a low level welfare state, forcing relatively much more attention to social capital, 
civil society and to household and larger enterprise production. Finally the Lord's Resistance Army 
is a much weaker force militarily and one with a much narrower support base (whether 
spontaneous, mobilised or/and coerced) than the Tamil Tigers.
Over 1986-2000 a series o f conflicts in Acholiland have been violent and been perceived - not 
necessarily accurately - as basic cleavages between the Acholi and the Government of Uganda. 
These have successively been characterised by insurrection/repression and subsequently 
dialogue/reconciliation/re-inclusion. Characteristics of and elements in reconciliation/rehabilitation 
include structures and strategies instituted in regard to Uganda as a whole and/or to the 14 districts 
characterised as 'Northern' and thereby needing rehabilitation of which Acholiland comprises two 
(Gulu, Kitgum).
Reconciliation, including civil society building and social capital rehabilitation, progressed 
rapidly from late 1997 through late 1999 but was set back by the Christmasstide 1999 Lord's 
Resistance Army raid bamboozling the government to believe its purpose was to accept the 
statutory amnesty accepted on the urging of (anti-LRA) Acholi. That raid and the weak security 
force response to it eroded Acholi trust in government ability to defend them and also Acholi 
willingness to trust already semi-demobilised LRA cadres in Acholiland when they seek to return 
home peacefully.102
The present situation - despite the setback - is one of reasonably well advanced and 
potentially self-sustainable reconciliation and of some social capital, local governance and 
basic service rehabilitation - but to date very little economic rehabilitation beyond the southern 
fringe parishes:
1. Relatively functional decentralised central and local governance structures exist and are 
moderately restoring access to basic services with their further advance now most severely 
limited by lack o f household production (and thus community and local government revenue) 
rehabilitation;
2. law, order and stability - as perceived by Acholi - over 1997-99 improved markedly as has 
government reconceptualisation of its core security problem as government plus Acholi
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majority vs the LRA not government vs Acholi. However, raids continue after a 1998-9 lull 
and there is unease about the implications/costs for Acholiland of Uganda's over all Congo and 
Sudan policies (including Sudanese backing of violent incursions into Kitgum and Gulu);
3. The basic barrier to sustained reconciliation and to continued advances in other aspects of 
rehabilitation (e.g. basic services, local governance, infrastructure) is the 1984-1996 collapse of 
livelihoods with output per household down about two-thirds in constant price returns, 
household capital losses of the order of $300 million (for 150,000-195,000 households) 
including $200 million for a 90% fall in livestock previously the largest source of cash income 
and a major component of many farming systems relying on ox ploughing of heavy black soils;
4. Livelihood rehabilitation requires 'going home' for over 400,000 Acholi in 'protected villages' 
(actually camps, some larger than 20,000) because they can neither walk to and from their 
farms daily and do much farming nor operate their pastoral activities from the 'villages'. At the 
peak of LRA attacks, the villages may well have been necessary for security reasons - now 
return home is crucial to rehabilitation and to future security (broadly defined to include, e.g., 
food), a conclusion shared by at least some senior military personnel;
5. Over 1997-1999 the period of lull in relation to LRA action was utilised by the Acholi and the 
Uganda Government to institute, explore and advance a significant process o f reconciliation 
and to begin to outline aspects of rehabilitation and to implement some of them especially as to 
basic services and local governance;
6. These processes were set back by the Christmasstide 1999 LRA raids especially because they 
raise doubts as to Army ability to protect and to either Acholi or Government commitment to 
radical 'return home' (camp to farm) action to restore livelihoods. This check is likely to be 
overcome but with how much loss of momentum is less clear;
7. The present Uganda government has given priority to rehabilitation since it achieved power 
in 1986. But this has been area (district cluster) by area, not in all districts at one time, and has 
not been specifically conceptualised, analysed or articulated economic/livelihood rehabilitation 
in the 14 (by government count) most war afflicted districts or in respect to their macro 
economic contribution;
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8. Data and articulation - even when logically possible e.g. use of pre 1980 farm system and 
output data to identify key crop, livestock and ox traction issues and, back by interviews, 
specific needs of female headed households - remain weak. This gap is especially dangerous 
for prompt, Acholi friendly action because the specific needs and the stages of recovery (from 
nearly complete - e.g. Tororo area - to still endemic armed conflict - e.g. much of West Nile 
area) among the 14 post war districts vary very widely. 'One size suits all1 fourteen district 
rehabilitation plans are in danger o f being ‘single size suits none’ if there is not more creative 
user consultation linked to data collection (or recovery) and analysis;
9. Resource allocation and mobilisation by the Uganda Government do confirm that 
rehabilitation is a priority. Substantial external programme support has been mobilised and 
domestic revenue commitments made as well as major allocations of senior civil and political 
personnel to reconciliation and rehabilitation articulation. But - perhaps because o f the lack of 
articulated district prioritised project/programme/policy packages - the totals when divided 
among 14 districts appear seriously inadequate. Acholiland (Gulu and Kitgum districts) 
rehabilitation probably needs of the order of $10 million a year of additional (to 1998-9 levels) 
state and state channeled funds, but only about one third of that appears to be in the pipeline 
and - more serious - the scale of the gap is neither self evident from broad 14 district summaries 
nor clearly identified by the state as a crucial area for corrective action.
Rwanda
Rwanda1"’ remains in a war, not a post war, situation. This is the greatest single constraint on
reconciliation and rehabilitation:
1. it diverts resources to war because Interahamwe is still a politico military macro survival threat 
to the Government and a micro source of near countrywide endemic instability;
2. as well as reducing revenues (from household to governmental) by reducing output (and thus 
tax revenue), deterring external support and focussing what is provided on external NGOs 
which - whatever else they can do - are institutionally unable to provide the staff, service 
delivery, user-government-staff interactions which could build up trust, interaction and social 
capital toward reconciliation;
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3. creates distrust because soldiers (largely wa Tutsi) cannot readily separate attackers from 
bystanders (both largely wa Hutu) and because IH's omnipresent menace constrains wa Hutu 
participation in government led projects. Such cooperation, let alone providing information on 
impending threats to peace, can very literally become a death sentence;
4. diverts leadership attention away from articulating rehabilitation strategy and taking more care 
to meet the needs of at least five groups ' 1959er' and later flight 'returnee' wa Tutsi; resident wa 
Tutsi; 'moderate'104 wa Hutu; uncommitted (to a non-communal state, to IH or to the RPF led 
government) wa Hutu. Their needs and grievances are not identical and create problems in 
respect to overly generalised policies in respect to farm, housing, urban land and related issues.
The second greatest constraint is history. Half a millennium can be traced since the wa Tutsi 
conquest more or less contemporaneous with European entry on the coast103 and - more particularly 
-  fourty since the 1959-61 Jacquerie, the 1959-90 low level civil war by wa Tutsi exiles, the 1990 
invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Front/Army, the 1986-94 buildup to and implementation of 
genocide by the wa Hutu Interahamwe (literally 'we who stand together', colloquially 'we who kill 
together') of probably about 800,000 wa Tutsi and 'moderate' wa Hutu, the 1994 RPA conquest and 
the arrest over 1994-6 of 150,000 wa Hutu on genocide charges with an agonisingly slow (to 
provide due process) judicial system and terrible prison conditions. Efforts to recast Rwanda 
history in less chauvinistic terms has arguably overstated the exaggerations of polemic versions 
and, to date, have convinced few not already committed to reconciliation.
Physical destruction in Rwanda during the war was surprisingly low. Basic infrastructure and most 
buildings were not severely damaged, let alone destroyed. The overall order of magnitude was that 
of serious deferred maintenance. The largest single capital loss was probably (as in Acholiland) 
depletion of the national livestock herd. Failure of rural output to recover fully over 1995-99 
relates primarily to lack of security, secondarily to uncertainty of tenure in respect to wa Tutsi 
returnees who are - at least nominally - interim occupiers and tertiarily to an apparent population 
balance shift to towns and cities.
Community social capital damage has not been restored. Previous to 1994, most villages and many 
town/urban neighbourhoods were ethnically mixed. This is much (although unevenly) less so 
today - a clear sign of continued lack of trust. Trans ethnic civil society bodies do exist - women's
54
and social service groups plus religious groups. However, both the Anglican and Catholic 
Churches were deeply divided along ethnic lines and the plurality of their hierarchies were 
perceived to be anti Tutsi. While genuine efforts at reconciliation have been and are being carried 
on - perhaps more so in the Anglican Church - many congregations are still ethnically homogenous 
and deeply distrustful o f each other.
The RPF government has sought to address the reconciliation requirement in several ways:
1. seeking to avert massive revenge killings by sweeping arrests of accused planners, leaders and 
participants in genocide - with 1994-99 totals of the order of 150,000. Parallel to this 'arrests 
not assaults' policy has been one of rehabilitation of courts and trial procedures to allow justice 
to be done and seen to be done. This has been followed up with review and release of apparent 
wrong arrests (20-25% of prisoners are thought to be innocent by senior legal officials and at 
least some ministers) and allowing downgrading of charges on confession - except for planners 
and leaders - and turning these cases over to paralegal community courts with powers to fine or 
to sentence to prison for terms more or less equal to time served on remand. The last two 
initiatives are intended to avoid a 25 to 50 year trial process with festering resentment and most 
defendants literally dying untried under remand;
2. acting to avert mass wa Tutsi returnee seizure of 1959 (or subsequent departure) losses of land 
and buildings by providing temporary use of abandoned farms/premises (of refugees and IH 
ravanchist exiles) until their 1994 owners' return and developing programmes to facilitate 
securing land for housing;
3. creating a governmental personnel pattern at political and senior official level which could be 
seen to be supra ethnic. At one point the President, Prime Minister, almost half the cabinet, and 
a majority o f the Parliament (which is more than symbolic if less than a fully empowered 
legislative branch)10'’ were wa Hutu;
4. attempting to rebuild and extend primary education and health services through re-employing 
the two thirds o f staff (largely wa Hutu) not in place in 1995. The purpose was to create 
universal access (or broad access moving toward universality) services and to recreate a non- 
ethnic/trans ethnic public service seen as confidence restoring/reconciliation promoting as well 
as directly crucial to rehabilitation;
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5. restoring law, order, peace within Rwanda with return home by displaced and returning refugee 
wa Hutu and border protection to prevent raids/externally based insurgency. Because operation 
Turquoise and the humanitarian assistance programme in Zaire (though not in Tanzania) 
provided (whatever their intent) safe passage abroad and regroupment plus base facilities for 
IH, the border cordon strategy has esculated into two wars in the Congo and to heavy military 
involvement there with no exit in sight, but not to radical reduction of external IH incursions;
6. seeking to revise chauvinist history (wa Hutu but also wa Tutsi) to demonstrate elements of 
past, and potential for present, harmony (oddly underplaying the Ankole in Uganda and Kagera 
in Tanzania cases in which radically lower levels of stress, more cooperation and, in Tanzania 
'normal' relations among people rather than 'tribes' and even more surprisingly almost 
overlooking the 1994 reality that a high proportion of genocide victims were 'moderate' wa 
Hutu) and to organise rehabilitation programmes on formulations which were at least nominally 
non-ethnic (e.g. differentiated short versus long stay returnees not specifically wa Tutsi '59ers' 
vs. 1994 wa Hutu camp refugees/displaced persons).
The building together of reconciliation and rehabilitation measures is strategic and high profile in
Rwanda than elsewhere because of the history of genocide and the resultant heritage of distrust.
While none of the five major thrusts has failed, none has been totally - or even near totally -
successful;
1. revenge killings and rigged trials have been averted. But the prison count is still over
125,000 - only 5,000 odd have been released under no or weak case provisions - though the 
new arrest flow is now a trickle. The cost in terms of continued grievances (of accusers and 
accused) and of government resources (even though prisoner's relatives must feed and clothe 
them) is very high.107 The polarisation of perceptions has meant almost no confessions - 
presumably from distrust of community courts;
2. IMF - and other donor - fiscal conditions have blocked rapid rehabilitation of state 
education and health services. Donor funding has to a large extent been channeled via 
INGO's which are more expensive (per unit of service delivered) because of higher expatriate 
(and often citizen) pay and greater supporting facilities (e.g. vehicles, staff housing) costs and 
cannot by definition play the reconciling role of joint Hutu/Tutsi public service cadres 
delivering services to all Rwandans via state programmes;
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3. the result of the leader focussed genocide of moderate wa Hutu has been that many 
appointees from this community are less than impressive. Further they create resentment 
among resident wa Tutsi because wa Tutsi appointments have been largely by merit so have 
gone overwhelmingly to returnees. Recent wa Hutu resignations and removals for corruption 
(even through some wa Tutsi were also removed) have aggravated this situation, further 
reducing the credibility and cohesiveness of a non-ethnic pattern of governance;
4. to a degree mass '59er' seizure of 1994-5 refugee/displaced person land has been averted.
But once in temporary possession, returnees have proven hard to 'move on' and both local level 
officials and some INGO's (presumably for different reasons) do not seem to be following the 
Kigali government's strategy very closely;
5. while violence by IH in Rwanda may be slightly lower than in 1995 but it remains high and 
linked to continuing external bases. The operations in the Congo have been highly 
expensive, prone to trying to dominate that country or at least its Eastern half and of limited
1 ORsuccess in weakening IH. Prospects for greater future success are dim and the operations 
have worsened Congolese animosity to the (Rwandan by origin) Banyamulenge so Rwanda 
may find itself with up to 500,000 new refugees;109
6. the historical revisionism - whatever its accuracy - has not been widely accepted by those 
with entrenched animosities and therefore has not been particularly useful as a reconciling 
tool.110 The non-ethnic terminology as to problems has suffered both from lack of transparency 
and from limiting attention to resident/returnee wa Tutsi and ex-majority party/’moderate’/ 
ambivalent wa Hutu cleavages.
The result o f the limited success and high costs of the reconciliation/rehabilitation strategic 
components has been that rehabilitation has moved slowly. That outcome has been reinforced by 
donor holding back even from delivering committed funding until peace, stability and good 
governance (including capacity to deliver) is seen to be achieved. From a Rwanda government 
perspective that is 'Catch 22'. The use of INGO's as channels for what finance has been released 
has further limitations in respect to reconciliation and domestic service capacity rehabilitation.
Unit cost and the lower reconciling capacity of foreign agency than national government 
programmes have been cited. In addition:
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a. there are too many INGOs for the government to coordinate even if many did not act as 
accountable to their own vision and that of their resource providers for Rwanda rather than to 
those o f the government of Rwanda or Rwandan communities;
b. many INGO's and many of their expatriate personnel do not comprehend the complex history 
and present tensions of Rwanda well enough to act fully effectively;
c. Rwanda's is a conflict which tends to polarise many expatriates as fiercely wa Hutu or wa Tutsi 
which is not particularly consistent with government strategy nor with rehabilitation or 
reconciliation.
The present status of rehabilitation is that most physical war damage has been made good with 
homes/farms in areas of severe instability/lack of peace and the national livestock herd the main 
exceptions. Government service delivery capacity is still well below pre war levels and public 
service pay is low enough (and eroding) to threaten productivity, professionalism and probity. 
Some economic sectors - notably commerce - have recovered fully, agriculture has not. With 
1998 output was estimated at 70% of 1990 levels (for a similar or slightly higher population). 1999 
- 2001 levels are likely to be still lower because of drought in parts of the country.
This is a full blown disaster in terms of poverty and nutrition. Most Rwandan households are 
small farmers. Even in 1990 between a third and a half were absolutely poor, malnutrition levels 
were high and poor farming households were net food buyers. The 30% total and per household 
fall (which is quite uneven by district and apparently related to 1994 killing and present instability 
levels) implies well over 50% absolute poverty and - despite food aid - alarmingly high levels of 
malnutrition. Whatever the virtues of long term farming systems transformation proposals, these 
are not relevant to the present challenge. As the post 1992 Mozambique experience demonstrates, 
an end of violence against producers and transporters should and can result in regaining or 
moderately exceeding pre-war output within 2 to 4 years.
Somalia
Som alia111 since 1990 is not a single territorial unit but ajigsaw of small, shifting, unstable 
provincial (e.g. Puntland), multiprovincial (e.g. the Rahanweyn Confederation over 1999-00 
advancing from Bakhool and Bay down to the sea between the Juba and Shibelle rivers), district
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(e.g. Bardhere, Belet Wein), sub-district (in the Shibelle Valley districts) and sub-metropolitan 
(five to eight fragments of Mogadishu) geographic and political artifacts. It is certainly not overall 
a post war but a continuing war situation and has no territory wide political entities, few coherent 
elder led governmental processes and a plethora of fragmenting militias, financed by decreasingly 
profitable looting and 'taxation'/protection money. Some militias are merging/disintegrating into 
armed bandit gangs in kaleidoscopic patterns.112
Not very surprisingly there has been little opportunity for rehabilitation (or reconciliation) 
outside a few stable enclaves and - up to a point - Puntland and perhaps from 1999 around 
Baidoa.11 The radical shifting of control lines - Baidoa has changed hands at least seven times 
since Barre's forces were first expelled; the Rahanweyn Confederation has swung from losing 
Merka-Brava on the coast, a share of the lower Shibelle Valley and of the inter river Shibelle/Juba 
area and Baidoa plus most of Bay district by the end of 1995 to regaining Bay/Baidoa, advancing 
down between the rivers and positioning themselves for advances up the Shibelle and the coast to 
Merka-Brava and perhaps driving past captured Bir Hakaba toward Baladogli Airport and greater 
Mogadishu. Inversely the high noon of General (Barre Army) Aideed's militia is guttering out 
under his successor and son Sergeant (US Marine Corps) Aideed, the Richard Cromwell of 
Somalian politics. But every rise and every fall increases destruction of livelihoods, of assets 
(especially livestock and homes) and of trust and therefore raises the barriers to regaining any form 
of stability, peace and recreation of socio economic and political economic linkages dense and 
resilient enough to be self sustainable.
There is no political uniformity within Somalia. Puntland is ruled by a multi sub clan elders' 
council in alliance with a militia with an Islamic organisation (al Itihaad) theocratic opposition. It 
has created at least minimal law, order and security for commerce but very little more except for 
management o f Bosasso harbour and market - the vital focus for commerce. At least one half of 
the urban population are internal exiles from Mogadishu who hope to return. With peace the 
dominant economic activity - external trade substituting for war closed Mogadishu harbour - will 
also return to Mogadishu and the second most important - shrimp fishing - is already in decline 
because o f gross over exploitation. As a result there is little commitment to basic services 
infrastructure or locally sustainable livelihood reconstruction - albeit great willingness to allow
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foreign NGO's and agencies to provide basic services, relief and transport infrastructure 
maintenance.
The Rahanweyn are a loose two clan confederation now on the offensive (with Ethiopian 
assistance because they oppose al Itihaad as well as Ethiopian Oromian rebels and Ogadeni 
irredentists). Until they regain most of their 1991-95 losses and reach a settlement with the Gebr 
Gedir elders/merchants of the valley and of Mogadishu (with whom, unlike the militias - especially 
Aideed's - they are willing to negotiate) their polity's resources are focused on external (to their 
present territory) war plus internal law, order, commerce protection and - probably - relief 
facilitation during the presently three year old drought. Because of the loss of substantial effort and 
resources when (General) Aideed seized Baidoa in 1995, INGO's and external agencies are still 
reluctant to venture back to Baidoa. They would be welcome not least to local mosque, 
professional and civil society groups who have human and mobilisation capacity in respect to 
water, sanitation, education and health but next to no access to finance or supplies INGO/agency 
reentry would speed up the limited rehabilitation of services lost with 1995 Aideed capture.
Mogadishu, per contra, is steadily refragmenting and sinking into chaos (less so in Mogadishu 
North than in Mogadishu South, and the Afgoi and Baladogli peripheral foci) with increasing 
numbers of militias, the newer ones more merchant led than sub-clan in base and also o f both civil 
and quasi armed mosque based bodies plus some professional service focused civil society groups 
and an eroding merchant/elder governing coalition in Mogadishu North.
The Djibouti Conference has not resolved this process. It was largely a conference of exiles and 
of dissident fractions from within Somalia (and peripherally Somaliland). Its 'President' anoint is a 
former Barre Defense Minister and the committee from which he 'emerged' included General 
Morgan, Col. Jess (Security Police) and Barre's last Chief of Staff - all four very much men with 
blood on their hands and prime candidates for war crimes trial star status. The hired (by printing 
press currency emission) militias who protect their - somewhat ephemeral to date - excursions to 
Mogadishu North do not constitute a broad political, nor a dependable military, base.
Detailed taxonomic description is of limited use as conditions are highly unstable. What 
rehabilitation is possible depends very much on when, as well as where, with whom and what.
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Certain characteristics and proto-trends may be worth summary listing:
1. processes of disintegration and partial restabilisation seem to be at different stages - more 
isolated zones and places - e.g. Puntland, Bardhere, Belet Wein, probably Baidoa - tend to be 
nearer reemergence as stable with some law and order plus commerce facilitation;
2. the keys to restabilisation - i.e. a base for more rehabilitation in most fractions of Somalia - are 
a Rahanweyn/Gebre Gedir settlement and the complete collapse of militia power in Mogadishu 
followed (which may neither be inevitable nor speedy) by interim functional metropolitan 
governance by elder/merchant led groups with mosque backing (probably in four zones plus a 
port/airport access and management coalition at first). Neither can be foreseen as imminent but 
over two to five years each is reasonably probable;
3. political forces based on elders, merchants and mosques - backed by armed forces under 
substantial elder/merchant influences - are much more likely both to achieve stability in an area 
and viable non violent relations with neighbours than those based on leader raised, loot and 
levy financed, 'autonomous' militias and/or al Itihaad as contrasted with less politicised Islamic 
institutions;
4. the Ethiopian/Eritrean war, Oromia insurgency and Ogadeni irredentism (both Somalian and 
Ethiopian) have contributed to destabilisation. Ethiopia's interests have been limited - a quiet 
border - but have led to raids and support for Somalian political fractions, now focused on the 
Rahanweyn. Eritrea - with no real interests in respect to Somalia - has sought to arm Oromian 
separatist rebels and Ogadeni irridentists and rebels as a second front against Ethiopia with the 
primary result o f rearming Sergeant Aideed's militia (not the Oromians and Ogadenis to whom 
the Aideed group did not - possibly could not - turn over most of the arms) and (through the 
Ethiopian reaction) facilitating and capacitating the Rahanweyn military resurgency;
5. In most zones mosque linked, professional (former health education, water staff) and 
community civil bodies able to provide advice, staff and mobilisation for rehabilitation of 
services exist but lack funds and supplies. How much they can do even with external help 
depends on:
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a. how likely renewed violence is in their immediate area;
b. whether their polities broadly favour (but do not/cannot finance) service provision (e.g. 
Puntland, Belet Wein, Rahanweyn and indeed most elder/merchant influenced groups) or 
see providers as a source of loot (e.g. the 'self accountable' militias);
c. how stable - seeing a future in the area in which they now live - as opposed to return to pre­
war areas o f residence oriented civil populations are e.g. most in Baidoa do see themselves 
as Baidoans but far fewer in Bosasso where both the external trade and the main trading 
community are displaced from Mogadishu;
d. no territory wide rehabilitation programme is now possible and even in the most 
favourable locations - Puntland and Bay/Baidoa - nothing comparable to what is 
practicable in Somaliland can currently be achieved because the instability is greater, 
the civil society weaker and the governmental functions beyond law, order and commerce 
protection (at a price) nearly non existent.
Somaliland
Somaliland114 contrasts very sharply with Somalia. Rehabilitation as a process is well advanced 
and based on cumulative reconciliation. Because of non-recognition and a weak revenue base state 
rehabilitation has been focused on constitutional and representational reconstruction, law-order- 
justice provision, facilitation of trade and of remittances and - with much more fragility - 
rehabilitation of a professional public service and of basic service provision.
Somaliland reconciliation and rehabilitation have been assisted rather than hampered by cross 
border linkages. Conflict has been minimal and external support for insurgency low. The key 
interstate relationship - with Ethiopia - has been positive (probably for the first time in 
Ethiopian/Somali history). The dominant relationship with Somalilanders abroad (contract 
workers, old East African diaspora and recent Barre avoiding wider diaspora) has been positive 
leading to very substantial remittances and not insubstantial business development and to a return 
of entrepreneurs and professionals. This balance is markedly different not only from Somalia but 
also from Acholiland, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Eritrea and - a fortiori - Rwanda. Official external
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support for rehabilitation (and more generally) has however been relatively low (albeit increasing 
in 1999) because of international and OAU1 1 non-recognition of the Hargeisa government. 
Somaliland since the defeat of the Barre forces - in Somaliland terms ’the liberation' - has had 
virtually no negative cross border involvements. Arguably this is partly by luck and location, but 
in part it represents deliberate state rehabilitation/consolidation strategy.
While in the early post 1945 years the Issak did develop or at least conceptualise modern Pan 
Somaliism from poetry to politics, their experience with the URS (United Republic of Somalia) and 
the Mengistu regime has led to a good borders/good neighbours approach with no irridentist claims 
in either direction (quite unlike the Ogaden, the southern half of Ethiopia's Somali Region which is 
plagued by separatism and irridentism). Autonomy in Djijiga and power sharing in Addis is 
accepted by the Issak o f Ethiopia. Somaliland makes no claim to Ethiopian Somali Region 
territory which (despite a formal transfer of sovereignty to Ethiopia in the interwar period) the UK 
recoccupied in 1942 and only evacuated in the early 1950's. Its claim is - in President Egal's 
words"6- "our frontiers at independence from the UK, not one inch more and not one inch less" - 
borders which are in fact agreed and almost totally demarcated.
Similarly no disputes exist with Djibouti. The wealthy Somaliland merchants there are ex-refugees 
from Barre. They are returning portions of their business to Somaliland and are supportive not 
hostile. That stance - o f support and transfer of funds to relatives, to home building, to business - is 
typical of long and short stay Somalilander diaspora in East Africa, 'over the water' in the Arabian 
peninsula, in Europe (especially the UK), North America and elsewhere. Numbering up to 
500,000, including family members of the longer stay diaspora, they transfer on the order of $500 
million a year -  over 40% of GNP and almost equal to GDP - which funds most imports and much 
personal consumption thereby holding poverty levels below the African average. With 
improvement in customs management strengthening government revenue, begun in 1999, it should 
also make possible less fragile basic service and infrastructure provision.
The frontier with Puntland (Somalia) is potentially one of transborder problems. In practice there 
has been no substantial separatist movement even in Las Anod whose main sub-clan is largely 
resident in Puntland. Further, despite occasionally flamboyant rhetoric, neither Somaliland nor 
Puntland has sought to escalate conflict, quite the reverse. For example, Las Anod at one point had 
two police forces - Somaliland on duty in uniform, Puntland out of uniform quietly living with kin
and Puntland's real goal seems to be to encourage Somaliland to back a multi state confederation 
(not a unitary government based in Mogadishu) of former Italian Somalia and British Somaliland 
because Puntland's own weight in such a confederation would be much greater if Somaliland were 
within it rather than a separate state. This frontier is fully agreed, but a small (physically near 
inaccessible) portion is not delineated on the ground.
Somaliland has had three major and two recurrent minor instances of armed conflict against the 
government. Of the main three (all involving Issak sub-clans) the Hargeisa Airport and Berbera 
Port cases of 1995 turned on political weight and economic benefits to go to residents living at and 
around key transport assets. In each case Somaliland troops blocked the advance o f the insurgents, 
councils of elders negotiated a settlement, the former insurgent militias were incorporated into the 
Somaliland uniformed services. In neither case was transborder support significant. In the case of 
the longer running Burao insurgency (also intra Issak and about power sharing in Somaliland, not 
secession nor about reunion with Somalia except in General Aideed's dreams) there was an external 
involvement. General Aideed provided some arms, supplies and funds to bolster his claims to 
'national' leadership, but there is no reason to suppose the bulk of the Burao leadership actually 
supported that. Again a conciliar process negotiated a settlement (in 1996) and the militias were 
incorporated in the national forces.
Somaliland has consistently taken an amiable, but arms length attitude to UN, Ethiopian, Egyptian 
and Djiboutian sponsored peace conferences. It has sometimes sent observers, but underlined the 
view that Somalia reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation were for Somalians whereas 
Somaliland had become independent from the UK in 1960, been occupied by the URS in 1961 after 
voting against union and won back its independence from the Barre regime in 1991. There has 
been a slight ambiguity as to whether, if a Federal Somalia were recreated and proven viable, 
Somaliland would consider confederation as well as close economic and cultural cooperation.
There has been no ambuguity that experience with a viable decentralised Somalia was a 
precondition for considering anything beyond developing Somaliland and its economic/cultural 
relations with its neighbours.
Somaliland was not officially represented at the Djibouti Conference. Some exiles/dissidents - 
from the diaspora and the Aideed camp - were present. Somaliland, Puntland, some Mogadishu 
North leaders and the Rahanweyn have taken a de facto  coordinated position against both the
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leadership emerging trom the Conference and its constitutional project for a unitary centralised 
state.
Somaliland has seduously cultivated good relations with Ethiopia both at Addis (national) and 
Djijiga (Somali Regional) levels while making clear it has no claims on the old "reserved grazing 
lands", let alone the whole or Northern half of the Region. The historic transit trade and cross 
border grazing links have been fully rehabilitated. Hargeisa and Addis both wish to build up the 
Berbera -Ethiopia trade corridor and have secured EU regional funding to this end. The one 
exception to the open corridor policy has been to make clear - in a low profile way - that arms 
shipments were unwelcome.
Somaliland has sought good relations with Eritrea, though with no common border both trade and 
transport links are limited. This initiative was presumably partly to build wider support for Horn 
and African recognition and a process toward IGAD and OAU membership. In respect to the 
Eritrean - Ethiopian war Hargeisa has made no statements beyond general support for peace.
In part this diplomatic strategy is directed to securing recognition and in part to ensuring that there 
is little scope for interaction between potentially violent domestic conflicts and cross border 
support or manipulation - i.e. to creating a climate condusive to national/territorial consolidation 
and reconciliation. But it is also directed to restoring and developing the historic highlands - coast 
and remittances economic arteries and thus rehabilitating the economy and government revenue.
Somaliland's national project also turns on reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction
(Hargeisa was virtually levelled and livestock herds ravaged by over half during the 1986-90 
liberation struggle). These three goals have been seen as interlocking and as drawing on four 
strands: the old highlands to the coast coalition state to provide law order, justice and 
pastoralism/commerce facilitation; the historic clan/sub clan elders system and especially the 
national council of elders; the late British colonial basic services by a professional public service 
and accountability for state operations to an elected legislature; the long standing contract 
labour/Diaspora support of the home economy, society and households through remittances. 
These have - especially since 1993 when the Somali National Movement (the civilian ruling body 
of the insurgency against Barre) in effect decided that the gruelling burdens of winning a war and 
stabilising a peace had worn it out and more or less voluntarily relinquished power to President 
Egal -  consistently formed a coherent core of government strategy, policy and praxis.
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The main elements in the project have been:
1. using the National Council of Elders (including 13 added members for largely non Somali 
minority groups) to negotiate settlements of disputes that threatened national coherence (near 
Hargeisa, at Berbera in the two Eastern Provinces and - especially at Burao) to devise the 
outlines of a constitution (now under review by the Executive and the Houses of Elders and of 
Assembly) and to elect the Houses of Elders and of Assembly as well as the President pending 
a direct general election probably in 2002;
2. recreating a professional, paid (albeit on a $20-100 a month range until major improvements in 
1999 raised it to perhaps $50-250) public service;
3. reconstituting basic services beyond law - order - justice focussing on health, education, water 
and veterinary - which, however limited, have regained and probably surpassed 1985 (Barre 
regime pre Somaliland liberation war) levels;
4. encouraging domestic civil society groups, those UN agencies willing to cooperate/coordinate 
with Hargeisa ministries and selected INGOs to act in the basic services field and also in 
infrastructure rehabilitation (now also supported by the EU regional fund for the Horn and 
some EU Member States on Berbera to Addis and Djijiga interstate transport arteries);
5. creating technical authorities to deal with infrastructure (Berbera Port and Hargeisa Airport) 
and other specialised units (e.g. demining with UNDP);
6. recreated local governance - on a mix of historic and British lines - based on nationally 
appointed but autonomous mayors with advisory councils, substantial service responsibilities 
and not inconsiderable revenue bases and actual provision of services (e.g. water, 
sanitation/waste collection, urban planning);
7. established a 5,000 member uniformed, civilian police force (Ministry of Interior, not Defence) 
which is perceived as user friendly and able both to limit crime (and keep guns off urban and 
town streets) and to prevent disputes between individuals escalating into lineage group or sub­
clan hostilities;
8. scooped up at least 90% of militias into the Somaliland Army where they are housed, fed, 
clothed and paid pocket money under national discipline. This has the problems of having
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5,000 needed troops and 12,500 to 15,000 'warehoused'117 personnel whom the government 
believes cannot sately be demobilised until training and demobilisation into livelihood, not 
poverty can be achieved. The earlier demobilisation (1991-2) was partly of men with 
livelihoods to resume and partly funded by merchants (in contrast to Somalia where merchants 
financed warlords) and the current small scale demobilisation via vocational training is also 
civil society financed;
9. established a respected, moderately rapid and transparent primary court system based on a 
synthesis of British Statute/Common, Sharia and Italian Law;
10. thereby creating a climate in which livestock and exports (with a hiatus when the FAO falsely 
declared a Rift Valley Fever epidemic and Saudi Arabia not unreasonably blocked imports) 
have fully recovered, transit trade with Ethiopia is at levels not seen since the early 1970s and 
commerce and services (e.g. mobile phones) are at or above pre-war levels (except for 
electricity);
11. and also encouraging remittances which have reached an all time high of about $500 million a 
year (half of household income) and are the core of many households' consumption 
entitlements, o f national import capacity and (indirectly via customs duty) of government 
revenue;
12. while making a beginning (very weak until 1999) at recreating a tax structure and tax collection 
system focussed on customs and (rather unwisely) export duties;
13. and in 2000 using - in response to initiatives by the House of Elders (which with the House of 
Assembly is relatively assertive and questioning of the Executive although not organised on 
partisan nor other permanent fractional lines) - government funds for water supply aspects of 
drought relief as well as coordinating with WFP and INGO's in respect of food aid. (The 
Somaliland and adjacent Ethiopian Somali Region south to Djijiga drought is apparently much 
less severe and its effects better mitigated than in the Ethiopian Ogaden, or Somalian Ogaden 
and Bay zones.)
The need and the possibility for these packages of strategic steps by Somaliland very much turn on
its own context - not least historic context - which is (and is perceived to be) quite distinct from
that of Somalia.
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The Ethiopian Issak-Hargeisa Highlands-Gulf of Suez Zones have historically had well developed 
pastoral and commercial links. These were vital to household, local and sub-clan economies and 
required peace and predictable law - order - adjudication. The result was law - order - trade 
facilitation states which were coalitions of sub-clans over most of Somaliland the northern half of 
Ethiopia's Somali Region. These states did not provide basic services (beyond law and order), 
much infrastructure (few states anywhere did so until the 19th Century) nor were they particularly 
long lasting individually, but the general pattern endured for several centuries prior to late 19lh 
Century European conquest.
Somali landers perceive themselves as having achieved independence within their current borders 
from the UK in 1960; voted 'No' on union with Somalia, but been militarily occupied; then having 
won back their independence from Mogadishu/Barre in the second half of the 1980s. This is a 
liberation (not civil) war perception (especially since no problem with a neighbour arises as it does 
for Ethiopia with Eritrea, because Somalia is not a going concern and Puntland favours a de facto 
confederal system in Somalia). It is both conducive to national reconciliation and consolidation 
and a base from which to mobilise toward rehabilitation and development.
UNOSOM never had a major presence in Somaliland (if only because it would have had to fight its 
way in to act as proconsul or else to have de facto  recognised the Hargeisa authorities to provide a 
range of support, relief and rehabilitation service parallel to those it attempted in Somalia). This 
did limit resources, but it also forced Somalilanders to handle their own political cleavages - not 
play them off against UNOSOM - and to follow an extended, elder based political reconciliation 
process, excluding self anointed militia. That process was totally unlike UNOSOM's approach on 
each key point. Unfortunately despite - or because? - results in Somaliland were clearly more 
positive than in Somalia, this 'go it alone' approach has led to substantial institutionalised aversion 
to Somaliland within some fractions of the UN system.
All of these contextual factors are unique to Somaliland. They have been bolstered by the - not self 
evidently predictable - emergence of the Ethiopian Issak Somali leadership as significant, relatively 
satisfied participants in the governing coalition in Addis Ababa and in the Ethiopian Somali 
Region. As a result Pan Somalianism among the Issak (as opposed to many of the Ogadeni) has 
again become cultural and economic and the enduring Ethiopian Somali Region-Hargeisa 
Highlands-Coast links pursued across a basically open border not through any attempt (which
would have been disastrous) to revert to the position of (then British) rule over the Ethiopian Issak 
area from Somaliland which pertained to the early 1950's.
The combination of the territorial/national council of elders and the remembered (perhaps in 
somewhat roseate terms) late British colonial governance/service provision model has proven to be 
a positive influence with elders' legitimacy combined with an elected parliament and semi 
autonomous local government as well as attempts to provide basic services and infrastructure 
through a professional public service with substantial space for enterprises and for civil society (a 
modernised development from the space for lineage groups to sub-clans left open by British 
indirect rule). The point is not any desire to see British rule return, but the ability to use elements 
from both historical ('traditional') and colonial institutions and processes in the quest for new 
syntheses. Italian rule (under military and, later, fascist auspices and with far more colonisation by 
Italians) did not (or is not so perceived by most Somalians) to offer any similar legacy.
Therefore, to attempt to apply Somaliland 'lessons' to Somalia, let alone to post war situations more 
generally, would be obtuse. However, some o f the strategic elements used - and the importance of 
genuine 'national ownership' and design of rehabilitation and reconciliation are of broader 
significance. Somaliland - like Mozambique and Namibia - is a success in
reconciliation/rehabilitation terms. But while many of the rehabilitation components are similar or 
the same, the overall strategic packages are not, and would have been less effective had they been, 
identical.
However, the very considerable reconciliation - rehabilitation - reconstruction achievements of 
Somaliland, not least a positive trend toward self sustaining processes, remain at risk and face 
severe challenges:
1. the state/nation remains fragile, not so much in respect to the likelihood of sub-group 
commitment unravelling as of limited financial and personnel capacity to deliver basic services 
and infrastructure;
2. the financial problem turns on a still very weak government fiscal position (despite 1998- 
GO reforms which may well have raised the revenue base from $25 million to $50 million) for 
two reasons:
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a. non recognition which gravely limits external assistance channelled via the government 
(an especially severe constraint on infrastructure and demobilisation/rehabilitation into 
livelihood programmes) and also foreign enterprise involvement;
b. a still weak customs and excise body because of lack of trained personnel and procedures 
partly linked to very little technical assistance to institutional reconstruction and training;
3. personnel constraints in the short run turn on ability to pay (again slightly relaxed - to $50 a 
month general minimum but $100 in the customs service) to ensure present staff can afford 
to/have incentives to work full time and that former public servants and diaspora educated 
younger staff can be recruited. In the longer term a public service training programme - in 
Somaliland at basic levels and in - say - Tanzania, Botswana, South Africa plus Europe and 
North America at technical, para professional and professional levels - is vital because there 
have been few new recruits - especially of professionals and para professionals - since about 
1970;
4. more private enterprise fixed investment is needed and is now constricted because non­
recognition creates serious barriers for banks and for non Somali business in general, but also 
to a degree even for Somalilanders (albeit Djibouti/Somaliland and, in principle, Addis or 
Djijiga/Somaliland linked operations can mitigate the latter);
5. 'warehousing' up to 15,000 ex militia in the national army is a successful step toward 
reconciliation but hardly a permanent solution and is a very serious drain on public finance. 
Neither in terms of finance, programme design nor at least some of the training personnel is 
Somaliland in a position to 'go it alone' and - to date - non recognition has blocked external 
involvement;
6. how Somaliland is to achieve non-sub clan grounded, national parties is unclear. The
Somali National Party has a certain claim to such status but is - and is perceived to be - 
predominantly Issak. The governing coalition led by President Egal is cross sub clan and 
collectively is broad based but is not institutionalised and is not actually a political party so 
much as 'the President's m en '"8.
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Ethiopia
Ethiopia's11 ’ 3R's have been Relief, Rehabilitation and Resettlement. This R-R-R, however, was - 
at least nominally on his part, genuinely by R-R-R professionals - devised as a strategic approach 
to drought during the Mengistu period albeit initially conceptualised and run throughout by a quasi 
autonomous, professional commission.120 The present government has a strategic political 
economic project focussed on regional autonomy, basic public service extension, effective 
mitigation of drought caused dearth and absolute poverty reduction especially in rural areas. This 
package - and its operational entrustment to a public service including major quasi-autonomous 
agencies (which have clear lines of continuity of nearly half a century) turns on the historic context 
of Ethiopia in 1992 and the political imperatives of deconstructing the centralised, exclusivist 
(upper class Amhara) empire (in the classical sense of that term) and reconstructing a regionalised 
inclusivist Ethiopian nation:
1. the Amhara dominated centralised New Empire flowing from Menelik (or arguably 
Tewedros) through Mengistu (a blood descendant of Menelik and very much in the New 
Empire style) had wrenched Ethiopia from the 17th to the early 20lh century and - with 
unintended Italian help - created a basis for a nation, but had also created explosive separatist 
tendencies by the majority frozen out (notably the Oromo, the Galla/Muslim Amhara, the 
Somalis, the Tigreans and the Eritreans);
2. the public service - created under HIH Hailie Selassie - was professional and functionally 
apolitical. As a result it - including quasi autonomous bodies like the Highway Authority and 
R-R-R Commission - was used largely unchanged by Mengistu. However, each regime (now 
including the present government) has set rather detailed political tests for policy and, on 
occasion - notably Mengistu's horrible perversion of an inherently not unsound resettlement 
programme out o f the most densely populated and most eroded, but more relevant to him also 
most anti-Mengistu areas - clearly used genuine technical professionalism as a mask for much 
less benign political projects (in the case cited seeking to empty the Tigrayan civil society lake 
in which the TPLF swam). After a brief confusion over the meaning of nominal membership 
in Mengistu's party the present government has continued (as have the stronger regional ones) 
the strategy of a strong, professional, technically independent (as to advice and, usually, agreed
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policy implementation) public service within a (now more transparent) set of political or 
political economic objectives and parameters;
3. direct physical war damage outside Eritrea and parts of Tigrinye was very limited - the
Mengiustu regime crumbled very fast when the TPLF/EPLF liberation forces broke out of those 
two (then) provinces;
4. for most Ethiopians (including the Galla/Muslim Amhara and - perhaps - the poor Amhara) the 
fall of the Empire was at least potentially a liberation event and the new Government 
perceived building on that potential as essential to survival because a Tigrayan dominated 
centralised state was seen (almost certainly correctly) as unviable;
5. absolute poverty together with absence of basic services in rural areas (whether caused by the 
13% of GDP going into the military or by other factors) was seen as the basic developmental 
challenge but livelihood rehabilitation was not particularly linked to demobilisee, refugee or 
otherwise absolutely poor status (at least outside parts of Tigrinye and Eritrea). Relief to ensure 
that drought and consequent dearth did not lead to mass death was given a high priority in this 
context. Mass death by starvation had catalyzed the fall of HIH Haile Selasse and weakened 
Mengistu (and the TPLF and EPLF had operated effective food relief systems). Urban 
employment/livelihood expansion apparently was still viewed as beyond state ability to achieve 
(as under Hailie Selassie and Menelik) despite urban unemployment (not informal employment 
but none), especially in Addis, from at least the 1960's at levels well above any other non-war 
SSA case and greatly exacerbated by war displacement and postwar demobilisation.
The main components of Ethiopian reconciliation/rehabilitation turned on broadening of access to 
power in Addis Ababa combined with decentralisation of substantial powers to over a dozen 
ethnically based regions backed by efforts to provide broader access to basic services, 
strengthening of rural livelihoods, effective interim survival/relief for displaced/demobilised and 
drought afflicted households and a macroeconomic and infrastructure provision policy frame to 
further rapid growth to reinforce fiscal and foreign exchange resource flows as well as to expand 
urban employment/household livelihoods.
The regions have substantial powers in respect to almost all areas of day to day concern to 
residents. While ethnically defined, they do not - in most cases - discriminate against long resident
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minorities either in the public service or elections. The Somali and Oromia Regions together with 
the Tigrinye underpin the same ethnic groups' support base for the central government. Potentially, 
and to a degree actually, the Amhara (who have elite, poor and Muslim factions with the first - 
except for its senior public servant component - the immediate core of opposition) and southern 
(Ogaden) half of the Somali Region plus several small, peripheral regions whose peoples had more 
in common with some similarly peripheral Kenyans and Sudanese peoples than with Highland 
Ethiopians are negatively disposed, as is a pro-independence Oromo minority. The peripheral 
regions are hard to reconcile and rehabilitate because of geography, history and few 'own' 
personnel either to serve regionally and/or to give a visible presence in Addis.
The senior public service remains both predominately Amhara and technico professional - not
political. The division between expert advice before and implementation after political decisions 
is, if anything, shaiper than under Hailie Selassie or Mengistu but also more transparent. Public 
service restructuring (more front line professionals, e.g. primary teachers, and less support staff,
e.g. janitors), re-professionalising (a sector by sector technico political process led by education 
and health) and paying more (by 1997 to a broad range of $50-500 a month up from a third that in 
the early 1990s) have been central.
Up to 1998 extra state finance for priority objectives came primarily from the peace dividend - a 
cut from 13% plus to 3.5% of GDP - and a rise in external cooperation flows as well as their partial 
redirection from INGO channeled pure relief to Ethiopian government channeled poverty
191reduction.
Interim relief/rehabilitation for refugees - displaced persons - excombattants (perhaps 2,500,000 
including soldiers' immediate families at the end of the war against Mengistu) dominated by the 
latter were eligible for interim food and other immediate assistance; food for work or work 
(for wages) for food project employment and household land allocation in home areas. For
the 65%-70% from rural areas this approach has usually worked (with a lag until ex Mengistu 
soldiers reassured themselves it was an opportunity not a trap). In parallel,proactive data 
collection and analysis to warn early and to respond rapidly with food mobilisation and delivery 
approaches were designed to avert future mass famines largely successfully in 1994-95 but less 
so in 1997-00 because the war with Eritrea diverted state attention and resources and reduced
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external support for financing operations comparable to 1994-95.122 In both sectors the present 
government has welcomed INGO participation on conditions:
a. within government parameters and coordinated with government and Ethiopian civil society 
group projects;
b. phasing down in the medium term as state/civil society capacity rose;
c. manageable in numbers to be seen and coordinated and also limited to INGO's with relevant 
expertise;
d. not perceived by donors or INGOs as an alternative to Ethiopian action or a means to erode the 
state (which had quite overtly been the case during the Mengistu period).
Reordering of relationships has been surprisingly good. Unlike Eritrea, Ethiopia has not moved 
toward a general INGO ban nor even a ban on the INGO's who had been prominent in working 
with the R-R-R under Mengistu even if then seeking overtly to erode state capacity and legitimacy. 
Equally - unlike the experience in Mozambique - INGO's and donors have accepted that the central 
and coordinating roles in basic services and in relief should be state ones and that INGO's should 
neither be alternatives funded externally to erode those roles nor operate without reference to (or 
excluding) state institutions and programmes.
Until 1998 the strategic project was moving ahead and developing momentum. The outbreak of 
war with Eritrea led to massive diversion of financial resources, key personnel and political 
attention as well as to reduced external resource inflows even for disaster relief (most 
unfortunately paralleling a well documented 1997-2000 drought build up in the southern half of 
Ethiopia' Somali region and several other lowland areas plus parts of Tigrinye). The overall 
economic impact is hard to calculate. Export falls relate more to coffee price and volume falls than 
to war and the limited direct physical damage (as distinct from the 75,000 probable death toll). But 
Ethiopia appears to have paid cash for its weaponry and substantially augmented its armed forces 
suggesting that up to $2,000 million has been diverted from basic service expansion, public service 
strengthening and investment over 1998-2000 even excluding perhaps $250 million lost external 
cooperation financing.
Ethiopia’s external policy linked to creating a peaceful setting for rehabilitation and to 
facilitating it via trade and transport links has been variable, kaleidoscopic and not self
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evidently consistent. In the case o f Somaliland it has sought to build up transport, transit and 
export trade and to maintain amicable relations with the Hargeisa government, aims successfully 
achieved at least partly because their Issak brothers in Ethiopia's Somali Region are a crucial and 
relatively content part of the ruling coalition in Addis. In respect to Somalia the priority goal has 
been a peaceful border with no bases for the separatist (a minority) Oromo and the (also minority) 
Ethiopian Ogadeni fighters for a united Ogaden and no border statelets controlled by irredentist 
Somalian Ogadeni (however branded e.g. as Muslim theocratic purists). It is well aware of its 
unpopularity in Somalia (in contrast to Somaliland), has no territorial ambitions and sees no 
prospects of short or medium term trade or Mogadishu port use. A minor secondary theme has 
been amiability toward Puntland and - rather trivial - use of Bosasso port. That goal in Somlia has 
led to brief invasions against al Itihaad area influenced statelets, attempts to create a peaceably 
inclined local government at Lugh and ultimately to substantial equipment, probably finance and 
training and perhaps a few field advisors for the Rahanweyn (and thus open, if indirect, war with 
the Aideed militia rearmed by Eritrea).
Sudanese policy has swung widely. Initially, because the SPLA had had support from the 
Mengistu regime, Addis sought a detente with Khartoum and an end to cross border operations. As 
Khartoum's response (other than desultory talks) was the attempted assassination of Egyptian 
President Mubarrak in Addis and based on a reanalysis - somewhat ironically partly on Eritrean 
advice - it shifted to substantial backing for the SPLA - Northern Democratic Party alliance (with 
their secretariat in Asmara). The 1998-2000 wars with Eritrea has led to a pragmatic lull in 
expressions o f enmity with Khartoum. The military's expulsion of its civilian partner - Sheikh al 
Turabi's Muslim Brotherhood - has created a crisis of legitimacy in Northern Sudan and, for that 
reason, led to Sudanese government tactical attempts to negotiate partial accommodations with 
Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda.
Irrigation on the plateau south and east of Lake Tana - tapping Blue Nile waters -is a significant 
theme in medium term Ethiopian agricultural rehabilitation, environmental protection, material 
food security and rural poverty reduction strategy. Since Ethiopia provides over half o f effective 
Nile water flow, it is also a potential casus belli with Egypt and the Sudan. Ethiopia is not a party 
to the Nile Waters Agreement, but its announcement of medium term plans to draw and abstract 
water without consultation with Cairo or Khartoum can hardly be conducive to good relations with
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the two Lower Nile Valley states. Egyptian policy toward the Sudan, the Horn and East Africa is 
heavily influenced by the vital objective of continued access to guaranteed - preferably 
growing - levels of Nile water. Only in respect to the Sudan are upstream state use limits and 
transboarder flow minima set. Very loose agreements include Uganda and Kenya but Tanzania, 
Rwanda and Burundi -like Ethiopia - have no treaty agreements relative to the Nile and all (as well 
as Kenya and Uganda) are likely in the foreseeable future to seek to irrigate from rivers and/or 
lakes feeding into the Nile. This is an explosive situation. It would appear to be resolvable only by 
negotiation leading to agreed limits to upstream abstraction and to cross border flow guarantees and 
in parallel reducing the 50% water loss from the White Nile by transpiration in the Sudan' Suud 
swamp so Egypt and the Sudan can have guaranteed stable or slightly higher levels consistent with 
some Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia use.
Eritrean relations - a massive setback to rehabilitation and reconciliation in the Horn - are
apparently perceived by Addis as more inter (Ethiopian) regional than interstate. While Ethiopia 
readily implemented the TPLF pledge to the EPLF to allow a referendum on independence and - in 
the event - independence, it apparently perceived Eritrea as a slightly more separate (for a 
time) region with common currency, monetary and fiscal policy and with its economy significantly 
dependent on Assab and Massawa as basically Ethiopian ports with the Assab oil refinery in a 
similar role. That view was not shared by Eritrea whose prickly nationalism rejected it and whose 
programme of national rehabilitation and development included inter alia an Eritrean currency.
This clash of view - bolstered by none too civil relations between the closely culturally and 
ethnically (indeed familiar in some cases) related Tigrinye and Highland Eritrean peoples led to 
increasing acrimony.
The 'border war' is not about undemarcated frontiers. These account for little land and in most 
cases areas very hard, possibly impossible in parts of the Danakil Depression, to reach. The areas 
under dispute - especially two small towns and adjacent agropastoral areas with mixed but majority 
Ethiopian 1990's populations - are territory undoubtedly part of Italian Eritrea but since the early 
1940s administered from Addis (first by the British Military Administration and subsequently by 
Ethiopia).124 The issue was simply not resolved in the run up to Eritrea's independence (for a few 
minutes) before accepting confederacy under the Imperial Crown nor in 1992-93 in the 
preparations for the referendum and renewed independence. The Eritrean case is colonial
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boundaries (the OAU formulation) and the Ethiopian one over 50 years undisputed 
administration/development and - by the 1990's - an Ethiopian population majority. Whether it is 
itself the casus belli, as opposed to a catalyst is doubtful. Eritrea's seizure of land shown on even 
the present Ethiopian government's maps (1995) as Eritrean under Ethiopian administration was 
initially at least largely a reaction to Ethiopian exchange control and trade restriction measures 
Asmara perceived as bullying while to Addis the measures were a response to Asmara's 'unfriendly' 
institution of a national currency.
The Eritrean war has clearly set back rehabilitation through eating up perhaps $2,000 to $2,500 
million with up to 75,000 lives snuffed out in the periods of open war (in arguably the most 
sanguinary trench warfare since Field Marshal Hague's Flanders campaign) and as many severely 
injured. It has also diverted leadership attention from rehabilitation and relief (resettlement, basic 
services, combatting drought imposed hunger and poverty) as well as constricting foreign 
development and emergency support. Ironically the 2000 Ethiopian assertion that it raised the 
scale of the war beyond the costs level the smaller, economically weaker Eritrea could match in 
order to be able to return to development at home is not necessarily disingenuous. A long running 
medium level war with Ethiopian human wave assaults broken by Eritrean artillery and trench lines 
would have been even worse for Ethiopian rehabilitation.
However, an indefinite cease fire with no final peace treaty will end any chance of transport, trade 
and general economic development of Eritrea as if it were an Ethiopian Region - the original 
strategic aim o f Ethiopian policy re Eritrea. It is also likely to prolong the inability of IGAD to be 
an effective regional organisation, to delay the collapse of the present Khartoum military regime by 
hampering coordinated action by the SPLA-Northern Democratic Parties alliance especially on the 
corridors from Port Sudan to the Gezira and to the 'Unity' oil field (overlapping the North/South 
border linne) and to increase the risk of external dabbling in Somalian conflicts. That context will 
raise fears leading to military budgeting above mid 1990's levels with rehabilitation, basic service 
provision and poverty reduction in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and perhaps Somalia and Somaliland 
less rapid than otherwise attainable.
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Eritrea
Eritrea125 is often seen as either a somewhat accidentally independent Ethiopian region or as a 
miniature (five million vs sixty million people) Ethiopia and its 1993 independence as vaguely 
analogous to Slovakia's 'velvet divorce' from the Czech Lands. The first understates the complex 
differences flowing from up to a thousand years of history and the second the convoluted love-hate 
relationship between the Tigrinye and Highland Eritrean elites.
Eritrea:
a. was not part of Ethiopia between the waning of the Axum Empire and its transition - via 
minutes of independence - from British Occupied Italian Colony to confederation with Ethiopia 
through acceding to the suzerainty of the Emperor. Until 1960 it had separate institutions 
including an elected legislature - all suppressed in 1961 by Emperor Hailie Selassie;
b. as a result Eritrea had thirty years of armed insurrection before the fall of the Mengistu regime - 
a struggle which increasingly debilitated that regime fiscally and militarily in Ethiopia proper;
c. the initial 1974 Ethiopian revolution (against the Emperor) included senior Eritrean officers 
who sought recreation of the pre 1961 confederal relations. Mengistu's assassination of their 
leader - the General who was at least nominally the head of the Dergue - precisely because of 
his pursuit of confederal peace put paid to any Eritrean compromise on independence;
d. Eritrea prior to the 1961-1992 liberation struggle had never been a national (or imperial) state 
but a border zone fought over by other states. Its boundaries as Italian Eritrea included most of 
its historic heartland but also the Danakil Depression/Asab coastal strip which was not part of 
historic Eritrea;
e. Eritrea - unlike Ethiopian regions - is not characterised by a large majority of one 
ethnic/cultural group. It - like Ethiopia - has a Highland Coptic/Lowland Muslim divide (with 
the same qualifications that not all Highlanders are Coptic and some groups straddle both 
altitudes). Its initial liberation warriors - the EPF - were largely Lowland Muslims. They were 
overwhelmed militarily by the EPLF which is cross faith and cross altitude but with a largely 
Highland Coptic leadership. As a result, the EPLF has always feared pluralism and
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condition of the people of, Sudan. The post 1997 military regime in Khartoum is perceived as 
analogous to Mengistu's, while Sheikh al Turabi and the Muslim Brotherhood are seen as 
promoting and exporting doctrines inimical to peace and unity in Eritrea. This led to serving as 
a catalyst for the SDLP - Northern Democratic Parties liberation alliance (Sudan Democratic 
Front) based in Asmara while the Sudan based attempt to assassinate the President of Egypt in 
Addis provided an opening for Eritrea to convince Ethiopia (previously hostile to the SDLP 
because Mengistu had assisted it) to back it;
4. because it saw food aid as dependence creating and market destabilising, Eritrea negotiated 
(successfully) to reduce food aid in non drought years and (less successfully) to convert it to 
cash aid for mechanised development resettlement. That process was reversed (consistently 
with Eritrean strategy but confusing to WFP) in 1999 as a result o f drought (exacerbated in 
2000 by war displaced persons);
5. because it perceived local rehabilitation and development as best carried out by Eritreans within 
an Eritrean government articulated strategy, Eritrea saw no long term role for INGO's - a 
perception exacerbated by the impression some were unwilling to coordinate or cooperate with 
anyone. Interestingly the INGO inputs it most valued were survey, data collection and analysis 
to be fed into its programmes. Near total expulsion by 1996 had begun to be shifted to selective 
use before the Ethiopian war. The war - by creating resource gaps - made INGO's (again 
presumptively ad interim) much more acceptable to Eritrea;
6. Disagreements with donors - reducing aid flows -turned on unwillingness to accept broad front, 
multi parameter conditionality. It has also presented project proposals which tended to be rigid 
and less than usually (even in SSA terms) backed by hard numbers and rigorous analysis even 
when probably sound. There has also been a serious misunderstanding over accounts - Eritrea 
lacks accountants, probably wants accountancy training, but took criticism of accounts to be 
charges o f fraud.
In the long term a democratic Sudan not acting to destabilise its neighbours would be conducive to 
stable rehabilitation. Eritrea has, in practice, avoided armed clashes with the Sudan but has quite 
overtly supported the Democratic Alliance as the only route to reach R-R-R in the Sudan. The 
stress on food production, Eritrean community action in national strategic parameters and avoiding
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overly time intensive collation of weak (nil prior to 1993) statistics and (consequently) analysis 
have plusses as well as minuses.
The war with Ethiopia - arising out of the growing hostility and consequential secondary disputes 
not just over the ex-Eritrean/near fifty year Ethiopian administered lands - has been an unmitigated 
disaster for rehabilitation (albeit it has apparently not weakened the success of intra Eritrean 
reconciliation). The bases of the two claims - Eritrea's on Italian boundaries and asserted 1940 
population pattern, Ethiopia's resting on near fifty years of actual Ethiopian rule and a mid 1990's 
Ethiopian population majority - are clear but clear in ways making resolution very difficult 
especially after war. With substantial economic disruption, up to 500,000 displaced 
persons/refugees and a de facto two year gap in development/rehabilitation spending to fund the 
military, renewed rehabilitation in Eritrea requires at least a stable cease fire/truce and preferably 
an internationally endorsed and monitored peace treaty. Whether this will eventuate and whether it 
will convince the governments to demobilise conscripts (probably several hundred thousand on 
each side) and reduce arms buying are highly problematic.
Particular components of rehabilitation conceptualisation and praxis have flowed quite directly 
from the historic context, centralised regime allowing limited space for civil society initiatives
because of fear of wilful attempts to reverse domestic reconciliation (this despite genuine concern 
for participation and poverty reduction) and prickly materialism sketched above:
1. creation of a state administrative structure from central to village level (in practice EPLF, not 
Ethiopia, governed from the fall of Mengistu, not only after independence) with a 
parallel/interlocking party structure;
2. creation of a civil service, initially paid room and food but transformed to a paid and more 
professionally structured basis in 1995 - necessarily from scratch because, while Eritreans were 
from the 1960's to 1998 the second largest cadre at middle and upper levels in the Ethiopian 
service, most Eritreans in that service did not serve in Eritrea and few were willing to risk rank 
and give up pay by returning home. The new Ethiopian regime trusted them as a counterweight 
to the Amhara plurality in the senior public service because they were not linked to any 
political fraction in Ethiopia so, until 1998, they were welcome to stay;
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3. a detailed, planned, controlled, serv iced resettlement programme for displaced persons 
and refugees phased over four years with few returning before being 'called up' and many 
'relocated' from their previous (sometimes over twenty years previous) home villages. This was 
in part to maintain control, in part to provide basic (health, education, water) and livelihood 
support (extension, transport) services and in part to avoid uncontrolled return of refugees in the 
Sudan who were remnants of the broken EPF who had fled the EPLF as much as, or more than, 
Mengistu and were perceived as a possible threat;
4. creation of participatory channels by location (from village up) and through other (e.g. 
women, peasants, urban workers) groups within the EPLF umbrella and controlled by it so far 
as strategic parameters and major policies went, but with some flexibility as to local projects. 
Participation - including knowledge provision and need elucidation - was desired, but only 
within civil society space set by the state/party and subject to boundary adjustment by them. 
Much participation in rehablitation work was/is genuine, some is under social pressure and 
some probably from tacit coercion. It would be inaccurate to describe it as a corvee system or 
analogous to the 'voluntary' labour system of Mengistu (although that too had genuine support 
for some projects in some areas);
5. concentration on primary health care and education, water (human and livestock), 
agricultural extension and transport, infrastructure rehabilitation and maintenance in the
national through village public sector and livelihood rehabilitation (using the public sector 
services) in the household and medium/small enterprise sector;
6. while avoiding a state trading economy Eritrea operates macro and sectoral economic 
policies characterised by intervention e.g. in agriculture which was initially marked by an 
emphasis on basic food self sufficiency from small farming household production, but was then 
radically (and suddenly) shifted to focus on high value export crops (horticultural) from large, 
mechanised farms;
7. both public and private physical rehabilitation through reconstruction since almost all asset 
categories (from houses through land improvements and livestock to basic infrastructure) had 
been damaged or destroyed during the war against the Mengistu regime except in Asmara 
proper, a situation quite different from most of rural Ethiopia, let alone Addis Ababa;
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8. Mobilising diaspora remittance, domestic tax/labour contribution and external resources - 
probably in that order - to sustain the financial requirements of strategic programmes 
(radically shifted to war over 1997-00). Remittances have provided several hundred million 
dollars a year financing household/small business rehabilitation and reconstruction indirect tax 
flows to the state and voluntary contributions. The tax revenues are primarily customs and 
excise while external resources have largely been food aid and related resettlement support 
falling away well before the 1998 war as coarse grain production neared national self 
sufficiency;
9. prior to the 1998 war output and service provision were rising significantly - probably on a 
5% to 6% trend. In part this may have reflected initial reversal of the near non-functionality of 
much of the economy after 30 years of war marked by the displacement or driving into exile of 
over half the population. With the exception of sugar, cooking oil, wheat and rice (the latter 
two preferred but not dominant staples), Eritrea probably had reached non-drought year self 
sufficiency by 1997. Both drought and war have knocked it back into deficit. Before the 
Ethiopian war, Eritrea had arguably achieved the least bad primary health, education, water and 
extension coverage in the Horn (excluding the city state of Djibouti albeit even in that case 
arguably Asmara, Massawa and many rural areas are better served than Djibouti, Obock and 
rural Djibouti respectively). The war impact has clearly been serious but how long lasting it is 
depends on how rapidly people can return home and how fully basic service financing can be 
restarted.
Eritrea provides a continuing lessons for early warning/early mediation advocates. In 
retrospect, the road to war with Ethiopia and the reasons for it (as separately perceived in Addis 
and Asmara) can be identified and comprehended. However, it is not easy to see how the chasm 
between Eritrean and Ethiopian perceptions of actual and normatively desirable interstate relations 
could have been bridged. Neither does the 'democracies do not go to war' rubric help. While 
neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea is a full democracy each is responsive to public opinion and in each 
case governmental nationalism has been at least matched by popular. Nor would clearer 
explanation of the costs of preparing for - let alone engaging in - war have been likely to sustain 
peace. The reason is not that the Addis and Asmara authorities gave a low priority to 
rehabilitation, but that they perceived nationalism, self determination and populist/mass
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support tor national self assertion as necessary to protect space for and to provide national 
support to sustain material rehabilitation.
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FLEXIBILITY AND MARGINS: MANAGING UNCERTAINTY
One nearly omnipresent feature of rehabilitation strategic design and programming has been lack of 
forward resource allocation stability. This includes not merely resource allocations doubtfully 
adequate to achieve significant results within a two year time frame, but also with no 
contingency reserves to compensate for unprojected (and often unprojectable) negative 
contingencies and to act on unanticipated opportunities. That weakness is often compounded 
(especially when no specific strategic frame or prism for ordering programmes to further objectives 
has been set out) by relative rigidity in programme design and articulation rendering viring 
resources among uses to side-step blockages and accentuate action in areas of unexpected (whether 
as to time, scope, volume or ease) opportunities difficult and delayed.
True, those criticisms apply to a majority of strategic and programmatic operations in Africa under 
structural adjustment rubrics, not only to R-R-R. But they are probably more telling in respect to 
rehabilitation because uncertainties which cannot he resolved ex ante are more numerous and 
basic in respect to rehabilitation than - say - overall fiscal management or non-conflict area 
infrastructure maintenance, restoration and development. Both for rehabilitation, and African 
economic management more generally, the principle that the greater the uncertainty, the greater 
the need for contingency reserves (either mobilised but initially unallocated resources or pre 
negotiated, rapidly accessible, specified event contingent facilities) is very evidently not being 
acted upon and apparently not even seriously considered. The basic reasons are clear enough:
a. with demands/needs above projectable/budgetable resources (not only in financial, but also 
analytical, institutional and personnel terms) to hold back reserves appears both economically 
wasteful and politically imprudent;
b. donors in general are unwilling to provide - say - 10% of ongoing funding on the basis of 
allocation during a budget year to meet unanticipated needs/opportunities or to provide for 
quick, easy viring within and among programme packages, let alone to pre negotiate rapidly 
drawable 'standby'/contingency allocations.
These reasons do have internal logics of varying degrees of coherence, but result in inefficient 
allocations, unusable resources, inability to respond actively to uncertainties and significant delays
VII
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in implementing at all. Very poor countries recently wracked by armed conflict are 
economically, socially and politically least able to bear these cost burdens/positive result 
delays.
Among the key uncertainties likely to impact on any rehabilitation and/or reconciliation process 
are:
1. calamities - both in the sense o f climatic (drought, flood) disasters and of external economic 
shocks quite beyond any short term state or directly productive sector ability to manage and 
also not subject to accurate projection;
2. domestic catastrophes - basically return to armed conflict flowing from primarily domestic
causes;
3. trans border/catastrophes in which externally based domestic fractions and/or their foreign 
associates 'restore' armed conflict which would not otherwise be sustainable;
4. failure to identify or to capitalise rapidly enough on a lull in hostilities which, if used, may 
create a reconciliation/trust building process able to block renewed widespread violence but if 
not perceived or missed may prove to be merely the eye of a hurricane. This is especially true 
if key areas o f potential future violent conflict - e.g. land ownership in Southern Africa - are 
postponed (initially perhaps quite validly) and then left as sleeping dogs rather than kept on the 
agenda for early action. Unfortunately such sleeping dogs are then available to be kicked to 
manipulate attitudes and confuse realities on other issues and have a tendency to be, at the least, 
vicious and often rabid. The Zimbabwe settler land issue and its systematic postponement and 
reactivation for varying reasons - not always closely related to land ownership as such - on
• t • 196several occasions since Lancaster House is an obvious example.
Calamities
Calamities reduce resources (physical and financial) available and/or increase costs. Drought (or 
flood) creates scarcity o f food accessible to poor persons - especially drought or flood afflicted 
farmers - and reduced industrial input/export crop production while also reducing poor producer 
entitlements to food as well as national foreign exchange and fiscal revenues.127 Terms of trade
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have similar results (poor producers lose on unit value as well as volume falls). In Kenya-Uganda- 
Tanzania-Rwanda 1999-2000 is likely to record substantial fall in coffee output paralleled (at least 
in respect of robusta) by a 30% to 50% dollar unit price collapse; a combined weather/terms of 
trade calamity far outweighing more limited drought impact on staple food production.
Calamities may or may not be natural (markets as human artefacts are somewhat hard to define in 
that way and water offtake/deforestation erosion do affect droughts and floods). They are not 
basically susceptible to accurate projection nor to short term national action to manage or to 
prevent/reduce, as opposed to alleviate after the event. It is valid to argue that SADC (Southern 
Africa Development Community) can in the medium term manage water flows/reservoir levels and 
releases in a way modestly reducing severity of droughts and floods. It is technically possible - if 
politically harder - for it to coordinate levels of use, water allocation (by price or mixed 
instruments), erosion control, selective reafforestation to decrease (at least relative to inaction) 
water drawings and loss by transpiration and to delay runoff from heavy rains reducing drought 
impact and flood surges. How the IGAD (Horn) countries could act similarly - even together and 
even assuming political harmony - is much less clear. They do not comprise all the Nile basin 
countries and the conflict of interests between Egypt (not an IGAD member) and the upstream 
riparian states therefore cannot effectively be managed within the present IGAD. Similarly, while 
the extreme volatility of the world coffee market imposes net losses on producers/exporting 
economies and consumers/importing economies (and probably on manufacturers), efficient and 
cost feasible methods of intervention have not to date been attainable and the initial impact of 
exporting country buy up and retention schemes are quite likely to be several months o f lower 
export earnings and fiscal resource availability with very limited price gains at the end.
The relevant point is that lessened domestic resource availability and reconstruction/survival 
support costs reduce funding for rehabilitation directly and by blocking the use of eternal funds 
contingent on domestic contributions, at least if the country is bound by external commitments on 
fiscal and trade deficits (as a large majority of African countries are).
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Catastrophes
Catastrophes have the same resource reduction/cost expansion impact as calamities. This is true 
even if the catastrophe relates to a different conflict (e.g. Ethiopia -Eritrea war or Uganda - Congo 
armed conflict) than the one whose consequences are addressed by the rehabilitation programme.
If the new/renewed war is full scale (in terms of the afflicted state), as is arguably the case for 
Sudan, Rwanda and Uganda, certainly for Ethiopia and DRC and a fortiori for Eritrea, genuine 
government priority for rehabilitation (or even preventing drought and dearth from becoming 
famine and death) will be unable to override war economy strategic 'necessities'. Negative donor 
reaction to any/all appeals from such war embrangled states is likely to accentuate the shortfall.
One significant (but partial) exception illustrates the generalisation. Since 1994 Tanzania has 
increased military expenditure and 'accepted' substantial spillover conflict costs from refugee tidal 
waves. It has succeeded in mobilising at least partially incremental external funds toward 
offsetting/reversing the impact of the latter but not the former. Why? Because the armed conflicts 
involved are the complex Rwanda-Burundi-Eastern Congo wars and the costs the impact of 
refugees on basic services, water supplies, environment (especially trees and bushes) and women's 
work load, whereas the military costs relate to (successful) deployment of existing forces on or near 
borders to prevent armed violence spilling into Tanzania.
The additional costs of catastrophes in respect to rehabilitation - at least if they reopen the same 
armed conflict and/or are in the same areas - is physical damage to achieved results and reversal 
of forward progress, not merely in respect to physical and institutional rehabilitation but also in 
respect to processes o f reconciliation and trust building which are key inputs into and whose 
sustainability is usually contingent on progress in rehabilitation.
For that reason Uganda's and Rwanda's desire to combat Interahamwe (primarily) in its Congo base 
areas (achieving relative peace and stability at home) and Uganda's to build up forces on or near its 
Acholiland border and roads to increase ability to respond to raids rapidly to keep the LRA away 
from Acholi reconciliation and rehabilitation, are inherently economically as well as politically and 
militarily rational. The particular strategies and tactics in respect to anti IH interventions in the 
Congo may however have unsustainable political, economic and military capacity costs and - at 
least to date - neither they nor Acholiland border protection have been even substantially effective.
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Lull Utilisation
Lull utilisation has a very uneven record. Prior to the outbreak of armed conflicts (or at least 
new ones) that event is often unforeseen and rarely identifiable with much accuracy as to catalyst, 
timing, geographical extent or intensity. In general over-optimism has been characteristic of 
what evaluations have been tried - especially when manifestly internally contradictory and 
unsustainable pauses have been negotiated - as was very notably the case in Sierra Leone. This has 
also been true of inherent contradictions likely to re-emerge as causes or catalysts (e.g. the settler 
land issue in Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. These include, the Italian 
Eritrean border areas placed under Ethiopian management by the British Military Administration in 
the early 1940's and not resolved - one way or the other - either at the time of the Ethiopian- 
Eritrean federation under one crown nor in the 1992-94 Eritrean independence process. There may 
have been too much willingness set aside or overlook on the 'let sleeping dogs lie' principle. Such 
'dogs' have a tendency to be kicked - accidentally or on purpose, to awake biting and to turn out to 
be rabid.
During armed conflict some reconciliation and rehabilitation initiatives are usually possible, but 
partial, local,fragile and unlikely to be self sustaining/expanding. One partial exception - in respect 
to Renamo forces in Southern Mozambique is illustrative. Renamo's forces there were starving 
in 1992. Their discovery that the State gave priority to food relief (and vaccination/immunisation) 
for them and their families and knew the size and location of their civilian (as opposed to military 
exercise launching) base camps (and thus could, if it had wished, have wiped out their families) did 
start a process of trust building which certainly facilitated demobilisation in the four Southern 
provinces. Arguably it also led to deeper civil reconciliation and to voters there (unlike the 
Northern and Central Zones) voting for Renamo only if they truly desired Dhlakama as President 
and Renamo as Government, not as a catchall protest against limited service delivery and manifest 
corruption by the Frelimo Government with no real desire for/faith in a Renamo alternative. 
However, the case is partial because the Southern Renamo leaders only became aware o f these 
facts at about the time of the cease fire/Rome Accords i.e. the beginning of the lull. They had 
existed for at least 12 to 18 months before, but Mozambique government and UN agency 
cautiousness plus opposition by Renamo's central leadership delayed action.
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To capitalise on a lull to set in motion self re-enforcing processes of rehabilitation and 
reconciliation requires willingness to take risks and identifications of social/political cleavages (and 
their causes) contributing to past armed violence and in danger -unless treated by reconciliation 
backed by rehabilitation - of leading to its renewal.
The risk ot renewed armed conflict is often evident. So long as trust is low it may be even more 
nakedly apparent than re a l . ''; Renewed armed conflict can sweep away physical, service and 
institutional rehabilitation virtually literally overnight - e.g. Baidoa, Somalia in the fall of 1995 and 
partially (and much more transitorily because all parties sought to avoid damaging key assets) in 
Hargeisa and Berbera, Somaliland a few weeks later.
Collapsed reconciliation increases distrust and can make new efforts harder than if there had 
been no earlier attempt. For example, early 2000 events in Sierra Leone have hardened broad 
public opposition (especially in Freetown) to any reconciliation with the RUF (Revolutionary 
United Front) and specifically put paid to any role for Foday Sankoh in a viable government of 
reconciliation (not necessarily a bad thing, but a limitation on ways and means). Per contra 
because the 1997 ex-army rebels (Koromah Group) have rallied to the government against the 
RUF, reconciliation with and political participation by them is now more likely to prove 
acceptable.
Capitalising on a lull requires reasonably accurate and (however hard) dispassionate identification 
of cleavages which are rarely simple dichotomies. It is true that perceived history is a cause of 
conflict and alteration o f perceptions can facilitate reconciliation. But historical revisionism 
which attempts by selective use of sources to suggest historic conflicts have been fairly secondary 
and exacerbation largely the result of colonial rule and of manipulation by unscrupulous politicians 
- clearly exemplified by the present government of Rwanda's 'strategic history project' - have 
distinct limitations. They tend to overstate their case - which frequently (including in Rwanda) has 
a substantial valid component. Even if correct, they are effective tools to reconciliation only if 
they result in changes of perception and behaviour by many of those previously committed to 
conflict.
In Rwanda to characterise present conflictual and actually or potentially armed conflictual 
cleavages as simply wa Hutu/wa Tutsi is dangerously simplistic, especially in respect to 
rehabilitation. On the other hand, to state all conflicts of interest in ways obscuring (verbally, but
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probably only verbally) the fact that (if only as a result of the past and present realities of 
Interahamwe and of the Rwanda Patriotic Army invasion and conquest) the most basic divide is wa 
Tutsi/wa Hutu is equally unhelpful.
Within the wa Tutsi there are two very differently placed fractions - the abiding residents and the 
long absence returnees (now probably each of the order of 600,000-750,000). The former lost up 
to half their numbers in the 1994 genocide but the latter lost very few in conflict over the past 30 
years (since the initial 1959 jacquerie). The genocide focused on leaders first - therefore pre war 
resident wa Tutsi are very thin on the ground in middle to senior government or enterprise ranks.
On the other hand they have - by and large - been able to reclaim their and their relative's pre 1994 
land and buildings. The returnees - who unlike the long time residents are anglophone - dominate 
political and military leadership, middle level business and government and professional positions. 
On the other hand - in principle if not so uniformly in practice - they have not been allowed to 
reclaim land or buildings (the majority of which were lost in 1959-61) to avert pauperisation of and 
consequent irreconciliability with wa Hutu. The wa Hutu have three fractions - 'Moderates' who 
supported the minority parties, a majority now committed neither to IH nor to reconciliation and 
last ditch ('Gun in hand we left our country, gun in hand we shall return')11(1 IH supporters in the 
Congo and in exile/raiding into Rwanda.
The 'moderate Hutu' hold a high proportion of senior governmental and para governmental posts (at 
one point President, Prime Minister and a majority in Parliament) but have only moderate to 
marginal influence. They are not prominent in professional services, nor the private sector. The 
reasons are first that their leadership was almost totally wiped out in the genocide and they - unlike 
the wa Tutsi - had no flow of returnees to regenerate leadership, professional and entrepreneurial 
cadres and second that the moderate wa Hutu or wa Hutu/wa Tutsi parties failed to influence the 
last pre genocide government (in which they held the Prime Ministership and a plurality of cabinet 
seats) and were rescued from annihilation during and after the IH genocide as a by-product of the 
armed conquest by the RPF/RPA. They share the losses of the resident wa Tutsi without being 
fully linked to, or trusted by, wa Tutsi or by other wa Hutu and many of their political 'leaders' are 
not impressive nor influential (because many are random survivors now promoted far beyond 
experience or - in some cases - capacity).
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The wa Hutu uncommitted and/or withdrawing from attention by not occupying public space 
(whether IH or RPF dominated) are predominately motivated by fear. They have lost any 
substantial political role and are caught between IH terrorism and attempted reoccupation and RPF 
inability (and an occasion disinclination) to differentiate between IFI cadres and supporters and 
silent bystanders who dare not openly endorse or assist against IH by day because to do so is 
frequently a death sentence when night falls. They perceive a need for peace (absence of IH) and 
more sustained rehabilitation especially of rural livelihoods, but also of basic services and of 
avenues to participate in governance. In general professionals and urban merchants in this group 
have retained their positions and property as have farmers who never fled but - despite government 
policy - those who were displaced domestically or into exile have frequently lost it to wa Tutsi 
'returnees'.
The IH core - partly on the ground in Rwanda backed up by larger cadres and bases in Congo - is in 
no way interested in reconciliation (even with total amnesty and a major role in the government). 
Until defeated militarily (or by a generation change and despair over quasi permanent exile) the IH 
are an insuperable barrier to peace and stability and therefore a major limitation on reconciliation 
and rehabilitation particularly in respect to social capital and to institutional and self generating 
expansion aspects. They also are a virtual guarantee of transborder conflict because no likely 
Congo government will have resources and priorities consonant with breaking them and no 
international peace keeping force is likely to have the 'seek and destroy' mandate nor the 15,000 to
25,000 well trained, well armed, mobile, heli gunship led force needed to put IH out of business 
once and for all (or at least for a decade).
Even this snapshot sketching of characteristics indicates that the conflicts of interest and potential 
violent cleavage lines are multiple. Needs/concerns in respect to land access, land/building return, 
prompt, transparently just resolution of the 150,000 genocide charges resulting in imprisonment 
pending trial, stability in terms of ending of credible armed threats to the government vary widely 
among these five fractions.
A cross cutting set o f cleavages are social - youth, women (and especially female household heads) 
rural and urban residents have significantly different livelihood needs and capacities. These are 
unlikely to be well served by uniform rehabilitation programmes failing to examine either
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national/sub national contexts or particular operational requirements of different social and ethnic 
fractions.
The nature and timing of lulls - as opposed to their appearance, passing and re-emergence - are 
highly contextual and historically influenced/bounded. General principles relate to their 
providing opportunities to mutually supporting/self reinforcing reconciliation and rehabilitation; to 
the need to identify historic and present cleavages which have led to armed conflict; to possible 
entry points for reducing these cleavages in articulated ways relevant to particular social groups.
But to take advantage of such analysis and insights requires flexibility in resource levels and 
allocations not one size fits all procedures or parameters whether development assistance 
bureaucratic or macro economic.
Like alleviating the downside of calamities and catastrophes, the exploitation of lulls requires 
flexibility in resource use and standby/contingency lines of finance. For them to be available 
requires that R-R-R be prioritised as part of the strategic core of macro economic (as well as macro 
political) policy by external resource providers as well as by domestic governments. To date that is 
manifestly not the case.
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BY WHAT MEANS? ON WHAT PATHS? TO WHAT ENDS?
A series of conclusions appear to flow from this study. Post war situations with many - often a 
majority - of households severely deprived in respect of livelihood, access to basic services, 
existence of local infrastructure (and therefore aces to markets), to existence of effective - let alone 
participatory and accountable - governance and to robust social capital networks (especially across 
ethnic division where these have been integral to armed conflict) are numerous, in all continents 
except Antarctica and Australia, and afflict scores of millions of households. Empowerment of 
households, communities, social actors, national economies and states to recover cannot be 
expected to take place as a matter of course. Nor - because many of the gains flow from inherently 
public goods, are from programmes with large external economies or relate directly to enabling 
poor people to become less poor - can the market alone initiate and drive recovery.
While some aspects o f Reconciliation-Rehabilitation-Reconstruction after war are analogous to 
recovery after calamities (natural disasters and external economic shocks) and/or poor person 
friendly growth and development initiatives others are different because of the depth, breadth and 
duration of the losses sustained.
Rehabilitation needs to be in a context of Reconciliation and Reconstruction with which it interacts 
because state capacity is a key element in perceived legitimacy and because large scale 
infrastructural, directly productive and financial enterprises in many cases depend on purchases by 
and inputs from the urban and rural household sectors. Rehabilitation is a process not an event if 
only because setbacks from calamities, apparent opportunities which turn out to be dead ends, 
partial rekindling of armed conflict and/or plain mistakes are inevitable. It is not a short term 
process but a medium term one - five to seven years might be a plausible estimate if delayed starts, 
marginalisation and/or massive repetitive setbacks can be avoided.
Rehabilitation comprises of five main elements:
1. facilitating restoration of livelihoods (to which a precondition is normally ability to 'go
home');
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2. restoring (or providing) broad access, with universality as a target, to basic services: law - 
order - absence of violence, primary and, often, applied adult education, primary health services 
(with emphasis on prevention - education - nutrition as well as basic curative capacity), water 
(often including livestock and small scale irrigation), frequently extension (agricultural, 
veterinary and their urban analogues);
3. repairing/extending local infrastructure with special emphasis on that needed for market 
access, basic service delivery and local governance;
4. providing effective safety nets (preferably of the trampoline or 'bounce back' type) with 
particular reference to food (and public works employment to buy food) and water to ensure 
that episodic calamities do not implode the rehabilitation process;
5. Deconcentrated central and decentralised local governance with capacity to deliver which 
is increasingly participatory (not least in articulating from strategy to policies, programmes 
projects, priorities, and in providing data on household goals, capacities and needs for outside 
inputs into empowerment) and accountable (beginning with intelligible oral and numerical 
accounts).
Rehabilitation (like Reconciliation and especially Reconstruction) is not replication of the pre war 
situation. Elements in that situation usually contributed to the tensions erupting in armed conflict, 
the system was unlikely to have been either poor household or female headed household friendly, 
war itself causes changes which need to be addressed e.g. the increase in the proportion of female 
headed households (with weak able bodied hands to hungry mouths ratios and problematic access 
to land) and - to a degree - HIV and malaria epidemics. The world has not stood still during the 
wars. For better (e.g. present understanding of primary health care) or for worse (e.g. international 
economic constraints including increasing volatility and trend decline in grant aid) what is possible 
now diverges from what was possible pre war.
However, this need to build anew can be seen as more of an obstacle to speedy action than it is.
The overriding goals of war afflicted households are to recover that which was valued and has 
been lost. Most - not all - basic services units and local infrastructure were valued and suffered 
more from paucity than inappropriateness. Even quick participatory exercises can usually elucidate 
clear priorities for initial action.
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To this degree it is practicable to conceptualise Rehabilitation and to generalise across 
countries. However, context is usually of overriding or at least substantial importance so that 
a universal action blueprint is highly inappropriate. The nature of the war, its duration, the 
physical damage done, the survival of social capital, the specific nature of civil society and social 
actors, the continuation of hatred between ex warring parties especially if  perceived by them as 
ethnically based, the presence or (more usually) absence of massive remittance flows, the safety of 
the neighbourhood (e.g. borders with Tanzania or Somaliland are very different propositions from 
ones with the Congo or Somalia), the key sectors of the household economy are all important.
Local knowledge in details and indepth is needed to capitalise opportunities and avoid debacles,
e.g. Somalia/Somaliland all water is - in historic law - owned by someone and others must pay for 
its use; a fact UNOSOM overlooked with serious consequences because the Mogadishu wellfield 
community, who had protected it during the war, viewed UNOSOM's unilateral restoration actions 
and failure to offer rents, jobs or basic services as blatant armed robbery.
The cost of full scale rehabilitation is not low. For deeply impacted areas the combined capital 
and additional basic services/local governance bill is likely to be of the order of $50 per war 
afflicted person per year for five years (plus additional safety net and delay outlays)131 after 
which local and central government revenue (from multiplier effects and indirect taxes much more 
than fees or poll taxes) should balance recurrent spending while basically rehabilitation capital 
spending should be largely complete.
However, neither are the potential gains negligible. If the household (and especially rural small 
farming household) sector is large and the overall war devastation severe doubling of national 
output (including multiplier effects) may be the order of the five to seven year payoff quite apart 
from improved health, education, per cent of households above poverty lines, national food security 
(physical) and household food security (entitlements) and government fiscal and national external 
(im)balance positions.
The complexity o f the rehabilitation process and its content together with its resource allocation 
requirements, interaction with other sectors and economic potential argue for its inclusion as a 
strategic component at the core of macro economic planning, programming and budgeting. Unless 
this is done Rehabilitation is likely to be marginalized, trade offs with other sectors will be based
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on very inadequate perceptions and contributions to overall economic, revenue, export, food 
security and sustainable household poverty reduction will be underestimated and/or misestimated.
Rehabilitating designing, planning, programming and articulating as well as monitoring and review 
should to the maximum extent practicable be nationally led with both domestic and external 
actors coordinated by the central government. This is not a feature unique to R-R-R but it is 
probably of higher importance than in some other areas because contextual differences make 
external knowledge likely to be highly limited and presumed ‘knowledge’ from generalizations or 
particular experiences in other countries misleading and because a state needing full scale R-R-R is 
by definition weak and fragile with great danger of fragmentation and erosion if a multitude of 
INGOs and external official agencies engage in direct programmatic activity outside of government 
parameters and coordination. However because of extreme immediate post war resource scarcity 
R-R-R (especially the second and third) will usually require significant new resource inflows 
and/or writedown of war period incurred external debt.
Selected Signposts For Action
1. Rehabilitation should be seen by postwar governments (central and local), domestic social 
actors, INGO’s and external agencies as politically, socially and economically central, not 
marginal;
2. Therefore it should be treated as a strategic component of macro and sectoral, policy and 
programme as well as local and project analysis, planning, budgeting (in terms of decision 
taking time institutional capacity and personnel as well as finance), articulation up from and 
down to specific projects and monitoring/review for the medium term (initially five to six 
years may be a generally suitable working estimate);
3. With at least an analysis and monitoring unit nationally with key regional/district sub-units and 
some programmes (and domestic social actors plus INGO’s) quite specifically charged with 
reconstruction even if others -  e.g. basic service provision -  will normally be more suited to 
implementation by line ministries and local governance bodies;
4. Because Rehabilitation is key to reestablishment of government legitimacy and should be 
highly influenced and informed by contextual factors which are unlikely to be external experts
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areas of comparative advantage national ownership led and coordinated by the central 
government is of special importance in Rehabilitation (as well as Reconciliation) even though a 
mix of national and local government, domestic social act on and INGO operational 
involvement will usually be desirable;
5. With early attention to sustainability through phased enhancement of domestic institutional 
and personnel capacity (especially through built in training elements in all external 
programmes whether as to road maintenance of simple, functional domestic social actor 
accounting systems and bookkeepers to operate them) and phased reduction of external 
financial support;
6. Backed by pre-agreed flexibility finance to meet direct (e.g. safety net, emergency repairs) 
and indirect (e.g. revenue loss from climatic or terms of trade calamities). Pre-arrangement is 
crucial because the lag involved in negotiating new support from a tabula rasa after a crisis hits 
will seriously impair the pace of rehabilitation (and past calamity recovery) and can collapse 
the R-R-R process;
7. Recognition is needed that time is crucial to R-R-R and that detailed good governance/basic 
service provision preconditions are normally not merely unrealistic but self defeating 
because without R-R-R good governance and legitimacy, basic service provision/household 
livelihood restoration are impossible and that -  in most cases -  external finance and often 
some specialist expatriate personnel are a precondition to full scale R-R-R;
8. This implies that once a serious postwar government with a start toward coherent R-R-R 
strategy and implementation is in place external debt service should be suspended pending 
more formal qualification for and provision of HIPC (highly indebted poor country) debt 
writedown;
9. Because one goal of R-R-R (for domestic as well as foreign actors) is usually enhanced 
participation in user friendly forms external actors need to avoid actions which fragment 
and erode domestic capacity -  governmental, civil society and household. The massive 
injection o f INGO’s with broad, heavily funded programmes at best parallel to and often 
competitive with domestic (public, social sector or private) ones is a serious weakness
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characterizing post war ‘support’ in several countries and one producing rising (in depth and 
breadth) resentment;
10. Research on Rehabilitation to date is relatively limited— especially at country strategic level. 
Probably there is enough work on conceptualisation and generalization to suggest that -  
operationally at least -  more in depth country studies are the first priority net refining 
conceptualization or drawing up more detailed checklist. Another priority may well be closer 
cooperation of Peace Studies/Sustainable Peace research with that on Rehabilitation which 
is usually understressed and in particular underarticulated in respect to potentially operational 
prolegomena.
Rehabilitation is frequently a strategic necessity for post war economies, polities and societies. It is 
never a silver bullet, an easy highroad to utopia nor a complete monist strategy. Basically it turns 
(echoing T.S. Eliott) on the quest to recover what was lost and won and lost again and now in times 
and places which rarely seem propitious.
The case made here is for including Rehabilitation (and R-R-R) not excluding or marginalizing 
‘economic good housekeeping’ (medium term sustainable imbalance and growth management as 
the successor to short term structural adjustment to end unsustainably rising imbalances and 
sinking growth rates). A focus on the war dispossessed need not preclude attention to attention to 
non war aspects of poverty nor should one with a priority to restoring displaced household incomes 
bar attention to continued progress in less poor/less war eroded areas or capitalizing on new large 
scale economic activities (both of which can contribute fiscal and external account gains toward R- 
R-R). The real strategic issues are of balance and of priority -  i.e. of allocation of scarce resources 
toward multiple ends to achieve at least minimal acceptable progress toward each. At strategic (vs. 
marginal programme scope or project choice level) seeking to answer either/or formulation is to 
ask the wrong questions. Rehabilitation has been excluded strategically and/or marginalized in 
resource allocations. Reversing that misconceptualisation/malprioritisation should not be 
marred by a Foucault’s Pendulum (or similar deconstructionist) exclusion of all other elements 
from possible/possibly desirable overall policy and allocation strategies.
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Preemptive Rehabilitation? An Epilogue
The importance of rehabilitation to making lulls in armed conflict permanent and peace settlements 
sustainable raises the question: Can Rehabilitation be used to avert or to preempt armed conflict 
during periods of rising tensions?
In principle the answer should be ‘yes’. In practice it is more likely to be ‘usually no, sometimes 
perhaps’. A quick look at several cases suggests why:
1. the Barre (Somalia, Somaliland), Mengistu (Ethiopia, Eritrea) Liberia (Libero-American 
elite/Sammy Doe army) and Zaire (Mobutu) regimes clearly had no interest132 in rehabilitation 
to redress inequities (albeit the Mengistu regime did apply several aspects of it to favoured 
areas and groups). Further the first two had for years prior to their overthrow lost the 
institutional, personnel and resource capacity to implement serious strategic rehabilitation 
programming and the Liberian state had arguably never had it;
2. the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda, while during lulls in the long run guerilla war from the
1960’s to 1990 rather less repressive than Barre-Mengistu-Mobutu-Doe quartet as well as less 
corrupt and with greater state capacity was not inclined to seek to redress wa Tutsi grievances 
and in particular not those o f the million odd exiles (and children of exiles) whose plaints were 
focused on participation in governance and freedom to return;
3. From a few years after independence (say 1965) the Sierra Leone government eroded into a
morasses of corruption and incapacity so that neither it rulers’ key motivation (theft) nor the
tools of service provision available to them were relevant to rehabilitation, a situation not too
1dissimilar to the second (post Amin) Obote regime in Uganda.
4. Mozambique’s 1975-81 strategy (before full scale civil war) did include most features of 
rehabilitation strategy. Arguably broader participation and less focus on modernization and 
large scale productive units (relative to the small farming household sector) would have 
reduced tensions. But given the catalytic role of Rhodesia and subsequently South Africa in 
creating and sustaining Renamo, avoidance of armed conflict via more inclusive, higher priority 
rehabilitation was never possible.
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Rehabilitation As Prevention: Conditions And Cases
If Preemptive Rehabilitation is to be effective, several conditions would need to be met:
a. a state whose leadership wished to reduce tensions and to redress inequities with special 
reference to poor disadvantaged groups;
b. was willing to interact with/build a network of social capital contacts including these groups;
c. was willing and able to prioritise resource allocation for those purposes even if that potentially 
reduced benefits to core supporters;
d. still enjoyed at least a suspension of disbelief in respect to even opponents’ perceptions of its 
legitimacy and commitment to order under a rule of law;
e. had enough institutional, personnel, knowledge and financial resources to launch and to sustain 
a significant Reconciliation and Rehabilitation initiative; implying
f. enough international credibility to mobilize external funding.
To set out the conditions is to reduce optimism as to how often they can be met even by a new or 
partially new leadership which has evolved by non violent means (perhaps in response to crises and 
war or near war) and does not carry the full historical baggage of its predecessors.1,4
However, given the appalling human, economic and regional security costs of civil wars for
• 135 •afflicted states and their neighbours, it is certainly worth canvassing potential pre-civil war cases 
to seek to identify opportunities. The two evident cases in SSA are Kenya and the Delta Zone of 
Nigeria.136
In Kenya the rule of law has collapsed -  the police and the ‘justice’ system are widely perceived 
as enemies of the poor and of decent civil society. Corruption -  and consequential external public 
and private resource flow loss -  in gutting state capacity to deliver. Rigged (even if by 
‘constitutional law’ more than direct fraud) elections have eroded legitimacy. Unless an electoral 
change of government is allowed/achieved in the risk of massive violence is very real.
But it must be questioned whether the ruling elite’s leadership can afford even the physical aspects 
of rehabilitation let alone the participatory given the uses of state ‘aid’ for key supporters (whether 
projects, contracts, jobs or ‘licensed’ corruption). If it does surrender power in reasonably fair 
elections in 2002 (to avert civil war) a window of opportunity may open. May because the leaders
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of the anti Moi coalition are very diverse and their political leadership element often appears at 
least as interested in power and distribution of the spoils of office as in economic and social 
rehabilitation. Assisting civil society (religious, women’s, trade union, domestic NGO) actors and 
seeking to influence (by seminars and study trips?) selected politicians to take a wider view of 
governance and resource allocation may be possible -  how would be worth researching with a view 
to informing action.
The prospects in respect to the Nigerian Delta Zone -  while problematic -  may offer more scope 
for Rehabilitation as a reconciling, relegitimising and peace restoring/sustaining strategy at least 
largely because President Obasanjo and other key political leaders are clearly sympathetic to such 
an approach and have taken some steps toward it and because civil war in the Delta would 
devastate the macro economy of Nigeria -  oil burns, pipes puncture, technical personnel bleed.
The general grievances of the Delta peoples are not hard to catalogue:
a. inequitably low access to basic services and -  until very recently -  an iniquitously low share
in the oil revenues derived from their areas;
b. a negligible share in the employment (direct and indirect) generated by oil even in their own
zone;
c. Blatant manipulation of local governance to serve as a tool of control of rather than 
empowerment of Delta peoples secured in large part by ‘licensing’ them to steal or misallocate 
what state funds did flow to the Delta;
d. Massive environmental destruction by oil leaks, flare gases, forest destruction, poisoning 
creeks (destroying fishing), land (devastating crop growing and health), air (degrading of 
health) flowing directly from petroleum exploration, developing and transport;
e. Violent repression (including rigged trials) of all dissent in the Delta let alone mobilization
137against state or company.
New legislation does allocate a significant proportion of oil revenues to producing areas and 
provide for a new, independent body to handle the logistics of getting them to ordinary people in 
the Delta. The oil companies are now -  at least rhetorically -  agreeable to cleaning up past and 
reducing future spillages as well as ending gas flaring (by turning it into marketable liquefied
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petroleum gas). In principle the 1998-99 electoral cycle should have produced accountable State 
and District legislators. But:
a. the new money has been slow to flow and mutual distrust is so high that the new independent 
allocation body does not enjoy even an initial suspension of disbelief;
b. company dialogue with communities on cleanup, preventative maintenance and training for 
employment is still noticeable by its absence or by company choices o f dubious interlocateurs. 
The quite real (apparently of the order of $50 million in 1999/00 by Shell) expenditures on 
services and environmental action are not effective on the ground and appear to be in large part 
going lost, strayed and/or stolen) and are certainly not in the parameters of a national 
Government -  Local Government -  Social Actors -  Companies coordinated strategic livelihood 
employment, environmental, basic services, local infrastructure strategic rehabilitation plan;
c. police (and company response) to mobilized dissent remains intolerant and on occasion brutal;
d. many local governance and some civil society units are still perceived as hopelessly self serving 
and corrupt.
The ‘buts’ do not appear to be insurmountable if priority is given (not least by the Federal 
government at Presidential and the oil companies at Board and Nigerian territorial chief executive 
levels). But the ‘hows’ (especially ‘how to speed up’ and how to engage in dialogue with whom to 
achieve first suspension of disbelief and then a beginning of social capital building) are complex 
and problematic. Again applied research is needed (and the present Nigerian government and the 
Nigerian research community should take the lead in sketching parameters and seeking partners 
and resources).
So -  No, Rehabilitation is no silver bullet for preempting armed conflict but Yes, in some contexts 
it may be part of the answer.
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NOTES
1 This paper is in conjunction with "Rehabilitation, Sustainable Peace and Development: Toward 
Reconceptualisation" by R.H. Green and I. Ahmed (IDS, 1998 for initial Cope Workshop), 
"Toward A Macroeconomic Framework for Somaliland's Postwar Rehabilitation And 
Reconstruction" by R.H. Green (IDS, 1998 for 1st Somaliland National Reconstruction 
Conference, Hargeisa, October 1998), Ahmed and Green, "The Heritage of War and State 
Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: local level effects, external intervention and governance 
reconstruction", and I. Ahmed, "The Legacy of Complex Emergencies in Somalia and 
Somaliland: local effects, rehabilitation and approaches to peacemaking and state 
reconstitution (IDS, 2000 for concluding COPE Workshop), COPE Working Papers 4,11, 23, 
37, the third also is in Adedeji (ed.) Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts. The 
search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance, Ch. 14, London/New York: Zed 
Books: 257-281.
2 Rough estimation and extrapolation along the lines of UNICEF's Children On The Front Line 
(New York, 1987, 1989) which indicate well over 2 million lives and $70,000 million output 
lost in the SADCC (excluding South Africa) countries over 1980-1992 concentrated on, but by 
no means (especially in respect to lost GDP) solely in, Angola and Mozambique.
3 UNICEF, op. cit., formulated such elements in respect to Southern Africa in some detail.
4 Except for farming (which was unpopular except when related to child nutrition) SWAPO's
1989's camps in Angola and Namibia illustrate what can be done. For farming the experience 
of non-camp Mozambican refugees in 'relative' peopled districts in Malawi and Tanzania is 
illustrative.
5 Shocks and policy errors are not unique to R-R-R contexts. However because political 
legitimacy human and economic resource availability, and household margins above survival 
are usually - though not always e.g. post liberation war political legitimacy is usually high - 
especially constrained in post war situations their impact - especially on already war afflicted 
poor, households and on national political - economic stability are more severe than in non-war 
economic and public provision crises contexts - e.g. Mozambique versus Tanzania in relation to 
adverse weather shocks at the turn of the millennium.
6 This proposition may be less true in border war cases. Reconstruction of what has been lost 
since 1998 is likely - if possible - to be an appropriate strategy in the Ethiopian and Eritrean 
border areas.
7 The 1959-90 histories o f Burundi and of Rwanda leading to the explosive escalation of war in 
both - especially Rwanda - are illustrative.
8 For example, in 1995 a top priority of the new Rwandais Government was rehiring its 'missing' 
two thirds o f health workers (mostly wa Hutu) and reactivation of a reformed (toward primary 
health services with rural plus mother and child clinic emphasis) health sector. The perceived
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value of a common, cross ethnic public service and of universal access to a highly desired 
service as evidence of the states will and ability to serve all Rwandans were seen by the 
Minister of Health as important in themselves and complementary to the priority he attached to 
universal primary health services.
9 Well designed and organised retraining can - e.g. Zimbabwe - facilitate entry or reentry into 
viable livelihoods for at least two thirds of ex-combatants but is not cheap. Ironically the 
lowest cost 'safe' approach is 'stockpiling' ex-combatants with food, clothing, pocket money, 
barracks housing (if desired) and permission to develop parallel civilian livelihoods. Both 
Ghana in the 1980's and Somaliland since 1991 have practiced variants of this approach with 
positive results, albeit Somaliland since 1998 has attached priority to mobilising external 
resources to permit a training - public works transition to civilian livelihoods for 12,500 to
15,000 'spare' soldiers (versus 5,000 soldiers, 5,000 civilian police and 1,500 prison custodians 
seen as needed by the three separate uniformed services).
10 This list is based on observations and interviews in several SSA countries as well as on 
observed actions and demands by returnees. The basic service priority list is relatively uniform 
across war and non-war surveys and participatory assessments with poor people in several SSA 
countries (including non-war cases such as Tanzania and Zambia).
11 That proposition may appear self evident. In practice, it is not. Even the desire to 'return home' 
and the centrality of such return to livelihood reconstruction and to livelihood reconstruction 
and to geographic programming of service rehabilitation is frequently seriously underestimated 
- e.g. Acholiland in Uganda prior to the 1999 Reconstruction and Peace Agenda meetings.
12 For a much fuller review of strands in conceptualisation and of rehabilitation literature see 
Green and Ahmed (Cope Working Paper, op. cit.)
13 Conflict theory work on gainers and losers from war is potentially relevant but - to date - not 
operationally linked. Fear of loss is the key economic (and social and physical) reason to 
hesitate at the prospect of peace for most combatants. Assured safe return home, reintegration 
into civilian society and social - basic service - infrastructure access are likely to be key 
instruments for allaying such fears.
14 This paper leans on the author's personal experience with about fifteen (including two in Asia) 
countries from operational and observational as well as research perspectives particularly in the 
COPE and 'Conflict Comprehension and Mastery' (ACDESS) programmes and as a 1986-94 
part time Mozambican civil servant.
15 While simple economic correlation's - e.g. high ratio of commodity exports/high risk of civil 
war - can be partial or misleading, they can also yield insites. Major commodity resources (e.g. 
diamonds and petroleum in Angola) can create both the motivation for seeking central power at 
almost any price and the means to sustain both governmental and insurgent military machines. 
Land shortage can lead to violent conflict over present allocation, potential land loss and/or 
local governmental structures with powers over future allocation.
16 The separation of 'development' from 'emergency' has tended to lump R-R-R with calamity 
relief and therefore with safety nets to alleviate poverty caused by shocks and to facilitate
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emergence from relatively short, self limiting and reversing shocks affecting a relatively 
limited, proportion of a nations households.
17 The Mozambique strategic paper is National Planning Commission, 'Reconstrucao: The road 
from emergencia to developmento: livelihoods and macro economics' (Maputo, 1992) excerpts 
and analysis from which are more readily accessible in Hanlon, J., Peace Without Profit, 
Heineman/James Curry/Irish Mozambique Solidarity/International African Institute, (London 
1994).
18 In such cases saving life in the short run requires using all experienced capacity e.g. in 1991-3 
Somalia refugee camps with monthly infant mortality in excess of 100 UNICEF did - and was 
right to - concentrate on grab (and house), dab (of food), jab (vaccination). Similarly Medicin 
Sans Frontieres precisely because it is syndico anarchist in philosophy and simple curative care 
focussed is possibly the body most able to work in active, disputed war zones and across firing 
lines, but the same characteristics limit its suitability for postwar rehabilitation of a national 
health system with high priority to preventative, educational, environmental and nutritional 
aspects and with government coordination.
19 If external actors are perceived as complementary to, and work within parameters set by, 
domestic actors (including social sector actors) phasing down of external resource inflows may 
be painful, tedious and slow but poses few conceptual snags. But if multiple, parallel, 
externally designed headed and financed service systems have been implanted, it is hard to see 
how phased handover to whom can be arranged. In poor countries domesticating INGO 
national unit staff and programme design may be possible - if rare to date - but even then no 
firm civil society resource base can readily be identified.
20 See for example, "Emergency - rehabilitation development: sequence or detour?" in Simon 
Maxwell (ed.) 'Linking relief and development', Institute of Development Studies, Bulletin, 25- 
4, (IDS-Sussex, Falmer, 1994).
21 The War Torn Societies project illustrates this. Its flagship Mozambique study is, in general, 
weakest on economics and does not address rehabilitation of livelihoods or of local level 
infrastructure while its basic services chapters (which exclude consideration of the role of 
police and primary courts) do not address the gaps and priorities resulting from finance and 
access constraints during the war.
22 See COPE papers and also "Rehabilitation, sustainable peace and development: towards 
reconceptualisation', with I.A. Ahmed, Third World Quarterly Vol 20 No 1: 189-206, 1999 
and December 2000 Disasters Special Issue.
23. See Adedeji (ed.) Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts. The search for 
Sustainable Peace and Good Governance, Ch. 14 "Towards a Macro-Economic Framework 
for Somaliland's Post-War Rehabilitation and Reconstruction", London/New York: Zed Books: 
257-281, 1999.
24 In a number o f countries recurrent near war or war conditions characterise certain regions but 
not the whole country e.g. the Eastern half of Ghana's Northern Region; Acholiland and certain 
other Regions o f Northern and Western Uganda the Casamance in Senegal, arguably the Delta 
in Nigeria. Even if these do not constitute national level civil wars (and at least the Nigerian
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case could become that because of the location of hydrocarbon fields and the parallel 
Southwestern ‘opt out’ movement), they are central to regional macro and sectoral economics 
and can rarely be dealt with by short term safety nets.
25 It is perfectly plausible to argue on available data both that Somaliland is making sustained 
process on political reconciliation and institutional (re) construction on economic and service 
rehabilitation and - more recently -  on main infrastructure rehabilitation while also perceiving 
the Sudan to constitute a complex, intensifying crisis (or set of overlapping crises) in which 
only limited livelihood/service rehabilitation within a basically survival under war frame are 
possible. It is not plausible to argue that the political base of a won liberation war (as perceived 
by Somalilanders) in Somaliland is now available to Sudanese or, indeed, that the remittance 
economic lifeline enabling R-R-R to proceed in Somaliland can be paralleled in the Sudan so 
long as the Khartoum Junta lacks both Northern and Southern legitimacy and the interactions of 
and within Southern and Northern Democratic fractions on the insurgent side(s) remain highly 
complicated and fraught with tensions - in the South recurrently breaking out in violence. But 
per contra there is no evident reason the constraints - contextual parameters - applying in the 
Sudan should be assumed to be particularly relevant to Somaliland nor necessarily a guide to 
the restrictions on R-R-R in Somalia.
26 For a more elaborated presentation in respect to Southern Africa see UNICEF Children On 
The Front Line, (New York, 1997, 1999).
27 This is a poorly researched area. Fragments of data exist in scattered Mozambique studies and 
internal papers on other topics.
28 For example, Interahamwe organised camps as bases for current (in then Zaire) or potential 
future (in Tanzania) revenge against the Rwanda Patriotic Front led government and 
discouraged diversion of energy toward rehabilitation, especially if organised outside the IH 
command structure.
29 The apparent reason for the disinterest in general agriculture according to the then Deputy 
Secretary for Health was the difference in climatic and soil patterns from those in Namibia plus 
the relatively adequate supplies of basic rations available from WFP via the SWAPO 
governmental structure.
30 In Mozambique restoration of displaced small farming households to Tanzanian levels of 
output could - with direct multiplier effects - have raised national product 50%. In Angola and 
Namibia the potential was - as of 1990 - probably 10% to 15% and 2.5% respectively because 
oil and diamonds in Angola and mining, large scale ranching and fishing in Namibia dominated 
GDP. However, in Angola the proportion of households dependent on small scale farming 
rehabilitation was at least 40% and in Namibia perhaps 25% so that the political and socio 
economic potential impact of livelihood rehabilitation, as well as that in many districts, was 
potentially comparable to that in Mozambique. In one sense it might be easier as the large scale 
sectors -  especially in Angola -  yield fiscal flows per capita qualitatively higher than in 
Mozambique.
31 This condition poses particular problems in respect to new governments in previously 'failed 
states' (e.g. then Zaire, Sierra Leone) as contrasted with those which had maintained at least 
some operational capacity (beyond waging war) throughout the period o f conflict (e.g.
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Mozambique) and to liberation movements which had the experience of operating significant 
programmes in liberated areas or in exile (e.g. Namibia, Eritrea).
32 Usually such safety nets have had to be official donor financed - including indirectly via 
INGO's - but in the cases o f Eritrea and Somaliland diaspora remittances have been dominant.
33 The 'Parliament', 'Executive' and 'President' emerging from the 1999-2000 Somalia Conference 
in Djibouti have not to date altered the Somalia situation in any basic way. A majority of 
delegates were exiles. Somaliland, but also Puntland and Baidoa (Rahanweyn Confederacy) 
which are much less unstable than the balance of Somalia, were 'represented' only by exiles and 
dissidents. From the point of view of each of these zones (and not only of their present leaders) 
the new 'President' (Barre's last Defense Minister) and three of the 'executive' from which his 
nomination emerged (General Morgan, Barre Security Police head Col. Omar Jess and Barre's 
last Chief of Staff) are quite literally war criminals guilty of "crimes against humanity" in the 
present international law meaning of that term. Their initial fleeting visits to Mogadishu like 
those of their ‘Parliament’ were covered by multiple hired merchant militias who do not 
necessarily support them politically.
34 Because of the 30 year gap between the Somalia conquest of the then Republic of Somaliland 
in 1961 after it voted overwhelmingly not to join in the United Republic of Somalia and the 
1991 armed liberation from Barre forces, relatively few present political and even fewer senior 
civil servants have much first hand experience from within that system. The accuracy of 
recreation on the operational ministerial side its surprisingly high - the deja vue recollection of 
Anglophone West Africa of the early 1960's can be very strong for any observer who has 
experienced both. The will to obliterate the intervening URS structures and procedures is, in 
this case, a positive Rehabilitation/Reconciliation force e.g. in the recreation of a uniformed, 
civilian (separate from the Army and the Defense Ministry) police force and of a magistrates' 
court system using primarily (British) Somaliland Code Law, common law and some civil law 
elements o f Sharia law with former URS code law (derived directly from Mussolini's Italian 
Code) used only for gap filling.
35. Persons displaced to towns and (usually via relatives) integrated socially and economically are 
exceptions, but it is often open to question whether they would have migrated to cities war or 
no war. e.g. Mozambique's urban population indeed rose from 10% to 30% over 1975-95. But 
Portuguese policy limited black urban residence so that 10% was artificially low and the 
Tanzanian urban proportion (in that case in the absence of war or famine) is also 30% 
suggesting the 1995 Mozambique figure is not abnormally high.
36. Demobilised combatants - at least below officer level - also tend to choose to return to pre war 
homes and occupations e.g. Mozambique and the two failed lulls/demobilisations in Angola. 
Eritrea is an exception because state policy is to resettle both returnees and demobolisees in 
patterns unlike previous district and village ones.
37. This is a contextual question. In general civilians tend to prefer civilian to military policing e.g. 
the priority to civilian police restoration/separation from army in Somaliland. But, if  police 
have an history o f oppressive, violence and corruption there may be no great preference for
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them over the army e.g. Acholiland at the turn of the millennium because the Uganda police 
force has (throughout Uganda) had a very bad reputation for over a third of a century. The 
(British) Somaliland civilian police, however, were largely respected and trusted unlike their 
Italian style military police successors of the United Republic o f Somalia.
38. See FAO, The State of Food Insecurity in the World, (Rome, 2000).
39 For example in Somalia surveys do not show primary health services - especially by the state - 
as high priority because of lack effective colonial or URS provision and because there has been 
what would elsewhere be regarded as over emphasis on hospital curative services. In 
Somaliland because the late British period did feature a more robust and primary oriented 
health service health stands with water as a key and relatively well staffed ministry' and one 
which (under UNICEF guidance) has focussed on vaccinations, oral rehydration, mother and 
child and clinic oriented primary services, although it has yet to restore the pastoral area 
paramedical network which was arguably the crown jewel of the postwar British colonial health 
service development.
40. In several cases - e.g. Sierra Leone in 1996-97 before the military /RUF coup - concentration 
was on urban road, sewer and related works. These may meet the tests of lesser vulnerability to 
renewed outbreaks of violence and of'safe1 project designs 'on the shelf but it is hard to believe 
that even urban residents (let alone the 80% plus of displaced persons who are usually rural) 
would put them high on priority lists. Nor are they 'sustainable' in the sense of generating 
entitlements not dependent on continuing external finance - unlike, say, restoration of 
crop/livestock production. As humanitarian intervention the traffic circles, gutters and 
carriageways of Freetown seemed to be analogues of ineffective humanitarian randomness 
paralleling Joseph Conrad's French cruiser firing untargeted salvos into the Congo jungle as an 
example of military intervention in the early stages of his exploration of the (European) Heart 
of Darkness in the Congo ultimately symbolised by Mister Kurtz and his driveway lined with 
human (African) skull topped posts. One need not imply bad faith or ill will to point to the 
potential for disaster in misuse of very scarce resources.
41. The danger - because of rehabilitation marginalisation - is that these large, long payoff, limited 
livelihood/entitlement generation reconstruction projects will be disproportionately central to 
macro economic investment policy and allocation as in the case of the ROCS (major highways) 
project in Mozambique (see Hanlon, op. cit.).
42. The actual expatriate personnel figures would suggest uniformly high requirements. However, 
they may mislead. In Mozambique 3,000 1992-95 expatriates at a cost of over $300 million a 
year in large part replaced 3,000 tertiary educated Mozambicans working at lower levels abroad 
because of sub-subsistence to sub-lower middle class domestic salaries. They would be 
returnees at a gross cost of perhaps $12.5 to $20 million a year. Aid finance for technical 
assistance or INGO's is not in practice fungible into even bridging domestic salary support 
whatever the benefit/cost ratios. Mozambique’s Ministry of Health actually asked for a 
controlled test between a government and an INGO primary health care programme at district 
or provincial level to compare cost and care efficiency and was turned down out of hand. As
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the unit cost of INGO PHC seems to be tenfold (at least fivefold allowing for maximum 
unrecorded health goods transfers to state health services) that of the Ministry of Health and the 
quality little, if any, better (arguably worse on prevention and education) the challenge and 
response are both interesting. Somaliland per capita is a relatively successful R-R-R case with 
only 250 expatriates (because it is not recognised), but could certainly use rather more 
specialists (perhaps 100-150), plus training courses to avoid massive gaps in citizen personnel 
when present senior officials retire well before a full scale universally/public service institute 
will be on stream.
43. In practice food for armed forces viewed with some approval, or at least not severe disapproval, 
by donors is often donor financed using Nelsonian ‘blind eye' techniques whether with budget 
support and food aid to be sold or bloc distribution to camp systems including basic civil 
governance but also army elements e.g. Mozambique and SWAPO's camp system in Angola 
respectively. If the armed forces are seen as deeply unacceptable, either food is not provided to 
anyone (rare) or substantial debate and partial withdrawal combined with food seizure by the 
military units results (e.g. the then Zaire Interahamwe controlled Rwandan's refugee camps and 
the Red Cross food supplies to Renamo controlled zones in Mozambique).
44. The case against relief/rehabilitation support in the Sudan has been most cogently argued by 
Joanna Macrae and Mark Duffield. The case for has been spearheaded by Oxfam and Christian 
Aid (in conjunction with South Sudanese civil society actors) e.g. Roger Riddell and David 
Bryll, Guardian, 16 October 2000, p20 who argue that there can be INGO and civil society 
access to most people most of the time, are substantial pockets of relative and relatively lasting 
peace and growing numbers and capacity of domestic civil society actors autonomous from the 
SPLA military. Therefore initial food production, medical, water and education rehabilitation 
are both feasible and desirable both in terms of present human welfare and the post war base for 
full R-R-R (whatever the military/political end game and outcome). In the IH case the logical 
alternative to allowing the use of the camps as reorganisation, retraining and reinvasion bases 
was not necessarily starving all Rwanda's refugees and exiles alike, but inserting a UN armed 
guard contingent to control the camps - an exercise the Security Council rejected. O f the three 
options - forcing civilian refugees to return to Rwanda to be fed, controlling the camps to 
extrude IH/Exide 'Government' elements and letting IH rebuild it appeared even at the time - 
and much more so today - that the international community was choosing the worst.
45 In the South Sudan case such bodies exist and are becoming stronger as well as increasingly 
tolerated and welcomed by the SPLA. See Guardian, op cit, loc cit, and also passim  articles 
on Sudan previous two weeks. In the Rwanda camps case IH took good care to suppress them 
in then Zaire and sought to do so in Tanzania camps which were cordoned and policed by day 
by Tanzania but under LH control at night. Interestingly even under those unfavourable 
conditions, autonomous mother and child care and, less overtly, Anglican 'civil society' type 
groups emerged and operated.
46. Arguably Ebola fever is a war catastrophe. The strain in Gulu is South Sudanese (not
Congolese) so that the most probable entry is via Lord's Resistance Army raiders, deserters or 
escaped captives and/or refugees returning from Sudan. The problem in coping even beyond
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the absence o f preventative or curative treatment is lack of knowledge of the host animal (both 
human beings and other primates die once they contract Ebola) so that predicting outbreaks, 
designing ways to avoid them and developing spread limitation and initial contagion 
minimisation are virtually non-feasible.
47. This may be a sector with potential for preparation during war. For example from the mid 
1980's to early 1990's several thousand Mozambican primary school teachers fled to refugee or 
displaced person camps or urban areas. Most were in known locations and in receipt of pay but 
not fully employed. Most were also less than fully qualified. Despite earlier internal 
suggestions, only in 1992 did the approach of large scale further training while waiting for the 
ability to redeploy to rural areas build up substantial momentum and then on the initiatives of 
two or three Provincial Directorates not the national Ministry. The problem is most acute 
where - as in Mozambique - a high proportion of basic service personnel before war were not 
qualified or where - as in Somalia and Somaliland - there has been minimal professional or para 
professional training and recruitment for over a decade and a half so that restoration/ 
maintenance of previous levels, let alone expansion, faces a growing crisis even after war 
because o f unreplaced retirements.
48. See A. Adedeji, R.H. Green and V. Jamal, Pay, Professionalism and Productivity UNICEF, 
UNDP, (New York 1997) for fuller case on the negative results of paying front line 
professional 'salaries' as low as one quarter the household absolute poverty line.
49. Banks in SSA - especially when they have just engaged in financial and loan procedure 
reconstruction - are often so cautious as to rural loans or new credit instruments (e.g. leasing) as 
to threaten to constrict economic revival especially in rural areas led by small and medium 
enterprises. This can justify risk sharing type partial guarantees (preferably for a fee) to 
encourage priority lending flows, but neither justifies nor creates a need to subsidise either 
merchant transporters or the banks.
50. The $1 standardised purchasing power per capita per day yardstick used by the World Bank for 
international comparisons and aggregations has severe limitations for operational country use.
A specified absolute poverty line budget for a household of 5 or 6 costing stated goods/services 
and - probably - converting to $ on a relatively free (which may mean parallel) market basis to 
have a less unstable one country measurement over time is preferable, where possible, partly 
because IMF/UNDP conversions to standard purchasing power - especially within SSA - are 
often open to grave reservations.
51. In 1960's East Africa access to seasonal wage labour income tended to be a key determinant of 
poor or not so poor household income status. In Southern Mozambique from the 1940's 
migrant labour in South African mines was key to building up tools, herds and other assets 
needed to raise a farm's production capacity above the household poverty line.
52. While the typical sizes vary, except for street trading the typical informal business has 
substantially more employers than owner managers (up to an average of 7 times as many in 
West Africa).
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53. Mozambique, for example, placed at least 200,000 orphans (including de facto  orphans who 
may have had living parents but with no evidence where they were) in new households as 
members with quite limited use of initial, and no continuing, material incentives.
54. However, a special problem arises for HIV/AIDS orphans who may be or are HIV positive.
Only close relatives - and not always they - are likely to accept the risk of accepting/loosing a 
new son or daughter let alone taking in a new household member with a maximum realistic life 
expectancy of 3 to 4 years.
55. These represent a shift in emphasis from most pre-war systems which relates to general 
rethinking and redesign of poor country health services beginning in the 1970’s.
56. Discussions with researchers and participants at September 1999 Reconstruction and Peace 
Agenda Workshop.
57. Labour intensive approaches can reduce cost and maximise cost sharing with returnee 
communities for seasonal labour and local building materials are likely to be easier to mobilise 
than cash.
58. Cf Hanlon op. cit. for perceptions of the World Bank's flagship ROCS national highway project 
turning on these issues and the related diversion of potential local infrastructure and services 
programmes to the highways combined with a continuity in not conceptualizing or integrating a 
viable maintenance strategy.
59. The upgrading of several of these routes as war roads by President Barre, whose aim was to 
suppress Somaliland, does not invalidate their present value for rebuilding pastoralism, internal 
and external commerce. Similarly in Acholiland, roads in several areas are now denser, more 
accessible and better maintained to facilitate military response to the Lord's Resistance Army. 
Their existence and location are key to local infrastructure rehabilitation planning and may alter 
patterns o f farming household settlement.
60. Very often both capacity in general and decentralised capacity accountable to users in particular 
were defective long prior to the outbreak of war. In cases such as Sierra Leone and (then) Zaire 
that decay of capacity was at least a substantial background factor in the loss of legitimacy 
facilitating the rise o f civil war. It would be otiose in rehabilitation to seek to replicate capacity 
only up to the pre war levels if these were manifestly a major 'part of the problem', not of the 
answer. It is arguable that government supply of cement and roofing, community building of 
floor slabs, pole frames and temporary walls plus wooden desks, benches, cabinets for 
books/materials - i.e. downgrading primary school buildings - to concentrate on teachers' 
salaries and training together with books, writing materials, chalk and blackboards is 
appropriate to the initial phases of rehabilitation. But if pre war district and local 
bookkeeping/bookkeepers meant 50% of spending was unallocable because initial entries were 
incorrigibly unintelligible, another 25% went lost-strayed-stolen (facilitated by opaque 
bookkeeping) and only 25% clearly went to intended uses, it is folly not to include properly
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trained bookkeepers and transparent book keeping systems in first stage rehabilitation as a 
necessary, if not sufficient, condition to the rapid reduction of corruption and increase of 
accountability. 'No accountability without accounts’ deserves to be a more important good 
governance rallying cry than is usually the case.
61. In Rwanda returning wa Tutsi (including descendants as the majority of refugees date to 1959- 
60) have been temporarily - at least in terms of policy goal - housed in 'vacant' urban/peri urban 
buildings and to a lesser extent on 'vacant' peri urban and rural farm plots. These are 
recognised officially to be the property of wa Hutu who fled in 1974. On their return they have 
- not surprisingly - found those in possession unwilling to relinquish buildings or farms, local 
level authorities less than energetic in supporting them and alternative plot/home provision 
lagging badly.
62. For example in Angonia District in Tete (a maize and potato basket) colonial settler freeholds 
were turned into state farms (after settler abandonment) which were then abandoned in the early 
1980's during the upsurge of the civil war. In large part these have been occupied by returnees 
step by step over 1986-1994. Both some ex settlers and the Lands Commission (for new 
freehold grants) have called for their expulsion with obvious probable conflictual results, not 
least because these farmers have rehabilitated their livelihoods and made a large contribution to 
national (especially Beira) food security.
63. Discussions on site and later with John Drysdale who headed the survey.
64. No farm could be demarcated unless the occupier and all adjacent holders agreed on boundary 
points. This procedure rapidly diffused cross claims (which may have been as much game 
playing as fully serious) because holders wanted clear, up to date entitlement documents.
65. Uganda has a very diverse mix of de facto  rural tenures. Feudal recorded tenure - notably in 
Buganda and Bunyoro - has partially (but often opaquely and contestedly) transmuted into 
individual freehold tenure. So in practice has historical secure, heritable household usehold 
tenure in some areas, especially if tree and bush crop (coffee, tea) are dominant. A variety of 
such household, usehold tenures survive - some formally recorded but with gaps and dubious 
entries in registers. In pastoral and peripheral areas some more communal/more frequent 
reallocation systems survive. Dotted in are plantation (and urban) freehold enclaves e.g. sugar, 
tea. Standardising, re-recording and arbitrating a generalised transition to freehold will be a 
major exercise entailing substantial personnel, institution erection and consultation costs and 
one which does not (at least in immediate post war areas as contrasted to those with limited 
violence for the last decade and a half) appear to have high temporal priority. The deferral of 
implementation suggests that position has support within the Uganda government with the 
apparent contrary signal of early passage of an Act relating at least as much to USAID and 
World Bank agendas and leverage as it does to Uganda government and/or interest group 
concerns.
66. Most of the changes in tenure from the prazeiro (feudal 'knights' of the sword) through 
chartered company to empressa (state farm) modes have been injected by war with the lesser
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recent resistance to tenure change partly because the general 1981-1992 phase of the 1963-1992 
war subsumed land tenure conflict and partly because many freehold grant holders, seeing they 
could not secure and enforce 'quiet possession' have not sought to push their claims. However, 
the situation remains volatile if  large numbers of'concessions' and large family farm freeholds 
were to be created and attempted to be enforced. The economic doubts about general 
freehold/mechanisation driven modernised agriculture are underlined by the pre 1970 (and 
apparently post 1995) record of 90% of domestic food and 60% of agricultural exports flowing 
from the (disfavoured) historic usehold tenure small farming sector familial (household sector).
67. On the southern (Zambesi River) border of Malawi and Mozambique literally hundreds of 
thousands of refugees rotated from camps to rehabilitation of farms and back to camp to collect 
rations during 1992-1994. This greatly puzzled some observers who, erroneously, thought the 
massive 'return' flow to Malawi was of refugees who had given up and were returning to camp
to stay.
68 Evidently return to camp for food to rebuild by many does create a cover for fraud by others. It 
also wastes time and energy on treks, disrupts families yet again and reduces the working time 
deployable so long as some adults need to stay in camp to collect rations and care for children.
69 See Somaliland country discussion elsewhere for fuller contextual setting.
70. The largely expatriate - or at least non-Acholi - suggestion that cattle restoration in general is 
ecologically undesirable is not shared by Acholi households nor does it appear likely to be valid 
ecologically. Under interior east African upland plain conditions, livestock, annual crops and - 
less uniformly - tree crops can be symbiotic with livestock on land unsuitable for crops, or 
under grass fallow and contributing manure to tree crops (e.g. bananas in Kagera Region of 
Tanzania) and horticultural plots.
71. See J. Fairly 'New Strategies For Micro enterprise Development, Integration and the Trickle Up 
Approach' in J o u r n a l  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A ffa irs ,  op. cit. for fuller reflections on micro credit in 
general and the case for its institutional integration with knowledge and service delivery in 
particular.
72. For a review o f the general issue see R.H. Green, "A Cloth Untrue: The Evolution of Structural 
Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa" in International Affairs, 52, 1, 1998, and for an update 
(including notes on World Bank accepted reports of weaknesses) see N. Dunne "Fees issue 
entangles US debt relief plan", Financial Times, 18 October, 2000, pi 2.
73. Water is probably easier to run on a cooperative basis because user management/maintenance 
committees can reduce cash maintenance costs substantially, the cash as well as opportunity 
costs o f no or non functional nearly water delivery are perceived as high by households and - 
like health - fees can be projected equally across the year and can rarely literally be collected at 
point o f use (albeit they are in some Somaliland systems).
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74. In respect to local (and central) government in Uganda, see E.A. Brett "Responding to Poverty 
in Uganda" in International Affairs, op. cit.
75. Discussions with officials, domestic NGO leaders in Somaliland in 1995 and 1998.
76. Mozambique has sought to adopt this approach with respect to religious institution schools and 
clinics from 1992-3 but has been limited by financial constraints as has Tanzania in respect to 
religious body (almost all Christian in practice but with a few Islamic) secondary schools and 
hospitals which it has partially subsidised (as well as providing staff training) for four decades.
77. See COPE Working Papers specifically focussed on women in conflict listed in bibliography 
for a fuller discussion.
78. Male headed single adult/multiple dependent households could in principle be a similarly 
disadvantaged category. However, it is in practice virtually an empty box. Men who have 
lost/been separated from their spouses and have dependents in practice remarry.
79. Discussions with African gender researchers in both East and West Africa.
80. Hard to do - need to plan ahead - costs are greater than pure pre food aid variant and perhaps 
greater than commercial builder cost (with no food aid) but less than food for survival plus 
contract infrastructure building e.g. Botswana regular PWD and Drought infrastructure 
programmes.
81. The INGOs' higher unit costs relate primarily to the cost of expatriate personnel and the 
logistics of supporting them, as well as to a tendency to desirable but higher than essential 
material infrastructure (e.g. four wheel drive vehicles).
82. Observation and discussions on several visits for diverse sponsors over 1994-1999 and 
especially at the 1998 Somaliland and 1999 (Acholiland) R-R-R/Peace Agenda workshops.
83. Observation and discussions in Mogadishu and Baidoa in 1993 and 1995.
84. For a detailed - if slightly overstated - account of this process in Mozambique see Joseph 
Hanlon, Mozambique - Who Calls The Shots?, Zed Press, London 1994 and Hanlon op. cit. 
Hanlon underestimates the coping processes used at all levels in dealing with donors/outsiders 
whom it is seen as dangerous to refuse or to criticise harshly head on. These are by no means 
negligible in impact. But many are inefficient in resource cost/desired outputs terms. A 
common example is to accept external agency desired programmes and personnel which are not 
domestic priorities, and/or cannot be used, in order to gain funding for priority programmes and 
technical assistance. This approach 'works' but - at least as perceived by Mozambicans - wastes 
potentially more fruitful resource use. Donors may well have a mirror image view having 
accepted the Mozambican priority elements to achieve Mozambican acceptance of theirs. The 
problem is much more general than R-R-R and does not (as is sometimes asserted) rest on
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donor conspiracy nor recipient duplicitousness but on inequalities of power, lack of flexibility 
and divergent perceptions in contexts more often than not characterised by opacity.
85. In Mozambique Renamo focused on rural terrorism to prevent family farming for self 
provisioning and urban food supply and on destruction of primary schools, water systems and 
health posts and centres while the government prioritised getting food through and 
repairing/rebuilding health - education water facilities and protecting their personnel. 
Legitimacy/capacity more than direct military gains were at stake in these priority campaigns.
86. Discussion and observation in 1995 and 1998. Civilian police are armed but on normal duty 
keep the arms out o f sight. They are perceived as polite to Somalilanders as well as expatriates 
and do appear to be successful in halting escalation of minor clashes between individuals into 
larger lineage group to sub clan armed conflicts, a 'progress' which is historically the most 
volatile feature o f Somali socio-political interaction. Vendors and chatters congregate outside 
Hargeisa's Central Police Station and exchange greetings with police. With a contextual 
translation one is in the world of Dixon of Dock Green and 'Here-Here! What's All This?'
87. Except in open ended participatory dialogue - whether in R-R-R or other contexts - users are 
unlikely to prioritise services they have never received from the state (e.g. low stress on desire 
for state primary health services in Somalia in 1985 and subsequently).
88. For a brief - and more positive than most - survey of post war Uganda see E.A. Brett 
'Responding to Poverty in Uganda: structures, processes and prospects' in Journal of 
International Affairs, op. cit.
89. Mozambican provinces have very substantial de facto  powers at Executive (Governor) and 
Official (Provincial Commissioner) levels including (within tight overall and looser sectoral 
ceilings/floors) Recurrent Budget. By distracting central attention and disrupting 
communications war substantially increased autonomy. For example the de facto  province 
of Maputo Cidade was much more closely overseen and much less autonomous precisely 
because ministries had easy access and tended to teleguide even areas (e.g. primary education 
and health) in which substantial (if fuzzy) powers had been delegated to provinces and were 
exercised by those less close to Ministerial headquarters.
90. This problem is not unique to rehabilitation. In Mozambique many projects - e.g. provincial 
hospitals, agricultural infrastructure schemes - were negotiated by the central government with 
associated 3 to 5 year grants toward early year recurrent costs. The central government 
ministries administrated during the 3 to 5 year period intending to hand over to provincial 
governments thereafter. As the latter had - up to that point - not been integrally involved in the 
projects and received no sudden income boost to meet the recurrent cost burden, the process, 
predictably, has worked very badly.
91. These can be very innovative and small user friendly. Overall this may be particularly true of 
UK operations (and least o f EU) albeit variation is high within donor programmes because the
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attitudes o f the head of the mission in a country and of his/her small projects 
assessment/disbursement officer are crucial.
92. In two of these cases the convictions of the INGOs (neo-Christian theocratic in one case and 
syndico-anachist in the other) are central to the problems of cooperation and coordination.
Each is humanly concerned and usually highly professionally competent/motivated but normal 
relationships with governments or domestic social actors are inherently virtually unattainable.
93. The gaps need case by case scrutiny. Middle level management, secretarial and book 
keeping/accounting weaknesses are often at least as great as (or greater than) those of 
professionals or top managers. That applies to local governments - and sometimes central 
governments - as well as to domestic social actors.
94. In Rwanda it has proven impossible in some areas to maintain or restore non ethnic villages in 
the aftermath of genocide even though of 800,000 dead up to 300,000 were 'moderate' wa Hutu. 
Many pre war mixed villages have been recreated as neighbouring wa Hutu and wa Tutsi 
villages and at least several urban neighbourhoods have become homogenous. The motive is 
fear - exacerbated by continued IH attacks which use resident supporters and informants.
95. Somaliland would prosecute senior military and security police personnel guilty of crimes 
against humanity in Somaliland as well as some associated political figures, but none has been 
Somaliland.
96. This seems to have been facilitated by Renamo's practices of kidnapping many o f its 
combatants (making them perceived as victims as well as perpetrators) and rarely deploying 
them against their own villages or immediate areas (making returnees relatively innocent of 
attacks against the community to which they sought reentry).
97. Community (almost always intra ethnic group), as well as religious, procedures often involve 
public 'accounting' of/for past actions even if compelled to do them. Expatriate professionals 
have queried these - especially for girls/young women kidnapped as porters/prostitutes. 
However, it is unclear that the returnees have similar objections if the ordeal leads to full 'return 
home' to their locality and religious congregation communities. Nor in the absence o f an 
alternative acceptable to civil society is criticism necessarily in returnee interests.
98. An irregular declension problem arises: liberation forces 'mobilise'; governments 
recruit/conscript; insurgents 'kidnap'. The boundaries are often in the eye of the observer and 
the judgement of history on the movement. In Mozambique, however, 'kidnap' is widely (and 
accurately) used in respect to Renamo's methods which are seen as distinctly unlike the 
government's even by persons not particularly supportive of Frelimo.
99. Rwanda, Uganda (Acholiland), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somaliland, Somalia, Sri Lanka.
100. This section draws on discussions at two 1999 COPE related conferences in Sri Lanka as well 
as on the Bradford studies in COPE working papers.
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101. This section draws heavily on the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative/Accord 
Reconstruction and Peace Agenda Workshop at Gulu in 1999 and during 1997 and 1998 UNDP 
and ACDESS missions on related topics.
102. In late 2000 an Ebola Fever outbreak (probably transmitted by escapees from or cadres o f the 
LRA in the Sudan or Uganda soldiers returning from the Northeast Congo) further isolated 
Acholiland and disrupted R-R-R processes.
103. Based on 1995 UNICEF/UNDP Mission led by Professor Adedeji and discussions with 
Rwanda participants at 1997 UNDP/ACDESS Bamako Workshop on conflict as well as at 
meetings in UK and COPE Working Papers on Rwanda.
104. Those wa Hutu supporting peaceful resolution of ethnic conflict political power sharing with 
wa Tutsi and return o f wa Tutsi refugees/emigres.
105. The pre-colonial history of the Interlake Kingdoms - Burundi, Rwanda, Kivu, Ankole, Kagera 
sometimes united under a Rwanda based Great Mwame - is highly contested territory. The 
presentation here is relatively 'middle of the road1.
106. The parliament represents all parties to the pre - 1994 parliament more or less in relation to 
their then members except for the late President Habyarimana's majority wa Hutu chauvinist 
party. In addition there is a minority of RPF appointees. In fact almost all members are 
appointees o f their parties, because the elected MPs fell victim to the 1994 genocide. The 
Parliament has increasingly raised issues, challenged legislation and, on some occasions, 
caused it to be significantly revised.
107. Economically the impact of pauperising over 100,000 households and of taking up to 150,000 
able bodied persons (by no means all are men) out of production are significant at agricultural 
production and food security at macro, as well as micro household, levels.
108. The Eastern Congo, especially along the relevant borders, is marked by very dense tropical 
forests with thick ground level as well as canopy vegetation. The problems of'clearing' it of IH 
are in many respects physically analogous to those which faced USA forces in parts of 
Vietnam.
109. Uganda's vital interests in the Congo are blocking IH raids and infiltration by rebel or terrorist 
groups from the Congo. Rwanda's are the same (but more crucial) in respect to IH but also 
include the survival o f the Banyamulenge and, at least up to 1997-8, were defined to include the 
exercise o f substantial influence in the overall governance of the Congo as a whole as part of a 
Eritrea - Ethiopia - Uganda - Rwanda - Burundi ideologically and supposedly ethnically allied 
arc of power.
110. The evidence that by the 1700's there were wa Hutu sub-kings and court members and that 
individuals could leave their own birth group and be adopted into the other, as well as that
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intermarriage was not rare (less so than from 1920 through 2000) is convincing. But it suggests 
a post conquest state such as Norman England in - say - 1300 which also had Saxon and Celtic 
secondary leaders and courtiers, overlap in levels of freedom (or serfdom) and livelihood and 
significant intermarriage not a fully integrated nation state more or less at ease with itself.
111. This section draws on discussion during and reports from UNICEF missions in 1985, 1993 
and 1995 as well as interviews with John Drysdale who as British Colonial and Diplomatic 
Officer, UN Advisor and Advisor to various Somali and Somaliland governments has served in 
Somalia/Somaliland for over half a century, Ismail Ahmed and ACCORD resident Somali 
personnel.
112. This is especially true in the lower Juba valley, the inter river area (at least prior to the 1999- 
GO Rahanweyn drive toward the sea) and Mogadishu. The Djibouti Conference named 
President’s ‘Army’ seems to be a congeries drawn from several militias and paid by unbacked, 
printing press' currency emissions which are highly politically and militarily polluting but likely 
to be ephemeral as the currency can hardly retain credibility since the expected hundreds of 
millions of UN, EU and Arab state dollars expected are simply not materialising.
113. The Rahanweyn authorities would verbally support basic service professional committees 
backed by INGO, UNICEF, other agency funding and personnel but to date both decision 
taking and resources have been focused on restoring security and reversing 1991-95 territorial 
losses.
114. Draws on 1995 UNICEF mission and 1998 Conference as well as interviews on those 
occasions.
115. The OAU position is ironic. The 'colonial boundaries at independence' clause in its 1964 
Charter was in large part directed against the irredentism of the then United Republic of 
Somalia and its five star flag (Somalia , Somaliland, Djibouti, what is now Ethiopia's Somali 
Region, Kenya's then Northwest Frontier District). While it did not seek to roll back the 
conquest of Somaliland, the OAU saw it (as well as infiltration of guerillas into Kenya) as 
evidence of dangerous, militarist Pan Somali Adventurism. In 1997 President Nyerere 
confirmed this view of the 1964 OAU Charter and the Heads of State's perceptions.
116. Opening Address to 1998 National Reconstruction Conference, Hargeisa.
117. Many of the 12,500 are sometimes termed 'ghosts'. However this is not because they do not 
exist. Those with families in Hargeisa are allowed to live at home reporting on rations parade 
weekly and pay parade monthly.
118. Men - sic. Women are still virtually excluded from public political posts. One or two have 
served as junior ministers and one or two on the appointed advisory council to the Mayor of 
Hargeisa. While women can be elected to the House of Assembly (but not the House of Elders) 
none were. Similarly the female public service role is very limited in numbers and formal 
positions. Especially since 1991 women's economic roles have broadened (even in respect to
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owning a few large enterprises) as have their professional positions. Women's groups are now 
active in urban areas and do receive a hearing - a development partly catalyzed by experience in 
the UK/USA diaspora and on the large delegations UNDP sent to several Women's Decade 
international conferences.
119. This section draws on a 1995 UNICEF/UNDP Missions headed by Professor Bayo Adedeji on 
which the author served and on the ECA/RRR 10th Anniversary Conference on the 1974-75 
drought and famine.
120. Humanitarian alleviation of dearth/reduction of famine death toll in 1970's Ethiopia was 
highly politicised. Mengistu wished to use it to strengthen his fiscal position and to limit 
'diversion' of resources from military to drought relief purposes. Certain donors - notably the 
USA - wanted to use food relief channeled via their INGOs from port to consumer to save lives 
but also to discredit the Mengistu regime and its Soviet and Cuban allies.
121. Ethiopia has not sought to exclude or extrude INGO's but to coordinate their activities within 
state set parameters and to phase down their activities relative to domestic public and - to a 
limited degree - civil society actors.
122. The southern (Ogadeni) half of Ethiopia's Somali Region also posed special problems. The 
most direct highway - Berbera to Hargeisa to border near Burao to Djijiga and the Ethiopian 
Ogaden - was in very poor condition and (because of non-recognition of Somaliland) repairs 
were not internationally supported until well into the drought. The Ethiopian Ogandeni are in 
part secessionist and in large part dissatisfied with their place in the regional as well as the 
national government.
123. Ethiopia has taken a semi agnostic position on the Djibouti Conference and the 'President' it 
has thrown up. As its friends in the Eastern Horn - Somaliland, Puntland and the Rahanweyn 
are all deeply antagonistic to him and his project for recreation of a unitary centralised state 
based in Mogadiscu while the UN, OAU and Arab League wish the Djibouti process well 
(albeit in floods o f words and trickles of material support) that is perhaps to be expected.
124. The British action was almost certainly purely for logistical/administrative convenience. Such 
administering of border areas of one territory by another was not uncommon among adjacent 
British colonies, but was regularly sorted out before independence sometimes by reversion but 
on occasion by transfer.
125.This section draws on discussion with Lionel Cliffe and with Eritrean participants in IDS 
(Sussex) course and in the concluding COPE workshop in 2000.
126. The over 50% share of'settler' holdings in good quality land is not sustainable politically nor 
economically, especially given that about one third is typically farmed intensively, one third far 
from fully and one third held as a 'land bank' (usually with some of each on each farm). Either 
rapid entry on to all abandoned farms in 1975, or a tax on rated (not actual) output offsettable 
against income tax but making desultory or 'land bank' use ruinously expensive proposed in the
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mid 1980's, could have been used to start a process of transition including in it the 400,000 odd 
large farm worker households (who are predominately Zimbabwean not foreign as sometimes 
politically asserted) who are the most landless of all rural Zimbabwean households, the key to 
continued higher productivity and the most overlooked (or rather deliberately disregarded) in 
1999 - 2000 rhetoric and practice.
127. Drought reduces agro industrial output directly and consumer goods output by destruction of 
rural entitlements (demand out of crop sales). In 1992 Zimbabwean manufacturing sector 
output was, for these reasons, estimated at 25% below what it would have been without 
drought.
128. Based on internal discussions in the Planning Commission and with UNICEF in 1991-93 
when the author was a part time Mozambican public servant advising on poverty reduction and 
on planning for post war rehabilitation.
129. That was certainly the case in Mozambique where the degree of war weariness and the very 
real willingness of most supporters of both sides to seek to live together again was distinctly 
underestimated. Even organised banditry by ex soldiers proved to be relatively limited in 
quantity and in territorial spread.
130. Monsignor the Chief Chaplain to former government's Rwanda Army and to Interahamwe in 
1994 TV interview in Goma, then Zaire.
131. For example the 2000 Mozambique floods require substantial basic service and local 
infrastructure funding by local (municipal) and central government to claw back 1992-1999 
Rehabilitation now set back as well as emergency medical/logistical and 2000-2001 food 
security support. These orders of magnitude exclude household contributions out of own 
labour, sales and remittances and domestic social sector mobilized resources other than central 
government and related external flows. These might raise 5-6 year basic rehabilitation costs per 
household of five to $l,500-$2,500 with an annual household increased earned income payoff 
of $500-$ 1,000 and a public services annual flow o f -  say - $50-$ 100 per household. It is 
worth noting that these relatively fast payoff benefit/cost ratios are attractive in purely 
economic terms (particularly if a plausible multiplier effect on sellers to and buyers from 
rehabilitating households/localities is factored in).
132. The reasons vary. In some cases pure venality, in other willful disempowerment of 
disfavoured groups, in others provision of ‘services7,opportunities, to key support groups and 
in one or two all three are important to making a commitment by the late regime to preemptive 
rehabilitation a thoroughly surreal concept.
133. In such cases violence and human rights abuse tend to grow even if -  as in both cases and 
especially Sierra Leone -  venality and lack of state capacity were initially much more 
characteristic than systematic oppression and brutality.
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134. For example the Algerian President at the time the Islamicist tensions exploded during and 
after the aborted election was relatively new in office, was not an old line politician, and had a 
cabinet many of whose members shared these characteristics. However his army background 
led the Islamic groups to distrust him while his attempts to negotiate with them on economic, 
social and political issues led to his prompt ouster by harder line, more senior army personages.
135. For example, Tanzania’s Kagera Region (and especially Ngara District) was subjected to 
severe economic infrastructure damage from overuse and environmental costs as well as those 
of enhanced security. In Ngara the net costs (non-intuitively heavily in women’s and girls’ 
time because refugee demands forced more time use to retrieve water and fuel over greater 
distances) over 1994-96 were up to $150 per capita, over average rural Ngara annual per capita 
income, (see R.H. Green (1994) 'That they may be whole again: offsetting refugee influx 
burdens on Ngara and Karagwe districts', A Report for UNICEF, Ngara and Dar es Salaam, 
September.
136. The Southwestern (Yoruba) separatist tensions, which have indeed led to violent civil disorder 
are less pre-emptable by rehabilitation. They relate to the past reality of political repression and 
dispossession and a fear that the present is only marginally better (despite a Yoruba president) 
and the future potentially even worse.
137. The degree o f Shell/Military Regime (or indeed present civilian government) cooperation/ 
collaboration/collusion is somewhat obscure but -  in terms of tensions -  largely irrelevant. At 
the least Shell wanted a quiet life for exploration and production with few environmental 
damage restrictions and turned a blind (or perhaps 20/800) eye to how the state sought to 
deliver them. That this was economically both myopic and tunnel vision (e.g. Shell has been 
forced to abandon its Ogoni operations of over 200 wells) is also irrelevant in respect to 
tensions -  if  not to its change in attitudes and perceptions (whether principled or pragmatic or a 
mix o f both).
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AUTHOR NOTE
Reg Green has been a student of the applied political economy of Africa for over forty years 
observing researching, teaching, advising and acting as a civil servant in forty eight countries. He 
has been a faculty member at the Universities of Ghana, Congo (then Zaire), East Africa (Institute 
of Social and Economic Research), Dar es Salaam, Yale and the Institute of Development Studies, 
Sussex from which he has just retired after twenty six years. He has advised the governments of 
Ghana, Uganda, Botswana, Swaziland, Tanzania, Mozambique and Somaliland as well as SWAPO 
of Namibia, the East African Community, the Southern African Development Community, the 
Economic Commission for Africa, UNICEF, the ILO and UNDP. He has worked with/advised the 
World Council o f Churches, the British Council of Churches, the Catholic Institute for 
International Affairs, the (Philippine) Freedom From Debt Coalition, the International Centre for 
Law in Development, the African Development Bank and the African Centre for Development, 
Economic and Security Studies. His work on rehabilitation grew from the mid 1980's out of 
poverty, wartime survival, economic community calamity response (drought) and national 
economic strategy work for UNICEF, Mozambique, Tanzania, ACDESS, SADC, ADB, ECA in a 
dozen African countries.
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METHODOLOGICAL AND SOURCE NOTES
Means And Methods
While this paper flows directly from the 1997-2000 COPE project, it has a broader and longer 
background affecting/informing its methodology and sources and its applied focus. The earliest 
components flow from 1960's experience and observation in Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania while 
working on quite different themes and from a 1979 Commonwealth Secretariat Mission to Uganda 
as part of the failed effort at governance reconstruction and macro economic capacity rebuilding 
undertaken in the immediate post Amin era.
However of the three main streams into it, the first relates to a series of Southern African 
consultancies and operational assignments in and for Mozambique and SADC (then SADCC) 
covering both war time catastrophe and post war drought catastrophe survival support and 
rehabilitation analyses, strategic frames, policies and programme development. Via UNICEF 
consultancies in respect to the impact of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi on Tanzania and on 
Somalia/Somaliland (the first from 1987 as well as 1993 and 1994 and the second in 1995) the 
conflict oriented work extended to the Great Lakes and the Horn.
The second main input was two missions led by Professor Adedeji of ACDESS - the first on a semi 
related topic and the second ACDESS' ongoing 'Crisis Comprehension and Mastery' project in 
1995 and 1997 followed by an ACDESS/UNDP conflict workshop in Mali in 1998. These covered 
Southern Africa (Mozambique and Angola), Central Africa (Rwanda and Burundi), the Horn 
(Ethiopia, Somaliland, Somalia) and West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali).
The third was COPE proper with two project workshops and participation in national workshops in 
Uganda, Somaliland and Sri Lanka as well as related panels and presentations in the UK and at the 
World Council o f Churches in Geneva.
Much of the material on which this paper is based is published in UNICEF, ACDESS, COPE and 
Mozambique work cited below.
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Other portions came from discussions at workshops and in the field ranging from a President, a 
Prime Minister, an Archbishop, Bishops, Ministers through government officials, elected local 
government leaders, domestic social actors, INGO staff to ordinary camp residents and returnees. 
Other contributions come from students from countries surveyed participating in IDS (Sussex) 
seminars and courses. Much of this material is - by its nature - not published nor directly citable. 
Also not citable directly are several memos on 'what is to be done' prepared for governments and 
institutions in four countries.
Special thanks for insights and discussions and for comments and criticisms are due to Ismail 
Ahmed and Robin Luckham of IDS. Lionel Cliffe and Philip White of Leeds, Adebayo Adedeji of 
ACDESS and Joana Macrae of the London School of Tropical Hygiene and Medicine.
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